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Observing Power as Governmentality in Palestine: De-Constructing the Dynamics of World-Societal Order

Verfasser:

Jan Busse

Promotionsausschuss:

Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Franz Kohut

1. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Stephan Stetter

2. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Dietrich Jung

3. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Carlo Masala

4. Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Marc Frey

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Abbreviations

AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
AHLC	Ad-hoc Liaison Committee
ARIJ	Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
DORA	Department of Refugee Affairs
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
ICBS	Israel Central Bureau of Statistics
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICHR	Independent Commission for Human Rights
IGO	International governmental organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International non-governmental organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
ISA	International Studies Association
ISM	International Solidarity Movement
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MTDP	Medium Term Development Plan
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA	Palestinian Authority

PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCBSNR	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Natural Resources
PHDR	Palestine Human Development Report
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNC	Palestinian National Council
PNGO	Palestinian NGO Network
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP/PAPP	UNDP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People
UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's (Emergency) Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNV	United Nations Volunteer Programme
UN HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
WFP	World Food Programme
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators
WHO	World Health Organization

1 Introduction

Purpose and Relevance of the Book

While Palestine – recognized as a state by more than 130 other states[1] – lacks certain important features of sovereign statehood, the situation on the ground is far from chaos and disorder. But how should we make sense of this observation? In order to lead to the book's topic and its underlying research question, I will briefly present three different empirical instances. While these might appear somewhat unrelated at a first glance, it will become evident that the suggested theoretical perspective points to their interconnectedness.

13 September 1993 was a milestone in the relations between Israelis and Palestinians. At the center of global public attention and under the auspices of US-president Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the so-called Declaration of Principles (or Oslo-I-Accord), signaling the beginning of the Oslo peace process and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA).[2] Less than two weeks before this historic event, the establishment of a Palestinian organization – the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) – sparked little public interest. This is not surprising as the foundation of a statistics office appears to be a very unspectacular event with little political implications. Ever since 1993, the PCBS has become the hub of Palestinian statistical data collection and dissemination and its work was not even disrupted by the escalation of the Second Intifada. While various institutions of the PA have been accused of corruption, the PCBS adheres to the highest statistical standards that internationally exist (Palestinian National Authority 2012a), a fact that is also acknowledged by its counterpart the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) (Ilan 2005).

[1] At the end of 2015, Palestine was bilaterally recognized as a state by 137 states (http://palestineun.org/about-palestine/diplomatic-relations/).

[2] In reaction to the recognition as a non-member observer state by the United Nations General Assembly in November 2012, in January 2013, PA president Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree to henceforth use the term 'State of Palestine' on all official documents as well as in diplomatic relations (CNN 2013). Also note that before this change, Palestinian *National* Authority was used as the Palestinian self-description. In spite of this, however, due to the fact that the term 'Palestinian Authority' remains prevalent in academic and political discourses, I have decided to adhere to it in this book when referring to the formal governmental and administrative apparatus headed by President Abbas.

It was in particular during the presidency of Yasser Arafat (1994- 2004) that the PA was constantly accused of corruption. At the same time, the ongoing Israeli occupation has considerably affected nearly every aspect of Palestinian life, and the Oslo Accords clearly limit the PA's power to Areas A and B of the West Bank. One might assume that in this situation Palestinians might resort to a victim mentality and blame the occupation and the international community for its misery. Instead of this, however, since the end of the 2000s the PA has initiated a comprehensive and ambitious reform agenda in order to improve the good governance capacities of its institutions. These institutional reforms are closely connected to the then Prime Minister Salam Fayyad (2007-2013) who was instrumental in the development of the PA institution-building and state-building program. Besides detailed socio-economic development plans, such as the so-called Fayyad-Plan (Palestinian National Authority 2009), the PA has also subscribed to the adherence of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG Steering Committee 2005). The PA's progress in adhering to a good governance agenda has also been recognized by international organizations such as the World Bank (2011a).

Ramallah is primarily known as the seat of the PA and its administrative institutions and as a cultural and economic center of the West Bank. Since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Ramallah has witnessed a private sector driven building boom. As a result, between 2002 and 2010 the city's built-up areas increased by 500 percent, thereby considerably changing its urban fabric (Assadi 2010). Despite this unprecedented rise in construction, in March 2010 a rather unusual building project started in the West Bank, about 9 kilometers north of Ramallah. Rawabi, built from scratch, is not only the first planned Palestinian city, designed to accommodate about 40,000 residents. It is also the first establishment of a new Palestinian city after 1,000 years. According to its developer, Palestinian businessman Bashar Masri, its construction is the biggest real estate project in Palestinian history (Schwartz 2016). Not only business entrepreneurs are shaping the Palestinian space. While Palestinian refugees are often portrayed as passive aid recipients who are not capable of determining their own fate and future, they are in fact actively involved in the everyday production of refugee camp spaces (Abourahme/Hilal 2009). This takes place

in the context of various initiatives, such as rooftop gardening or the establishment of a campus in Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem.

At a first glance, the examples of the Palestinian statistics office, institutional reform of the PA, and spatial practices of Palestinian entrepreneurs and refugees seem both unrelated and of rather little political relevance, compared, for example to the Israeli occupation and Palestinian resistance towards it. As this book will show, however, the opposite is the case. In order to govern the Palestinian population, the PA fundamentally depends on the statistical knowledge that the PCBS provides. In other words, modern statistics is instrumental for the political order of Palestine. Moreover, not only the PA but also Hamas, to a considerable extent, base their political agendas on the good governance paradigm, thereby contributing to the political order of Palestine. Their adherence to good governance is closely monitored by both international and Palestinian organizations. Finally, by shaping the Palestinian space through everyday practices, both business entrepreneurs and refugees make a significant contribution to the political order of Palestine. It is the objective of this book to make visible the commonalities of these different instances by focusing on the underlying power relations.

Accordingly, in all these cases, subtle and intricate power dynamics are at play that contribute to political and societal order in Palestine. Equally important, these examples illustrate that Palestinians are also not entirely subjugated to the Israeli occupation. Nor is resistance their only form of agency. Rather, there are various patterns of Palestinian agency that significantly contribute to political and societal order in Palestine. At the same time, it will also become evident that these power dynamics are not unique to the context of Palestine and cannot be regarded in an isolated manner. Rather, in order to make sense of them, it is necessary to see them embedded in a broader global perspective.

For that purpose, this book offers a theoretical perspective on power dynamics in Palestine that stresses the procedural and relational aspects of power and combines it with profound empirical examinations. The chosen research perspective takes a comprehensive view on how order is constituted in Palestine by contextualizing it within a world-societal framework. The book will point out that the underlying power dynamics cannot be properly comprehended by

existing approaches. As will become evident, power is understood here in a Foucauldian sense and therefore not primarily seen as being located within institutions. Rather power is seen as dispersed power that is pervasive in potentially every social relation. As a result, this book aims at making visible specific instances of this kind of relational power. In other words, the book's relevance especially stems from the fact that many existing analyses of Palestinian politics cannot properly make sense of the complex dynamics of political ordering that are at play in Palestine, on the one hand due to a rather inadequate conceptualization of power and due to the negligence of the importance of the overarching global context on the other.

On this basis, the main research question that guides the line of argument of this book is: *How does political and societal order come into existence and how is power exercised in Palestine?* In order to provide an appropriate answer to this question this book introduces a research perspective that is located at the intersection of Middle East/Palestine Studies and the broad field of International Political Sociology in International Relations. From this perspective, the book relies on poststructuralist governmentality theory and combines it with elements from world society theorization of the Stanford School's sociological neo-institutionalism. Accordingly, the book argues that conceptualizing governmentality as a theory of modern societal and political order(ing) and structurally embedding it in a world societal horizon is most suitable in order to comprehend the complexity and intricacies of power dynamics in Palestine. In this regard, I will also show that Palestine is an interesting object of study as it allows for analyzing dynamics of modern governmentality beyond the world of advanced liberal Western democracies, in which most existing studies tend exclusively to locate governmentality. In addition, Palestine is a good example for highlighting the embeddedness of political orders in an overarching world societal context. As a result, the book will point out that political order in Palestine needs to be understood as world-societal order. Based on the combination of governmentality and world society theory, I will identify biopolitics, surveillance, and technologies of the self as key categories in order to analyze the empirical manifestation of power dynamics in Palestine.

It will become clear that a governmentality perspective helps overcoming the analytical preoccupation with state (-like) structures and institutions. Instead, I

will highlight the importance of subtler power dynamics that are, for instance, related to the importance of statistical knowledge for governing the Palestinian population, the responsibilizing and legitimizing effects of the global good governance discourse on Palestine, and the contribution of the individual to Palestinian political order by means of self-technological quotidian practices. These theory-guided examinations give evidence to the fact that political order in Palestine encompasses multiple facets that on the one hand cannot be deciphered by traditional approaches and that on the other hand need to be assessed in the context of world society.

In this way, the book aims at making a contribution not only to Middle East/Palestine Studies but also to those theoretical debates in IR which address questions of governance, order and power. Consequently, and responding to the area studies controversy (Tessler et al. 1999), the chosen research perspective displays awareness to the insight that both IR and Middle East Studies possess certain limitations. IR theories, in this sense, are often based on a universalism that risks not properly taking into account existing cultural variations of the Middle East. Middle East Studies, in turn, tend to be preoccupied with a particularist perspective that claims that the region is unique and not comparable to other regions in world society (Teti 2007; Valbjørn 2004). Instead, there is good reason to argue that the "Middle East is not an exception from the global condition, but an inseparable part of its developments" (Jung 2009: 10). Hence, by bringing together important elements of IR and Middle East/Palestine Studies, and following the tradition of Fred Halliday, as one of the most distinguished experts in both research fields, this book tries to find a way to address both the 'analytic universalism' and the 'historic particularism' of the Middle East and concomitantly also of Palestine (1996: 11–16).

