This chapter delves into the foundation and development of stochastic games, initially introduced by Shapley in 1953. It covers two-person zero-sum games, n-person games with discounted and average payoffs, and the existence of Nash equilibria. The text explores algorithmic approaches for determining optimal strategies and discusses the challenges in finding equilibria in non-cooperative games. Additionally, it introduces positional games on networks, highlighting the existence of pure Nash equilibria in certain classes of games. The chapter also presents conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in average and discounted stochastic games, making it a valuable resource for researchers and professionals in game theory and related fields.      «

This chapter delves into the foundation and development of stochastic games, initially introduced by Shapley in 1953. It covers two-person zero-sum games, n-person games with discounted and average payoffs, and the existence of Nash equilibria. The text explores algorithmic approaches for determining optimal strategies and discusses the challenges in finding equilibria in non-cooperative games. Additionally, it introduces positional games on networks, highlighting the existence of pure Nash equi...     »