Logo
Benutzer: Gast  Login

Autorinnen/Autoren:
Krenn, Stephan; Samelin, Kai; Slamanig, Daniel
Dokumenttyp:
Sonstiges / Other Publication
Titel:
Foundations of Dynamic Group Signatures: The Case of Malicious Openers and Issuers
Jahr:
2025
Sprache:
Englisch
Abstract:
Group signatures enable users to sign on behalf of a group while preserving anonymity, with accountability provided by a designated opener. The first rigorous model for dynamic groups (Bellare, Shi, Zhang, CT--RSA '05) captured anonymity, non-frameability, and traceability, later extended with trace-soundness (Sakai et al., PKC '12) and non-claimability (introduced as ``opening-soundness'' by Bootle et al., ACNS '16 & JoC '20). In practice, issuer and opener are often distinct entities, often implemented by different organizations and/or hardware modules. We therefore formalize and prove the consequences of a model that enforces their complete separation, allows key reuse across groups, treats issuer and opener as stateless, and makes both joining and opening non-interactive. This separation makes it necessary to reformulate traceability against a corrupt issuer and to introduce three additional unforgeability notions-key-unforgeability, certificate-unforgeability, and opening-unforgeability-for the case of a corrupt opener. Following this line of reasoning, we also develop strengthened formulations of trace-soundness and non-claimability. We prove that in this model the eight resulting properties are fully distinct: even the conjunction of any seven does not imply the eighth. This yields the first comprehensive map of group signature security in a stateless, reusable-key, and non-interactive framework, and formally demonstrates the impact of complete issuer--opener separation.
Article-ID:
2025/1752
URL zum Inhalt:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1752
Fakultät:
Fakultät für Informatik
Institut:
INF 1 - Institut für Theoretische Informatik, Mathematik und Operations Research
Professorin/Professor:
Slamanig, Daniel
Forschungszentrum:
CODE
Open Access:
Ja / Yes
Open-Access-Lizenz:
CC BY 4.0
URL zur Lizenz:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Sonstige Angaben:
Preprint auf IACR Cryptology ePrint Archiv
 BibTeX