As already indicated, in the context of Palestine it is evident that both IR and Palestine studies suffer from certain limitations. Research is often dominated by methodological nationalism (see Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2002). The state tends to be seen as the ultimate point of reference and the central unit of analysis and thereby is treated as ontologically pre-existent. This preoccupation with statehood prevents existing approaches from appropriately taking into account power dynamics beyond the state. In the discipline of IR, liberal institutionalist governance theory displays a sensitivity for governance beyond the state. At the

same time, however, most governance approaches tend to neglect the fundamental importance of power. Regarding Palestine this means that many studies address questions of institution-building of the Palestinian Authority (PA) without giving consideration to underlying power dynamics. Besides such an indifference towards power, in particular realist IR theories display a certain preoccupation with power that at the same time fails to properly conceptualize it. In contrast to these two perspectives, by considering governmentality as a theory of power, the chosen research perspective will provide a conceptualization of power that displays sensitivity to intricate power relations beyond the state. Equally important, the comprehensive understanding of power in the sense of governmentality combined with the overarching horizon of world society makes it possible to go beyond the state also when it comes to the question what contributes to political order in international relations. As a result, in order to stress the pervasiveness of power relations in society, I argue that it is justified to use the term *world-societal order* instead of *world order*.

Furthermore, Palestine studies often emphasize the uniqueness of Palestine and thereby analytically isolate Palestine from the rest of the (social) world. By contrast, the book will emphasize that one can only make sense of the power dynamics in Palestine when contextualizing them within an analytical framework of world society. Therefore, embedding Palestine into the overarching context of world society means rejecting a perspective that treats Palestine as not comparable to other research contexts. In this regard, the Palestinian sociologist Salim Tamari criticizes the 'problem of Palestinian exceptionalism' that he identifies primarily in the community of Palestinians doing research on Palestine (1994: 70–73). Hence, in contrast to ascribing an exceptionalist status to Palestine, I argue that the power dynamics that are observable in Palestine are a not a feature unique to this setting but rather the result of globally diffused patterns of political ordering. In this regard, it is also important to emphasize that Palestine studies often portray Palestinians either as passive victims of the occupation, as terrorists, or as heroic fighters against oppression and aggression. Therefore, the focus either lies on the predominance of the occupation and its implications or on different kinds of counter-conduct ranging from popular resistance and *sumud* to suicide attacks. This book argues that such perspectives either deny Palestinians the potential for genuine agency as in the case of

victimization, or their potential for agency is reduced to acts of resistance/terrorism against the Israeli occupation. By contrast, I will point out that there are other forms of Palestinian agency that go beyond these reductionist portrayals of Palestinians and significantly contribute to the political order of Palestine.

Governmentality: The Dynamics of World-societal Order in Palestine

The book attempts to make a contribution to Palestine studies and IR by employing a particular research perspective that rests on some important theoretical and conceptual innovations of governmentality theory. In this regard, the book will considerably go beyond existing studies of governmentality. I will argue that governmentality represents a pattern of modern political order that has globally diffused in world society. This definition has some important implications.

First, I argue that as power relations do not occur in a vacuum, post-structuralist governmentality theory must be understood in relation to the structural context of world society. Thereby, it will become evident that governmentality is not limited to national societies or the international level. Rather, governmentality and concomitant power relations need to be seen as being internal to world society as the overarching structural horizon of social reality. One the one hand, due to its emphasis on global diffusion, such a research perspective avoids reifying the Eurocentrism that is inherent in many governmentality studies. On the other hand, contextualizing governmentality with world society allows to overcome over-simplistic dichotomies such as global/local because all power dynamics are observed as occurring within world society.

Second, the chosen research perspective rejects limiting the scope of governmentality only to advanced liberal democracies. Instead, I argue that governmentality is a globally pervasive feature of modern political ordering. This is the case because even though it is clear that governmentality shares many elements with (neo-) liberalism, this is not its defining feature. Instead, I suggest that governmentality should be regarded as a distinctively *modern* way of governing. One important characteristic of modernity is the replacement of determinism with contingency. Governmentality as, in Foucauldian terms 'the

conduct of conduct' acknowledges the importance of contingency regarding the exercise of power. At the same time, using the label *modern* means rejecting a limitation of governmentality to (neo-) liberal political contexts. Whereas most governmentality studies are preoccupied with (neo-) liberalism, I argue that such a label obscures the fact that modern political rationalities and technologies also exist in political configurations that do not qualify as purely liberal, such as, for example, Palestine. Governmentality, in this regard, is *modern* in the sense that it is perceived as a legitimate pattern of governance that relies on a specifically modern social construction of reality that possesses potential global reach. Acknowledging this potential globality of governmentality also helps with overcoming the Eurocentrism that is inherent in governmentality studies that locate the origin and applicability of governmentality to 'advanced liberal democratic capitalist societies' (Rose 1991: 673). Therefore, instead of using the label *(neo-) liberal* I suggest speaking of *modern* governmentality.

Third, governmentality is "unthinkable without the freedom of the individual" (Busse 2015b: 172). In this sense, governmentality does not mean the direct control of behavior whose outcome is predetermined. Rather, governmentality is about governing world-societal contingency (see Bevir 2010: 427; Dillon 2007b: 44). In this context, I will argue that modern governmentality relies on a specific conception of subjectivity. In this sense, it will become clear that modern subjectivity is based on the autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization of the self.

On this basis, the book will introduce biopolitics, surveillance, and technologies of the self as three core dimensions of modern governmentality with the help of which it is possible to make sense of the specific power dynamics that contribute to political order in Palestine. First, in brief, biopolitics relates to the management of the features of the population such as birth, death or health. I will return in detail to this dimension when examining the biopolitics of statistics in Palestine in chapter four. Surveillance, as a second dimension of modern governmentality, refers to power techniques that go beyond security-related issues. Rather, especially by means of standardization and rationalization, surveillance contributes to world societal order. How surveillance contributes to political order in Palestine will be the subject of chapter five in relation to good governance. Finally, modern governmentality considerably relies on the active

and voluntary involvement of individuals in dynamics of societal order. Hence, technologies of the self represent a third dimension of modern governmentality and will be examined in the context of Palestine in chapter six.

Scope of Research

This book focuses on world-societal power dynamics in Palestine. It is important to point out that for pragmatic reasons, I use the term Palestine for the occupied territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. At the same time, however, as will be clarified in the second chapter, a communicative understanding of Palestine allows for going beyond territorial localizations. In this sense, borrowing from Stetter, I argue that Palestine "is constructed wherever it is communicated" (2008b: 27). Regarding the temporal scope, the book primarily focuses on developments since 1994 when the PA was established following the Oslo Accords. Concentrating on this period makes sense, because the establishment of the PA represents the birth of formalized Palestinian self-governance.

At the same time, it is important to make clear what this book is not about. While this is a book about Palestine, it is neither a book about the Israeli occupation nor about Palestinian resistance against it. Instead, my focus lies on forms of Palestinian agency also beyond occupation and resistance. In this sense, I will argue that a research perspective that makes use of modern governmentality in world society will show that even though the occupation and resistance against it are important aspects of Palestinian politics, Palestinian agency clearly cannot be reduced to these two elements. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Nathan Brown rejects a focus on Palestinian exceptionalism and instead points to the commonalities with other research contexts. He therefore advocates for "a perspective on Palestinian politics that is rooted less in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (…) and more in the comparative Arab experience" (2010: 46). A preoccupation with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would mean ignoring other power dynamics that contribute considerably to political and societal order in Palestine. Hence, a focus on modern governmentality will reveal the crucial importance of dynamics of world-societal order in Palestine. It follows that even though the book is aware of the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem

and the Gaza Strip for what happens in Palestine, the book instead focuses on more subtle power dynamics in the face of Palestinian agency that often tend to get neglected in existing research.

While this book focuses on governmentality as a specific configuration of power relations in Palestine, it does not deny the existence and importance of other forms of power, such as Foucauldian discipline and sovereignty.[3] Hence, governmentality, discipline and sovereignty co-exist with varying degrees. This book, however, does not pursue a holistic approach but rather focuses on one specific element of political ordering in world society, namely governmentality. Therefore, in spite of the relevance of disciplinary and sovereign power, my research will address the importance of governmentality for the establishment of political and societal order in Palestine. Although one might assume that disciplinary and sovereign power are predominant in Palestine, in contrast to this, I will highlight the importance of governmentality for the dynamics of world-societal order here.

Epistemological and Methodological Considerations

While this book starts out from a theory-guided perspective, this by no means implies that governmentality as a theory is bluntly applied to the empirical research object of Palestine. This would clearly contradict the objective of identifying patterns of agency in Palestine that tend to be neglected by other approaches. Therefore, instead, I utilize a re-iterative strategy making use of both induction and deduction so that theory and empirical findings continuously interact and influence each other. This, becomes evident, for instance, when looking at the origins of statistics in Palestine that can only be comprehended when taking into account their global embeddedness.

By bringing together Foucauldian poststructuralism and the Stanford School's sociological neo-institutionalism, this book relies on a post-positivist epistemology (see Lapid 1989). It thereby rejects a foundationalist account of knowledge and instead stresses the constructedness of social reality (see Brown 1994). In other words, epistemologically this approach stresses the social

[3] As will be explained in Chapter 3, Foucault's understanding of sovereignty fundamentally differs from its usual usage in political science and International Relations.

construction of reality and ontologically, the social construction of the social world (Guzzini 2000). From this perspective, the book operates on the basis of second-order observations (see Andersen 2003; Luhmann 2012) and addresses *how* in contrast to *why* questions.[4] Thereby, the focus on dynamic processes as opposed to (seemingly) static structures – in particular with regard to power relations – enables the book to take into account different levels of analysis simultaneously. In this regard, by relying on a thin ontology the book follows Foucault's historic nominalism in the sense that

> "instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices" (2008: 3).

Accordingly, for example, the state is not regarded as ontologically pre-existent but instead as a specific, institutionalized arrangement of power relations.

As will become clear, instead of engaging in a theoretical exegesis of Foucault's work, I will display a pragmatic way of dealing with theoretical work. Rather, theory should not be self-serving but contribute to addressing actual empirically grounded questions. This perspective very much corresponds to Foucault's own understanding of his work. He once stated that "I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not readers" (Foucault 1994: 524, trans. Clare O'Farrell). In this sense, I will make use of Foucault's work in the way as he suggested which is as "a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area" (Foucault 1994: 523, trans. Clare O'Farrell). Thereby, as Andrew W. Neal (2009: 543) points out, it is an important contribution to IR that Foucault also encourages research to transcend disciplinary boundaries. As a result, the book literally uses Foucault's work in the sense of a 'tool box' as he stated it. This insight, combined with existing inconsistencies in Foucault's own work can be read as an invitation to a re-interpretation and extension of his original ideas.

