The present study describes and explains the Colombian army’s reform that unfolded during the Santos administration (2010-18). While the government categorically excluded any changes to the security forces during the peace talks with the guerrilla (2012-16), as a final ceasefire accord became plausible, the land force issued a structural, doctrine and education reform. The army command designed these changes parallel to the ongoing confrontation and outside of the peace negotiations. To understand how and why the ground force designed and implemented these changes, the case study conducts a theory-guided process tracing to analyse multiple intervening factors in three analytical dimensions: the security and political environment, the interplay between civilian and military agents, and the organisational networks, pressures and expectations shaping the outcome of the reforms. Evidence confirms the hypothesis leading this empirical study in showing that an increasingly uncertain institutional and operational context prompted the land force’s leaders to advance changes that mitigated or prevented adverse, external reforms. On this backdrop, the civil-military interplay aimed to favour the army’s interests. Ultimately, the EJC responded to rising pressures and expectations by emulating organisations that confer material and ideational resources.     «

The present study describes and explains the Colombian army’s reform that unfolded during the Santos administration (2010-18). While the government categorically excluded any changes to the security forces during the peace talks with the guerrilla (2012-16), as a final ceasefire accord became plausible, the land force issued a structural, doctrine and education reform. The army command designed these changes parallel to the ongoing confrontation and outside of the peace negotiations. To understa...     »