[4] According to Luhmann (e.g. 2012), a second-order observation is "an observation of an observation as an observation" (Andersen 2003: VII). Note that the underlying understanding of 'observation' is a specific one that differs from its everyday meaning in the sense that every description of social reality represents a specific form of observation that depends on the chosen observer perspective. In other words, social reality is constructed on the basis of the respective observation.

In accordance with this toolbox-approach, therefore, the conceptual framework that I propose in this research project combines Foucauldian post-structuralism with the Stanford School of Sociology's neo-institutionalism. Hence, this book relies on a theoretical encounter or synthesis of two theoretical traditions that come from very different research backgrounds. This book relies on the insight that the proposed theoretical synthesis is not only plausible but also reasonable in order to address the research question outlined above. In particular, this is the case due to existing epistemological commonalities between both approaches on the basis of which several authors have already brought them together (see below). Whereas Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen (2003) compares the research of Foucault, Luhmann, Laclau and Kosselleck, I argue that there is good reason to also identify epistemological similarities with the work of the Stanford School of Sociology. First and foremost, both Foucauldian governmentality and the Stanford School's conception of world society are based on a thin ontology and therefore on what Andersen terms 'epistemologically over-determined thinking'' (2003: xii). As a result, first, both perspectives operate on the basis of second-order observations; in other words, they are aware that they observe observations. Second, both Foucault and the Stanford School share an anti-essentialist understanding of reality in the sense that they negate the existence of an underlying definitive reality that needs to be discovered. Third, a superiority of human consciousness is rejected by both perspectives. Fourth, in both cases actions are not seen as objective points of reference but as subjective or systemic attributes. Finally, both approaches are self-aware of the limitations and context-dependency of their own observation perspectives. Thus, they do not claim for themselves the hubris of an objective universalism (Andersen 2003: xvi).

In addition to these epistemological similarities, it is important to stress that both approaches rely on strong empirical foundations in order to develop their theoretical insights. Furthermore, there are several examples of combining governmentality research with the Stanford School's elaborations on world society (see Schofer et al. 2012: 61; see also Lim 2012). From the perspective of governmentality studies, the contribution of the Stanford School has mainly been ignored. Corry (2013) at least partially discusses the Stanford School's perspective. In addition, Neumann and Sending (2010) and Jason Weidner

(2010) take into account the Stanford School's research but do not significantly elaborate on its contribution to governmentality studies.

The Stanford School, in turn, has taken note of the potentials of governmentality research. For instance, John W. Meyer himself observes "many parallels to sociological institutionalism in the work of Foucault" (2009: 43). In addition, Drori, Meyer and Hwang explicitly deal with the connections between sociological neo-institutionalism and governmentality by pointing out that "inasmuch as discussions of governmentality emphasize the constitutive and transformative effect of enacted models, codifying expectant formats and behaviors, it has much in common with the idea of rationalization" (2009: 26). Moreover, while Krücken and Drori primarily observe "strong paradigmatic differences between Foucault's and Meyer's approaches" (2009: 23), they still acknowledge that there are certain points of contact between both. Accordingly, both Meyer and Foucault stress that individualization or subjectivity results from processes of social construction, be it by scripted forms of individual actorhood in the case of the Stanford School (Frank/Meyer 2002) or in Foucault's case by processes of subjectification (Foucault 2005). Another commonality relates to the emphasis on rationalization as a crucial ordering principle of societal relations in both approaches. Hence, as Georg Krücken points out, "Meyer and Foucault have developed a theory of societal rationalization with fundamental similar underlying mechanisms" (2002b: 10, see 2002a). Based on the described epistemological commonalities on the one hand and existing examples (see Corry 2013) on the other, it follows, therefore, that there is good reason for a theoretical synthesis of Foucauldian governmentality research and the Stanford School's conception of world society. Thus far, however, the intersection of governmentality and world society theory has remained mainly unexplored terrain.

Besides this question of compatibility it is important to ask what advantages a theoretical synthesis of governmentality and world society would have. In particular, even though Foucault rejects any explicit reference to a totalizing project such as society, governmentality does not exist in a structural vacuum. In spite of this, Foucault himself makes use of the term society, without actually defining it. Most clearly, this is the case in his volume 'Society Must Be

Defended' (Foucault 2003). Moreover, many proponents of governmentality studies explicitly refer to *society* (or *societies*) as a context in which governmental rationalities and technologies materialize without, however, further clarifying what is understood as society (see e.g. Dean 2007). This necessitates putting governmentality into a broader structural framework. On this basis, sociological neo-institutionalism allows for embedding governmentality in the structural horizon of world society. Accordingly, this book argues that the power dynamics that are observable in Palestine need to be seen in a world societal context. In other words, the power dynamics in Palestine cannot be analyzed in isolation from the rest of the world. Hence, the way in which order is generated in Palestine is comparable to other world societal contexts. As a result, I will present governmentality as a globally pervasive pattern of political ordering that also impacts the power dynamics in Palestine.

In this context, it should be noted that research dealing with governmentality most often refrains from describing it as a genuine theory. Instead, governmentality is considered as an approach or perspective, or labeled as 'analytics of government'. Indeed, it could be argued that this view corresponds to Foucault's own approach who rejected universals and focused on micro-phenomena. By contrast, as Michael Merlingen (2006: 182–183, fn. 4) suggests, speaking of governmentality as a theory makes sense as long as we overcome understanding it in a strictly positivist sense. Therefore, I argue that presenting governmentality as a theory allows for highlighting the evident compatibilities and similarities with other (de-) constructionist theories of political and societal order, such as the Stanford School of Sociology. In this sense, opting for governmentality as a theory does not deny its emphasis on genuine micro-phenomena and its related methodological nominalism. In other words, describing governmentality as a theory in a rather flexible manner, still allows for utilizing governmentality as a heuristic device as opposed to a descriptive tool (Zanotti 2013). My research perspective thus displays sensitivity towards (potentially singular) micro-phenomena but also sees the need to embed them into the overarching horizon of world society in order to excavate the deep structures upon which the dynamics of political order are based in modernity (see Merlingen 2008).

In order to interconnect the theoretical framework with the empirical case of Palestine the book rests on a combination of qualitative methods. While a post-positivist research project naturally questions positivist methodology, it has to rely on certain methodological foundations in order to reasonably connect the theoretical and the empirical dimensions (see Milliken 1999; Methmann 2014). In this regard, it is important to note that in conjunction with its theoretical sophistication, Foucault's focus on micro-phenomena makes his research profoundly empiricist (Walters 2012: 88). In the words of Paul Veyne, therefore, Foucault is interested in 'empirical singularities' (2010: 51; see Rose 1999b: 55). As a basis, this book relies on a systematic evaluation of the vast secondary literature on Palestinian politics and society. In addition, I have made use of think tank analyses, official documents from the Palestinian Authority, and reports from international agencies and international and domestic non-governmental organizations. Crucial for generating empirical findings for this research project was the field work that I have conducted in Palestine and Israel. While being a visiting research fellow of the Democracy and Human Rights Program at Birzeit University, Palestine, I have undertaken two comprehensive research stays in 2011 and 2012. In these periods, I have conducted dozens of interviews both with experts from Palestinian and Israeli academia, think tanks, NGOs, governmental organizations, representatives from international organizations as well as with ordinary people, such as, for instance, residents of refugee camps. In some cases I have made the interviews anonymous by request of the interviewees. In addition, I have had the chance to acquire substantive insights into Palestinian politics and society during numerous short-term stays in Palestine and Israel within the last ten years. As a result, and combined with the local embeddedness as a participant observer, I have been able to obtain considerable contextual knowledge and expertise that I hope enables me to competently deal with the empirical topic of this research project.

Outline of the Book

In order to establish the proposed line of argument, this book will proceed as follows. The second chapter, 'Global Palestine and World Society', will clarify why power dynamics in Palestine need to be contextualized with world society as an overarching horizon. Hence, it will become evident that properly analyzing

Palestinian politics requires not treating it as being separate from the rest of the world but rather stressing Palestine's global embeddedness. For that purpose, Chapter 2 begins with the identification and deconstruction of the 'mystifications of Palestine.' Mystifications in this context refer to approaches that tend to isolate Palestine from its overarching structural context and stressing its uniqueness compared to the rest of the world. In other words, this leads to a treatment of Palestine as a black box which is regarded as being unrelated and incomparable to (other) global political contexts. As a result, underlying dichotomies such as inside/outside, domestic/foreign, global/local tend to get reified, thereby neglecting the actually existing complexities and interrelations of power dynamics in Palestine. In this context, I will undertake a critical appraisal of academic literature on institution-building in Palestine on the one hand and of governance authorities beyond the Palestinian Authority (PA) on the other. It will become evident that, first, these approaches tend to rest on the paradigm of methodological nationalism and thereby treat the state as ontologically given. Second, institution-building research often is preoccupied with political structures and institutions and thereby ignores the role that processes play in the formation of political order. A third problem of these approaches is their inherent Eurocentrism that often projects a particular normative understanding of proper political institutions to Palestine. Finally, the involvement of non-PA actors in Palestinian politics requires careful theoretical and conceptual consideration that is often lacking. Based on this de-mystification of Palestine, I will argue that in order to make sense of the power dynamics in Palestine it is necessary to emphasize the global context into which they are embedded. I will show that there are plenty empirical examples of Palestine's integration into global politics that are related to global media coverage, international diplomacy, solidarity campaigns and the worldwide Palestinian diaspora. All these cases clearly give evidence for Palestine's incorporation into global political dynamics, making simplifying distinctions between an inside and outside of Palestine or between a global and a local context very problematic. On this basis, the chapter argues that these empirical observations can best be understood by theoretically embedding Palestine into the structural horizon of world society. By relying on the Stanford School of Sociology's understanding of world society, it is argued that we can observe the historical emergence of specific world-cultural norms in

Palestine. World society, in this regard, is characterized by the ubiquity of structural similarities – isomorphisms – concerning patterns of global political ordering. By bringing together Foucault's theory of governmentality and the elaborations of the Stanford School, the chapter argues that these world-cultural norms fundamentally impact how populations are governed in world society. In other words, as I will unfold in detail in Chapter 3, governmentality can be described as a globally diffused principle of political order that is constitutive for how order is established in modern world society. In this regard, it is relevant that these modern patterns of political ordering have diffused globally since the 19th century also to the Middle East and Palestine. Despite these dynamics, however, processes of global diffusion do not lead to any kind of homogenization (or Westernization) as this diffusion is always accompanied by processes of de-coupling. In other words, it is important to take into account that global norms are always translated into local contexts, thus accounting for a great variety in terms of how globally prevalent structures are actually manifesting themselves practically in different contexts. In this regard, two aspects deserve particular attention: On the one hand, the chosen perspective is historically sensitive. Accordingly, it does not observe any superficial trends but attempts to address patterns of political ordering which are deeply rooted in Palestine. On the other hand – and this is particularly relevant with regard to the dynamics of diffusion and decoupling – while the book describes governmentality as an explicitly modern way of exercising power, it rejects any notion of modernization as a linear, teleological, homogenizing process. Instead, in line with Eisenstadt, the chapter advocates in favor of the notion of 'multiple modernities' and emphasizes the variations of societal evolution and their different, contingent trajectories. In this context, it is important to highlight that by no means can modernization be equated with Westernization. Thereby, it is possible to overcome another simplifying dichotomy, namely that of modernity vs. tradition, which is often utilized in order to distinguish the 'modern' West from the 'traditional' Middle East. As a result, the proposed conceptualization of world society allows for reconciling the global and the local and avoids the reification of simplifying dichotomies by displaying context-sensitivity in different respects.

On the basis of empirically and theoretically embedding power dynamics in Palestine into world society, Chapter 3 offers a detailed conceptualization of governmentality as a constitutive pattern of political ordering in modern world society. For that purpose, I will first turn towards liberal institutionalist governance theory and critically discuss its limitations. I will show that an instrumental understanding of governance as primarily directed at problem-solving leads to an indifference towards the importance of power relations for political order in world society. By contrast, subsequently, I will point out that one of the advantages of governmentality theory is its emphasis on these power relations. Before I will give a detailed account of Foucault's genuine understanding of power, I will address the preoccupation of the discipline of IR with power. In this context, I will show in particular that in spite of the discipline's preoccupation with it, there is often a striking lack of coherent conceptualizations of power. As an alternative, I will argue that these limitations can be overcome by conceptualizing governmentality as a theory of power. Accordingly, I will introduce Foucault's relational understanding of power and point out that it is essential for governmentality. In order to lay the foundation of my own understanding of governmentality, I will then discuss and evaluate Foucault's own elaborations on governmentality before I will deal with governmentality studies that have followed Foucault's original ideas. In this sense, it will become evident that governmentality studies originally addressed power relations beyond the state but remained within the analytical framework of nation-state societies. In spite of this limitation, they have their merits due to important conceptual innovations. In particular, these studies introduced the distinction between rationalities and technologies of governmentality and emphasized that governmentality fundamentally depends on the freedom of individuals. With regard to international governmentality studies, I will show that it is possible to distinguish between a repressive and a productive notion of governmentality. Concerning the latter productive notion of governmentality I will point to the respective differences when it comes to how these approaches go beyond the state, how they address liberalism and, what follows from the chosen perspectives for agency and subjectivity. On this basis, I will introduce my genuine understanding of modern governmentality as being a constitutive principle of political ordering in world society. Accordingly, this conception is

distinctive as it, first, situates governmentality in the overarching context of world society. Second, I emphasize that it is reasonable to consider governmentality as an explicitly modern pattern of political order that is not limited to liberal contexts. Third, my proposed understanding of governmentality relies on a specific conceptualization of modern subjectivity as being based on autonomization, rationalization and entrepreneurialization. All in all, Chapter 3 prepares the ground for substantial empirical analysis of power dynamics in Palestine on the basis of the three key dimensions of biopolitics, surveillance, and technologies of the self.

Accordingly, in Chapter 4 social statistics have been chosen as a fundamental aspect means of exercising modern governmentality based on biopolitics. The chapter will point out that acquiring statistical knowledge of the Palestinian population is essential for the PA in order to govern it. As a first step, I will examine the emergence of social statistics as modern phenomena for governing populations. As will be shown, the 'discovery of the population' was a fundamental prerequisite for the systematic utilization of statistical data for governing purposes. I will point out that processes of problematization, normalization, and objectification are of particular importance in this regard. Closely related, the 'birth of modern statistics' is linked to major empirically observable events. Furthermore, statistics significantly contribute to the simultaneous empowerment and subjection of the population, both collectively and individually and are related to mechanisms of societal inclusion and exclusion. Based on this conceptual foundation, I will highlight that the emergence of Palestinian statistics can best be framed as a global phenomenon due to Palestine's integration into a global statistics community and the internalization of global standards. I will point out that statistical data are essential for the establishment of societal order in Palestine and that they provide Palestinians with a sense of political agency. In particular, with reference to the first ever Palestinian population census in 1997, I will address the inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics of census-taking. In this context, I will point to the role of statistics for Palestinian nation-building on the one hand and the importance of the Palestinian-Israeli demographic contestation on the other.

Chapter 5 will analyze surveillance as a second crucial dimension of governmentality. After having dealt with the dimension of biopolitics, in Chapter 5 I have opted to look at the importance of good governance in Palestine because it represents a globally pervasive element of surveillance that has an important impact on power relations. Accordingly, the chapter will examine how the globally predominant discourse of good governance has an impact on Palestinian political and societal order. I will argue that, on the level of formal organizations, good governance has become a pivotal paradigm of political ordering in Palestine. This is mirrored both in the way in which international organizations assess Palestinian political institutions and ascribe legitimacy to them as well as with regard to patterns of self-legitimization of the PA and Hamas. I will refer to the global diffusion of good governance in world society and stress that benchmarking and evaluation are central instruments of surveillance that contribute to this diffusion. I will argue that the surveillance of good governance fundamentally relies on the strategies of responsibilization and legitimization. In the case of Palestine, I will clarify that good governance is a particular arrangement of world-cultural norms which has emerged in Palestine due to global diffusion with the help of 'agents of world-cultural principles', such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations organizations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and expert communities. The diffusion of good governance to Palestine by means of surveillance can be related to the constant benchmarking and evaluation of the PA. Good governance, however, is not imposed on the PA, but rather it has voluntarily adopted the discourse of good governance into its practices and structures. In this regard, it is important to note that by adhering to good governance the PA is made responsible for its progress in achieving good governance, while at the same time, the PA becomes a legitimate actor as it gets legitimized by the agents responsible for promoting good governance in world society. Besides the PA, I will also point out that the discourse of good governance is relevant for Hamas and its rule over Gaza. The chapter will argue that Hamas's political agenda considerably refers to good governance which can be related to Hamas's desire to be recognized as a legitimate political actor in world society.

Chapter 6 will deal with the contribution of technologies of the self to the dynamics of political order in Palestine. In this regard, I have identified the social production of space as a crucial context of modern governmentality. I will argue that modern governmentality relies on a specific conception of subjectivity that is pervasive in world society and thus also in Palestine. Modern subjectivity is constituted by three distinct modes of selfhood: the autonomizing self, the responsibilizing self and the enterprising self. Regarding the relationship between subjectivity, power and governmentality, I will show that subjectivity is socially constructed in a simultaneous process of empowerment and subjection. Subjectivity and governmentality are related through technologies of the self that lead to the active and voluntary involvement of individuals into dynamics of world-societal order. On this basis, I will argue that the modern subject of world society is continuously socially produced and reproduced through practices of responsibilization, autonomization and entrepreneurialization. At the same time, I will highlight that modern subjectivity needs to be contextualized with the social production of space. It will become evident that space is not only socially produced through everyday practices of individuals but that this dimension matters for the question of how order comes into existence in world society. These conceptual elaborations will be used in order to analyze everyday spatial practices as self-technological acts in Palestine and their contribution to world-societal order in Palestine. I will address business entrepreneurship as an everyday spatial practice in relation to the urban development of Ramallah and the planning of the new city of Rawabi. Subsequently, I will examine the social production of space in Palestinian refugee camps. By taking into account both the importance of local camp committees and UNRWA, I will analyze how UNRWA's camp improvement program and the related project 'Campus in Camps' represent self-technological everyday spatial practices that affect the space of refugee camps. Furthermore, as a second example of everyday spatial practices I will address rooftop gardening projects and show how refugees develop the space of the camp by means of technologies of the self. Besides providing a summary of the main argument, the conclusion will address limitations of the existing research and avenues for future research.

2 Global Palestine and World Society

Introduction

This chapter starts by identifying and deconstructing some *mystifications of Palestine*. In other words, the chapter argues that extant approaches tend to stress the uniqueness of Palestine both as an object of study and in political practice. This leads to an isolation of Palestine from an overarching global horizon. As a result, underlying dichotomies such as inside/outside, domestic/foreign, global/local tend to get reified, thereby neglecting that in order to comprehend the actually existing complexities of power dynamics in Palestine it is necessary to stress the interrelatedness of both sides of these distinctions. By contrast, this chapter suggests relocating Palestine in a global context because there is clear evidence that Palestine – as well as any other political setting – cannot be treated as being isolated from the rest of the world. Rather, there are plenty of empirical examples of Palestine's integration into global politics. The historic foundation of global attention towards Palestine, the numerous global solidarity campaigns for Palestinian rights, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receiving

g world-wide constant high media attention and also attracting countless international practitioners and researchers from all over the world as well being a top issue of international diplomacy ever since the conflict has emerged – all these cases clearly give evidence for Palestine's incorporation into global political dynamics, making simplifying distinctions between an inside and outside of Palestine or a separation between a global and a local context very problematic.

On this basis, the chapter argues that one can only make sense of these political dynamics by theoretically embedding Palestine into a structural horizon of world society. By relying on the Stanford School of Sociology's understanding of world society, it is argued that we can observe the historical emergence of specific world-cultural norms in Palestine. World society, in this regard, is characterized by the ubiquity of structural similarities – isomorphisms – concerning patterns of global political ordering. By bringing together Foucault's theory of governmentality and the elaborations of the Stanford School, the chapter argues that these world-cultural norms fundamentally impact how populations are

governed in world society. Accordingly, in Chapter 3, these patterns of political ordering will be conceptualized as modern governmentality in world society.

What is relevant for the line of argument in the present chapter is the fact that these modern patterns of political ordering have spread globally in particular since the 19th century by means of diffusion and thus also to the Middle East and Palestine. Despite these dynamics, however, processes of global diffusion do not necessarily lead to any kind of homogenization (or Westernization) as this diffusion is always accompanied by processes of de-coupling. In other words, it is important to take into account that global norms are always translated into local contexts, thus accounting for a great diversity of how globally prevalent structures are actually manifesting themselves locally.

In this regard, two aspects deserve particular attention: On the one hand, the chosen perspective is aware of the historical foundations of political dynamics. Accordingly, it does not observe any superficial trends but attempts to address patterns of political ordering which are deeply rooted in world society and hence in Palestine. On the other hand, while the book describes governmentality as an explicitly modern way of exercising power, it rejects any notion of modernization as a linear, teleological, homogenizing process but instead makes use of Eisenstadt's notion of 'multiple modernities'. On this basis, this chapter will also argue that there is good reason to describe the different existing conceptions of Palestine as 'multiple Palestines'.

Mystifications of Palestine

This section aims at identifying and deconstructing what can be termed as mystifications of Palestine. By mystifications of Palestine I mean that the academic literature often treats Palestine in isolation from the overarching context into which it is embedded. Thereby, the difference between Palestine and its 'outside' gets overemphasized, resulting in an artificial separation of what is going on in Palestine and outside of it. Concomitantly, this leads to the reification of inside/outside, domestic/foreign, or local/global dichotomies. These dichotomies contribute to an over-simplistic account of the political dynamics in Palestine since they fail to address the complex interplay of both dimensions. It thus follows that many existing approaches are not capable of satisfactorily addressing the book's main research question of how a political

order comes into existence in Palestine. In this regard, it should be noted that this book conceives of politics of a global context within which power dynamics and political order manifest themselves.

Considerable parts of Middle East Studies have long been characterized by an emphasis of the uniqueness of the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular. Accordingly, the ascription of exceptionalism has been based on ontologically essentializing the difference between the Middle East and Palestine and respective *others*. This happens either by positively embracing an Orientalist distinctiveness of Palestine or by attributing negative characteristics to Palestine from a culturalist perspective thus encompassing, as Stephan Stetter puts it, "both the Orientalized celebration and the 'realist' condemnation of an 'authentic' Middle East" (2008b: 175–6). Accordingly, John Collins (2011: 3) points out that this exceptionalism resulted in an analytical isolation of Palestine from the rest of the world. Hence, bearing the area studies controversy in mind (Tessler et al. 1999), it is important to stress that both IR and Middle East Studies are equipped with certain limitations that become evident also in the context of Palestine. Morten Valbjørn stresses that while IR is mainly characterized by universalism that leads to a disregard for the cultural diversity of the Middle East, Middle East Studies in turn display a particularism resulting in the emphasis of the cultural uniqueness of the Middle East. As a result, IR turns out to be 'culture-blind' and Middle East Studies are 'culture-blinded' (Valbjørn 2004). While Valbjørn's observation is indeed useful, I rather agree with Andrea Teti to go one step further since "on closer inspection, *both* fields are *both* culture-blind *and* culture-blinded" (Teti 2007: 122, emphasis in the original) in the sense that IR's universalism rests on Eurocentric foundations and that Middle East Studies are informed by universalist epistemologies and ontologies (see Mitchell 2004).

Both Stetter and Collins highlight, that in spite of the enduring culture-blindness of IR and Middle Eastern Studies, "simplistic conceptualizations of Middle East exceptionalism" (Stetter 2012b: 1) have increasingly become challenged by approaches that take into account the Middle East's and Palestine's integration into dynamics of global politics. "As a result, work on Palestine is increasingly characterized by references to transnational process (…)" (Collins 2011: 4). While I agree with this assessment, I would add that, notwithstanding the

emergence of such integrative approaches, the implicit or explicit tendency to distinguish between inside and outside, global and local, and domestic and foreign dimensions of Palestinian politics persists. Therefore, most analyses of Palestinian politics are not capable of properly comprehending the "contingent, dynamic and non-linear processes which shape concrete semantics and structures in world society" (Stetter 2008b: 176).

Approaches emphasizing the uniqueness of Palestine do so on several grounds. Hence, in many cases, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the lack of proper statehood and the related struggle for independence, and the Israeli occupation serve as proof for the exceptionalism of Palestine. Mainstream IR primarily addresses Palestine from both a diplomatic and conflict/security perspective. Hence, the analytical focus lies on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the one hand and on attempts to resolve it by diplomatic means, most notably the Oslo peace process, on the other (see e.g. Shlaim 2013; Smith 2013).[5] As a result, this kind of IR research on Palestine tends to reify the inside/outside dichotomy by mainly neglecting the 'inside' of Palestine. By contrast, many analyses of Palestine that provide a detailed account of this 'inside' dimension fail to properly contextualize it with the 'outside' of Palestine (for examples see the next section).

Building Palestinian Institutions: Inside Out

A considerable part of the academic literature deals with questions of institution-building, state-building and good governance in Palestine. In these cases, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is primarily analyzed according to its institutional shortcomings and potential avenues for improvement. Implicitly or explicitly, the democratic, liberal nation-state serves as a blueprint for a successful development of Palestinian political institutions. Accordingly, these analyses take the nation-state as ultimate point of reference and thus focus on the question of how Palestinians can achieve proper statehood.

A number of studies address the institutional transformations of Palestinian politics since the Oslo Accords. In this regard, focusing on legal aspects, Nathan

[5] For a more nuanced perspective see Peters & Newman (2013).

J. Brown (2003) argues that it is misleading to see Palestinian politics exclusively in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Rather, Brown emphasizes that the establishment of the PA can be regarded as a resumption of previously existing political and legal institutional traditions on which Palestinians could rely. In this sense, Brown points to the importance of path dependency of political institutions. In his account of the 'Politics of the Palestinian Authority,' Nigel Parsons (2005) offers a comprehensive picture of the emergence of the PA and the origins of Palestinian politics. His study not only encompasses a detailed analysis of political dynamics and organizational structures of Palestinian politics but also a concise account of the Oslo Agreements and its implications. Parsons's repudiation of the latter is evident in describing the PA as a proxy for the Israeli occupation with the objective to neutralize opposition against the peace process (2005: 279). Michael Bröning (2011) stresses that changes both within Hamas and Fatah, the PA's state-building efforts and increased non-violent resistance against the Israeli occupation are crucial determinants of a 'Politics of Change' that can be observed in Palestine.

Furthermore, several studies related to institution-building address the question of the legitimacy of the PA. Muriel Asseburg, for instance, shows that the Palestinian Authority is confronted with competing claims of legitimacy. Accordingly, while internal legitimacy is based on elections, patronage, and co-optation, the PA's external legitimacy depends on being perceived as a reliable partner for peace with Israel by the international community. Asseburg highlights that this results in a dilemma regarding the democratic character of the PA since maintaining external legitimacy may necessitate a hard-handed approach towards opponents of the peace process in the domestic arena (2002: 138ff.). As a result, external demands dominate the agenda of the PA, while at the same time the question of independence gains primacy over that of democratization (ibid. 2002: 154f.; see also Sirriyeh 2000; Usher 1995).

Moreover, a couple of authors relate Palestinian institution-building to the issue of nationalism. In this sense, with the establishment of the PA, Palestinians were confronted with a fundamental change from revolutionary nationalism to state-building (Lindholm Schulz 1999: 162; Rubin 1999; see also Kimmerling/Migdal 2003; Jarbawi 1996). Yezid Sayigh (1999) emphasizes that armed struggle

originally represented the central theme for Palestinian nation-building. With the establishment of the PA, the subsequent change also has implications for a Palestinian identity that was altered from military struggle to the aspiration for state-building (see Khalidi 2010; Robinson 1997).

The narrative of good governance (see Chapter 5) plays an important role in the context of Palestinian institution-building. Hence, in order to point to the shortcomings of the Palestinian political system, many analyses describe it as neopatrimonial, combining modern political institutions with informal clientelist structures. From this vantage point, authors such as Rex Brynen (1995b), Amal Jamal (2001) or Hillel Frisch (1997, 1998) refer to the deficiencies of the Palestinian institution-building endeavor (see also Amundsen/Ezbidi 2002; Rubenberg 2003; Sayigh 2007). By contrast, the authors of the volume edited by Husain Mushtaq Khan (2004c) reject a focus on good governance and neopatrimonialism as being inadequate for analyzing Palestinian politics because such perspectives are based on Eurocentrism and thus fail to take into account the specific challenges with which the PA is confronted.[6] Instead, Khan suggests focusing on "far-reaching processes of *social transformation*" (2004a: 3, emphasis in the original) at play in Palestine and on developing related capacities for such transformations. In this context, Hilal and Khan (2004) stress that external limitations, such as restricted sovereignty and ongoing occupation, complicated the task of Palestinian institution-building.

In addition, related to the establishment of political institutions based on good governance, many authors focus on the question of the democratization of the Palestinian polity. Khalil Shikaki (1996b), for instance, observes that the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 led to the coincidence and interaction of three crucial processes: the peace process, nation-building, and democratization (see also Lesch 1992; Shikaki 1996b). A number of authors ascribe a crucial role to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in the process of the democratization of Palestinian politics (see e.g. Schenker 2000; Andoni 1996; Barghouti 1996; Ghanem 1996; Shikaki 1996a). However, according to PLC-member Ziad Abu-Amr the PLC failed to endorse substantial legislation

[6] For a critique of neopatrimonialism as an analytical perspective on Palestine see also Badawi (2003).

and exercise oversight over the executive (1997: 91; see also Brown 2003: 134ff.). As'ad Ghanem (2001) describes the Palestinian political system as a 'partial democracy' due to the incomplete and selective adoption of democratic principles and the persistence of authoritarian elements. Similarly, Jamal points out that electoral competition and formal institutional democratic structures are insufficient for democratic consolidation (2001: 25; see also Kamrava 1999). In this context, some authors focus on the issue of elite disunity in order to explain the developments and shortcomings of the PA in the context of democratization. According to Jamal, there are two dimensions contributing to the instability of the PA. First, there is a division between the PLO elite in exile, i.e. the returnees, and the elite that was socialized in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Second, there is a split between secular and Islamist elites (Jamal 2005: 1, 2006: 235; Shikaki 2002; see also Brynen 1995a).

Going Beyond the PA: Outside In

Resulting from an analytical focus on institution-building and the underlying methodological nationalism is a tendency to treat processes, structures, and actors that are not part of formal political institutions – i.e. the PA – as only accompanying power dynamics but not as being themselves important for political order in Palestine. While there are numerous studies dealing with the role of international or domestic governmental and non-governmental organizations in Palestine, only very rarely are these acknowledged as governance authorities in and of themselves.[7] In the case of Palestine there are two important exceptions. First, after having taken over the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas has increasingly been acknowledged as a governance authority (Caridi 2012: Ch. 8 in particular; International Crisis Group 2008; Levitt 2009; Milton-Edwards 2008; Sayigh 2010).[8] Second, in many cases observers agree that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) assumes governance functions to a considerable degree (Bowker 2003: 130; al-Husseini 2000: 51, 2010: 9). Hence, Robert Bowker describes UNRWA as "a quasi-state institution whose responsibilities extended to areas of education, health, and social services that would otherwise be handled

[7] Note that 'non-governmental' in this case means other than PA.

[8] To date, the book authored by Khaled Hroub (2000) provides the most systematic and comprehensive analysis of Hamas.

by national governments" (2003: 130). Sari Hanafi (2014) therefore argues that UNRWA is a 'phantom sovereign' in order to highlight the importance of the agency for governing refugee camps. Apart from these examples, however, even though the importance of a variety of actors other than the PA is taken into account, these actors are primarily seen as supporting the formal institutional structure of the PA.

For instance, the PA's dependency on donor aid receives considerable attention even though the assessment regarding its purpose and impact differ (Barsalou 2003; Frisch/Hofnung 1997). Brynen offers a detailed analysis of the different dimensions of international aid to the PA and stresses that "the assistance effort aims at strengthening the PA and creating tangible benefits for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, thereby generating support for the peace process" (Brynen 1996: 47, see also 2000). Martin Beck (2000) considers aid as a potential instrument to influence the PA by making payments conditional on demands concerning democratic progress. Benoît Challand is rather critical of the impact of donor aid on Palestinian society. He perceives this involvement as the imposition of democracy from outside which is not conducive for the establishment of sustainable, democratic institutions (Challand 2008, 2009). Even more critical, Anne Le More (2005, 2008) argues that the international community contributes to the fragmentation of Palestinian politics because

> "the international donor community has financed not only Israel's continued occupation but also its expansionist agenda – at the expense of international law, of the well-being of the Palestinian population, of their right to self-determination, and of the international community's own stated developmental and political objectives" (Le More 2005: 983).

Similarly, Mandy Turner (2012) describes the international involvement in Palestine as 'colonial practice' in the sense that it primarily aims at civilizing the local population while allowing the Israeli occupation to continue.

Already before the establishment of the PA, Palestinian non-governmental organizations have played an important role for the sustainment of political order in Palestine (Jamal 1995). When however the PA came into existence it took over many of the functions that previously had been assumed by NGOs (Brynen 1998: 187ff.). This resulted in a shift of donor aid from Palestinian NGOs to the PA (Sullivan 1996). Hanafi and Tabar analyze the interrelation

between the local dimension of Palestinian development and the global dimension of international aid. They argue that the international development assistance has contributed to the emergence of a

> "Palestinian globalized elite, composed of an important part of the leaders of NGOs and the local leaders of international NGOs, and loosely defined as a local social formation which is informed by and/or closely aligned with global debates and agendas" (Hanafi/Tabar 2005: 247).

This observation corresponds to Challand's distinction between those NGOs that are capable of participating in the global discourses of international donors and those excluded from these discourses due to, among other things, educational backgrounds and language barriers (Challand 2009: 15–19). In this context, Turner points to the exclusionary potential of the 'partners for peace' paradigm. In this sense, international donors identify certain parts of the Palestinian political elite as 'partners for peace' while others do not qualify as such. Hence, only those Palestinian actors favoring the internationally recognized version of the peace process receive support (Turner 2011).

Apart from the involvement of domestic and international governmental and non-governmental organizations it is necessary to also address the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. It is undeniable that the Israeli occupation has an impact on every aspect of Palestinian life. In some cases, therefore, the PA is described as a proxy of the occupation. As Neve Gordon puts it,

> "[t]he ingenious idea was to *outsource* the responsibility for the population to a subcontractor. A Palestinian authority was established to take on the task of managing the occupied inhabitants. In exchange for providing Israel an array of services, Israel offered the new authority some sort of autonomous self-rule. Israel, however, continued to control most of the occupied land" (2008: 169, emphasis in the original; see also Lagerquist 2003; Roy 2007).

While this perspective is plausible due to the undeniable importance of the Israeli occupation for daily life in Palestine, exclusively reducing Palestinian politics to the occupation is problematic. By solely focusing on the occupation, Palestinians are denied of any sense of agency and thereby the potential and dynamics of Palestinian politics that exist beyond the occupation and that contribute to social and political order in Palestine are neglected. In this sense, some authors claim that Palestinians do not possess agency and cannot speak for themselves (see

Spivak 1988), even though, this perspective is theoretically not convincing from a Foucauldian perspective which would point out that power is productive and always contains potentials for resistance and counter-conduct.

Inside/Outside Palestine: Methodological Nationalism and Eurocentrism

All of the presented perspectives clearly have their merits. A focus on institution-building offers a detailed account of Palestinian political institutions and their transformation towards functioning structures of governance. The same is true for studies of the role of domestic and international governmental and non-governmental organizations in Palestine because they make an important contribution to the understanding of Palestinian politics and its dependence on a variety of actors.

At the same time however, the presented research perspectives suffer from certain limitations. First and foremost, by taking the liberal, democratic nation-state as a blueprint for institutional development, literature on institution-building ultimately risks contributing to the reification of methodological nationalism. As a result, the state is treated as ontologically pre-existent. Moreover, in many cases analyses of the role of domestic and international NGOs operate with a concept of civil society which is contrasted with the state. The construction of such an opposition between NGOs and the PA, however, is problematic as it can easily lead to the conclusion that both operate in different spheres and that NGOs are not regarded as genuine political agents that equally contribute to political order in Palestine. Second, institution-building approaches are preoccupied with a too narrow focus on political institutions and structures, thereby neglecting the importance of processes that eventually lead to the formation of the very institutions that are being analyzed. Third, and equally problematic, the approaches described above rest on Eurocentric foundations that risk neglecting specific features and trajectories of Palestinian politics. This becomes evident with regard to the narrative of good governance that promotes a particular understanding of legitimate and proper political institutions (see Chapter 5). Accordingly, research on state- and institution-building is based on implicit or explicit normative assumptions about what a legitimate and effective polity is supposed to look like (see Chandler 2006). Fourth, while it is undeniable

that the role of non-PA actors, such as the EU, UN agencies or domestic and foreign NGOs is of crucial importance in the context of Palestine, addressing their involvement requires careful theoretical and conceptual consideration that should refrain from labelling them simplistically as 'external' actors. This would imply that they are regarded as being external to political order in Palestine even though they considerably contribute to it. Hence, the approaches described above risk reifying the distinction between inside and outside of Palestine, thereby overlooking the existing intricacies of power dynamics.

By contrast, the perspective proposed in this book considers the state as a particular, contingent configuration of power relations that stabilize in a particular manner. As I will demonstrate in detail in Chapter 3, bringing together governmentality and world society research allows for a proper analysis of political dynamics beyond the state. Thereby, it is possible to focus on the Palestinian polity based on the question of how political order comes into existence without being distracted by the absence of the characteristics of statehood. In this sense, this perspective can overcome methodological nationalism, which takes the nation-state as ontologically given and as point of analytical departure. Furthermore, my approach attempts to take into account both the global and the local dimension without privileging one side at the expense of the other and thereby trying to avoid a reification of dichotomies such as domestic/foreign or inside/outside. Hence, the suggested approach takes into account power dynamics in Palestine but stresses that these can only be comprehended by emphasizing the global horizon which serves as the overarching context. In this sense, "[a] shared global modernity (…) is the horizon to which local, regional, and global interactions constantly relate, embedding all places throughout the globe within a world societal order" (Stetter 2012b: 6).

Relocating Palestine

Based on the preceding elaborations I argue that one can only make sense of the political dynamics in Palestine by emphasizing the global context in which they occur. In this sense, what is going on in Palestine cannot be isolated from the rest of the world, and vice versa. Therefore, as Collins puts it, "the Palestinian struggle has always been a global one" (Collins 2011: 4). There is plenty of

empirical evidence for the global integration of Palestine. First, historically, the 19th century witnessed an increasing global attention towards historic Palestine. This global attention has persisted ever since. Palestine transformed from a peripheral region of the Ottoman Empire to a symbolically loaded site of imperial rivalry. As Simon Sebag Montefiore states, Napoleon Bonaparte's ambition to conquer Jerusalem, "had made the Levant fashionable" (2011: 333), not only among Great Powers but also among writers as well as Evangelical missionaries. The imperial interest in Palestine is mirrored not only in pompous visits of heads of state, such as Kaiser Wilhelm's in 1898, but also in the establishment of diplomatic missions in Jerusalem. The United Kingdom established its first Consulate-General there in 1839, followed by Prussia in 1842, France in 1843, the United States in 1844, and Austria-Hungary in 1849. In addition, in 1847, the Holy See re-established the resident Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem. At the same time, the expansion of railway and steamboat connections to the Middle East eased travel to Palestine and also led to the establishment of the first hotels for pilgrims (Sebag Montefiore 2011: Chs. 34–42).

Second, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constantly receives high media attention world-wide, often leading to accusations of disproportionate coverage compared to other conflicts in global politics (Bernstein 2010). It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Palestinians have made explicit reference to global public opinion. In the aftermath of the symbolic vote in the UK's House of Commons and the announcement of the Swedish government to recognize Palestine in 2014, Senior PLO official Hanan Ashrawi stated:

> "International public opinion is way ahead of many governments. There is a strong solidarity movement, there is a strong network of people speaking out when governments are much more timid and reticent" (quoted in Reuters 2014).

Third, the importance ascribed by the media to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is mirrored in international diplomacy where it has represented a major issue ever since it emerged. Take for example the countless resolutions of both the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council dealing with the issue, such as the UNGA Resolution 181 outlining the partition plan of 1947, Security Council Resolution 242 calling for an Israeli withdrawal from territories

occupied in the June War of 1967, or the recent UNGA Resolution 67/19, upgrading Palestine's status at the UN to that of a non-member observer state.[9] Moreover, at the end of 2014, 135 of 193 UN member states have recognized Palestine as a state (Johnson 2014). Apart from that, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict attracts not only researchers from all over the world but also countless aid workers employed by the UN or other development agencies. According to the website of the UN country team for the occupied Palestinian territories, a total of 18 UN agencies is working in Palestine: UNRWA, UNDP, UNTSO, UNICEF, UNESCO, OHCHR, UNFPA, FAO, UNIFEM, WFP, UNV, World Bank, UNSCO, WHO, UN HABITAT, UNODC, OCHA, ILO, UNOPS, IMF, UNMAS, UNDSS.[10] At the same time, the focus of international diplomacy on the conflict generates a demand for policy-relevant expertise, which is institutionalized in foreign policy think tanks in capitals around the world.

Fourth, there are numerous global campaigns in favor of solidarity with the Palestinian people. Most prominently, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement (BDS) has received considerable public attention for its actions against the Israeli occupation, for instance by exerting pressure on companies considered to be profiteering from the occupation. BDS has received the greatest resonance among student unions on US and UK campuses. Omar Barghouti, founding member of BDS, describes the movement as "the most ambitious, empowering, and promising Palestinian-led global movement for justice and rights" (Barghouti 2011: 16). In addition, the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) has emerged as a platform for international activists who engage in campaigns against the Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, thus representing a particular localization of global solidarity in Palestine (Sandercock et al. 2004). Whereas both groups and their demands and approaches are somewhat controversial due to irreconcilable demands, in particular regarding an unlimited right of return for Palestinian refugees, they clearly serve as examples for what Collins calls "the globalization of Palestine and the Palestinization of the globe" (2011: 2).

[9] For an overview: Laqueur & Rubin (2008); UNGA vote on non-member state status: United Nations (2012).

[10] United Nations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2014): *Official Website*, archived version accessible via: https://web.archive.org/web/20141218075953/http://unctopt.org/.

Fifth, Palestinians have a history of being a diaspora/exile community.[11] According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), at the end of 2014 there was a total of 12.1 million Palestinians, 4.62 million of which living in the occupied Palestinian territories, 1.46 million in Israel, 5.34 million, mainly refugees, in Arab countries and approximately 675,000 in other foreign countries (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2014). In other words, half of the Palestinian population lives outside of historic Palestine. In addition, since its establishment in 1964 until the Oslo Accords, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had been a national movement in exile being forced to relocate its headquarters from Amman to Beirut in 1971 and from Beirut to Tunis in 1982 (see Khalidi 2006: Ch. 5, 2010: Ch. 8; Parsons 2005: Ch. 2; Sayigh 1999). Similarly, the Hamas leadership, together with its political bureau, has also been located in exile. While originally based in Damascus, in the course of the Syrian civil war its chairman Khaled Mashal left to Doha in 2012, his deputy Moussa Abu Marzouk moved to Cairo (BBC 2012), and Saleh al-Arouri, senior member of the political bureau moved to Turkey (Eldar 2014).

It follows that many cases illustrate Palestine's integration into an overarching global context. In this sense, "the horizon against which Palestine emerges as a meaningful territory transcends all spatial and symbolic divides and includes all (political) communications in world society (…)" (Stetter 2008b: 50). In any event, it is important to note the inherent multi-dimensional relationship of Palestine and the global. As a result, simultaneously the world observes Palestine and Palestine observes the world. This became clear, for example, when Palestinian political activists related their own struggle to a global horizon by breaking a hole into the West Bank separation wall on the day of the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall (Ma'an News Agency 2014). Thus, in order to make sense of the power relations in Palestine it is necessary to take into account the complex relationship between local and global political dynamics. Dietrich Jung therefore rightly observes that "[g]lobal conditions and global constraints led to a confusion of international, regional, and local influences on both the territorial formation of Palestine and the building of a

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[11] For an overview of the Palestinian Diaspora see Farsoun (2005) and Lindholm Schulz (2003). For a discussion of the appropriateness of the term 'diaspora' in the context of Palestine see Peteet (2007) and Hanafi (2003).

Palestinian nation" (Jung 2004: 27). The challenge now lies in developing a conceptual framework that is capable of making sense of power dynamics in Palestine.

Making Sense of Global Palestine: World Society as Horizon

This section argues that the empirical observations that give evidence for Palestine's integration into global political dynamics can best be understood by theoretically embedding Palestine into a structural horizon of world society. In other words, the political dynamics that are observable in Palestine result from Palestine's integration into world society. I suggest that the Stanford School of Sociology is very suitable for providing a framework for the integration of Palestine into global power dynamics. The Stanford School perceives world society as a unitary social system. In this sense,

> "the world has constituted a singular polity. By this we mean that the world has been conceptualized as a unitary social system, increasingly integrated by networks of exchange, competition, and cooperation, such that actors have found it "natural" to view the whole world as their arena of action and discourse" (Boli/Thomas 1997: 172).

A crucial insight of this perspective lies in its potential for overcoming state-centric approaches or methodological nationalism given that the nation-state is not treated as ontologically pre-existing. As John W. Meyer argues, while the nation-state remains a powerful actor, "world society is a stateless polity" (2000: 236; see also Meyer et al. 1997: 169). World society is characterized by the global pervasiveness of world-cultural principles that considerably influence the institutional design of structures within it and lead to global isomorphism. In other words, the empirical observable structural similarities between, for example, nation-states, education systems or administrative bureaucracies all over the globe, are the result of an overarching world culture. It follows that that these isomorphisms are the result of the enactment of global models (Meyer et al. 1997).

According to the Stanford School, these world-cultural principles which lead to isomorphism have spread globally by means of diffusion. At the same time, "diffusion is importantly shaped and accelerated by culturally analyzed similarities among actors, and by theorized accounts of actors and practices"

(Strang/Meyer 1993: 487). In this context, it is important to note that only in the course of the last decade the discipline of IR has discovered diffusion as a research topic and directed increasing attention to dynamics of global diffusion. The growing awareness of the importance of diffusion in IR is also mirrored by the inclusion of a new chapter on 'Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies' in the second edition of the authoritative Handbook of International Relations (Gilardi 2012). Moreover, the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA) in 2013 was held under the main theme 'The Politics of International Diffusion: Regional and Global Dimensions'.[12] It is striking, however, that most studies in IR that deal with diffusion do so without making proper reference to the contributions of the Stanford School of Sociology despite the fact that the Stanford School generated important original research on this issue. This becomes evident with regard to a special issue of the journal *International Studies Review,* titled 'The Politics of International Diffusion' which is based on contributions presented at ISA's annual convention in 2013 (Solingen/Börzel 2014). Only one contribution out of ten briefly mentions the work of the Stanford School (Klingler-Vidra/Schleifer 2014: 268). All other articles display a complete disregard towards it.[13] By contrast, I argue that IR can benefit from an understanding of diffusion dynamics based on the Stanford School.

According to sociological neo-institutionalism of the Stanford School, constitutive for the emergence of world society are certain world-cultural principles which are critical for global isomorphism. These principles are rationalization, theorization, universalism, and individualization. In other words, the more rationalized, theorized, universalistic and individualistic world-cultural models are, the better they diffuse in world society. What is crucial in this regard is the fact that actors in world society adapt to these models not necessarily in order to increase efficiency but in order to gain legitimacy. In this sense, the adherence to rationalized, theorized, universalized, individualistic models contributes to the legitimacy of actors in world society. Hence, for example, even though it lacks certain features of statehood, the Palestinian polity strikingly

[12] International Studies Association (2012): *Call for Proposals for the ISA Annual Convention 2013 in San Francisco,* http://www.isanet.org/Conferences/SanFrancisco2013/Call.aspx.

[13] See Chapter 3 for a critical evaluation of liberal-institutionalist governance theory.

resembles the global model of the nation-state, and Palestinians adhere to this global model in order to gain international legitimacy. As a result, it is possible to "define organizations as dramatic enactments of the rationalized myths pervading modern societies" (Meyer/Rowan 1977: 346). In contrast to DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) elaborations on this issue, the global diffusion of isomorphic structure is therefore is not so much the result of coercion or normative pressure but rather motivated by the intention of being regarded as a legitimate actor in world society.

Following Max Weber's idea of instrumental rationality *(Zweckrationalität)*, the Stanford School understands rationalization as "the structuring of everyday life within standardized impersonal rules that constitute social organization as a means to collective purpose" (Meyer et al. 1987: 24). Ronald Jepperson offers a detailed definition of rationalization:

> "(1) continuing efforts to systematize social life around cultural schemes that explicitly differentiate and then seek to link social means and social ends (…); (2) efforts to reconstruct all social organization – including eventually the national society itself, constructed as an actor – as means for the pursuit of collective purposes, these purposes themselves subject to increasing simplification and systematization" (2002: 63, fn. 6).

Linked to rationalization, the diffusion of world-cultural models is enhanced through their theorization because theorization contributes to the legitimacy of these models. Theorization thus functions as a mechanism, "turning diffusion into rational choice" (Strang/Meyer 1993: 500). For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the fact that the good governance discourse is based on theoretical elaborations significantly increases its diffusion in world society. As Strang and Meyer highlight:

> "Diffusion within cultural categories is accelerated and redirected by their *theorization.* By theorization we mean the self-conscious development and specification of abstract categories and the formulation of patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effect. Without general models, cultural categories are less likely to arise and gain force" (1993: 492, emphasis in the original).

The strength of theorized models thus lies in their adaptability to various contexts, thereby "transcending local, idiosyncratic circumstances" (Krücken/Drori 2009: 17). As with rationalization, the adoption of theorized

models can be related to the intention to acquire legitimacy: "Such models include causal and normative arguments on how different actors all over the world – from nation-states to individuals – should behave and organize their affairs to be recognized as legitimate, modern actors" (Krücken/Drori 2009: 17). The diffusion of world-cultural models on the basis of theorization is promoted by "culturally legitimated theorists" (Strang/Meyer 1993) or 'rationalized others', denoting "social elements such as the sciences and professions (…) that give advice to nation-state and other actors about their true and responsible natures, purposes, technologies, and so on" (Meyer et al. 1997: 162). In other words,

> "science operates as the secular equivalent of a "sacred canopy" for the modern order, generating a modern, rational interpretation of world order, and offering this logic as a secular interpretive grid for natural and social life" (Meyer 2009b: 261).

Due to their authority regarding the ascription of world-societal legitimacy, these rationalized others serve as "modern-day incarnations of priesthoods" (Meyer et al. 2006a: 262). Similarly to this perspective, Niilo Kauppi describes social scientists as the "physical (personnel) and symbolic (practical knowledge) operators of global governance" (Kauppi 2014: 331). According to Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, experts represent a 'disinterested truth' (Miller/Rose 1990: 10). They also point out that the "complex of actors, powers, institutions and bodies of knowledge that comprise expertise has come to play a crucial role in establishing the possibility and legitimacy of government" (Miller/Rose 2008: 69). In this sense, Rose describes these rationalized others as 'experts of truth' (Rose 1999b: 30). In the case of Palestine, these rationalized others, for instance, influence the legitimacy of the PA by evaluating its governance performance (see Chapter 5).

Related to both rationalization and theorization, universalism represents another world-cultural principle contributing to the diffusion of global models in world society. Rationalization and theorization thus represent universally valid principles that considerably affect modern actorhood in world society. In this sense, "[a]ctors and action are illuminated by universalistic lights" (Meyer et al. 1987: 24). Boli and Thomas highlight that "human nature, agency, and purpose are universal, and this universality underlies the many variations in social forms" (Boli/Thomas 1997: 180). In this sense, the nation state represents a

universalistic global model for the proper and legitimate organization of political order in world society. It is important to note, however, that

> "[t]o say that a cultural element is ***universalistic*** is not to say that it is truly ***universal***, that is, found in all cultures (…) or found "everywhere" (…). Rather, it is to say that the element is presented to the world "as if" it were universally meaningful, applicable, useful, or proper. The element is presumed to have universal (worldwide) scope; it is presumed to be interpretable in a largely uniform way and to make sense both cognitively and, often, normatively, in any particular local culture or social framework" (Lechner/Boli 2005: 21, emphasis added).

For instance, even though human rights might not be fully realized everywhere in world society the idea of their universality cannot be denied (Meyer 2004).

The example of human rights is very suitable to introduce individualization as a fourth principle which is constitutive for world society as it points to the idea of the modern individual which is equipped with universal human rights. Individualization

> "encompasses the rise and legitimation of models of society in which the individual is seen as a central constitutive element: the sovereign source of public life – political, economic, social, and cultural – and the source of problems in these areas; the proper beneficiary of political, economic, social, and cultural life; and the primordial or grounding element of all of social structure" (Frank et al. 1995: 360).

The individual thus has become a main source of legitimate actorhood in world society (Frank/Meyer 2002). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the modern individual can be described as "an institutional myth evolving out of the rationalized theories of economic, political, and cultural action" (Meyer et al. 1987: 26).

The Stanford School makes a significant distinction between actorhood and agency: "Actorhood is the principle that social life is built up of actors – human individuals, organizations, and national states with valid interests that others are to respect, and with the capacity (i.e. agency) to validly represent those interests in activity" (Drori et al. 2003: 30). Accordingly, modern world society is comprised of actors, but only those actors who are capable of representing certain interests possess agency. From this perspective, sociological neo-institutionalism argues that world society is characterized by specific forms of

agency that are also based on the world-cultural principles of rationalization, theorization, universalism and individualization. The modern actors of world society are culturally constructed and can be seen both as driving forces for the diffusion of world-cultural principles as well as their result (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 101). Meyer and Jepperson point out that modern actorhood is based on specific cultural rules: the rationalization of representation of nature and of the spiritual world (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 102–106). In this sense, first, stemming from the scientization of world society (Drori/Meyer 2006), modern actorhood can speak for legitimated interests related to nature, such as whales or climate change. At the same time, and second, the rationalization of representations of the spiritual world contributes to the emergence of agents for higher principles resulting in the "cultural devolution of originally spiritual agency" (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 105). As a result, "[a]ctors are entities with rights or interests *and* with the assigned right and capacity to represent these interests" (Meyer 2000: 239, emphasis in the original). On the basis of these cultural sources, Meyer and Jepperson argue that "[t]he constructed capacity for responsible agency is the core of modern actorhood" (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 106). On this basis, they identify different kinds of agency; namely agency for the self, for other actors, for non-actor entities, and for principles.

First, modern actors can assume 'agency for the self' so that, for instance, individuals, nation-states or organizations pursue their own interests. An example would be the PA pursuing the objective of becoming a non-member observer state in the United Nations General Assembly. It is important to note that "[m]odern individuals, organizations, and nation-states, in becoming legitimated agents for their underlying interests, incorporate the highly standardizing responsibility to enact imagined moral and natural principles" (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 107). Second, there are actors that serve as 'agents for other actors', for instance as voters for the nation-state or employees for the corporation, or in the case of Palestine, global solidarity campaigns in support of the Palestinian population. Accordingly, "a striking feature of the modern system is the extreme readiness with which its actor participants can act as agents for other actors" (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 107). The standardized and rationalized nature of world society facilitates the shifting from agency for the self (actorhood) to agency for others (otherhood). Third, actors also assume

'agency for non-actor entities', such as, for instance, endangered animals. In this context, the relation to the above mentioned cultural rules of modern agency becomes clearly evident. Accordingly, "[t]he capacity to do so arises from the modern actor's imagined competence in applying natural and moral law, competence that can be put to the service of the widest variety of legitimated entities (…)" (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 108). Finally, actors can become agents of principles since "in becoming an authorized agent (of the self, or of any other), the proper modern actor assumes responsibility to act as an agent of the imagined natural and moral law" (Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 108). Certain agentic actors are characterized by the absence of any interest but 'pure otherhood' by exclusively serving as an agent for principles, for example for human rights. Thereby agents for principles can serve as 'norm-entrepreneurs' which significantly contribute to the global diffusion of world-cultural principles. These 'rationalized others' (see above) such as scientists enjoy a high degree of legitimacy in world society. As modern actors of world society are interested in being perceived as legitimate, they adhere to world-cultural principles which are considered legitimate thereby contributing to their global diffusion.

While the global diffusion of world-cultural models increasingly leads to structural similarities or isomorphisms, these structures are, however, often strikingly decoupled from their respective content (Meyer 2009a: 50–51; Meyer/Rowan 1977). In this sense, we can observe the failure to translate global scripts into local contexts (Meyer 2000: 244). Decoupling should, however, not be regarded as a flaw. Rather, it can be seen as an important precondition for global isomorphism and a typical feature of actorhood in modern world society: "Any rationalized "actor", whether an individual, organization, or nation-state, reveals much decoupling between formal models and observable practices (…)" (Meyer et al. 1997: 155). Regardless of the actual enforcement, modern actors in world society subscribe to world-cultural norms, such as human rights conventions, in order to gain legitimacy (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008). In the case of Palestine, such decoupling is, for example, justified with reference to the Israeli occupation, the division between Fatah and Hamas, or Islamic or traditional values. Decoupling therefore often occurs as a rationalized process. Accordingly, actors tend to justify deviations from global scripts with reference to rationalized strategies. The subscription to world-cultural norms does not

occur as a matter of efficiency but due to legitimation purposes. As a result, decoupling is an important mechanism in order to maintain legitimacy as an actor in world society (Meyer 2009a: 51; Meyer et al. 2006a: 261) because "decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations" (Meyer/Rowan 1977: 357). On a structural level, in order to gain legitimacy, modern actors in world society therefore adhere to a 'rationalized myth' which is adopted in a ceremonial manner (Meyer/Rowan 1977), while the actual operations of these actors is clearly decoupled from it.

Multiple Modernities, Multiple Palestines

Related to these insights are two important points: First, the historical anchoring of the dynamics of political order in world society, and second, the underlying understanding of modernity. First, it is important to note that the chosen perspective is aware of a historical dimension. Accordingly, it does not observe superficial trends but addresses patterns of political ordering which are deeply rooted in world society and thus in modern Palestine. In this sense, these patterns of modern political ordering have spread globally since the 19th century by means of diffusion and therefore also to the Middle East and Palestine. As such, the phenomenon of global diffusion possesses a considerable historical foundation, exemplified in the Middle East and Palestine, for example, by the modern ideas of nationalism and national self-determination, in particular in the context of decolonization and embodied in the Zionist movement or Palestinian nationalism. Furthermore, the establishment of modern bureaucratic institutions based on rationalization and standardization in the Middle East and Palestine can be traced back to attempts of Western imperial powers to exercise control over their colonies as well as the comprehensive reform initiatives of the Ottoman Empire, especially during the Tanzimat period in the middle of the 19th century (Osterhammel 2014). At the same time, there is clear evidence of the diffusion of modern subjectivity to the Middle East and the consequent availability of the idea of the modern individual as being equipped with particular rights (see Jung et al. 2014). In this context, it is important to note that the discipline of IR does not have a well-developed understanding of modernity. It can be interpreted as a sign of the discipline's a-historicity that the term

'modernity' does not exist in IR. In contrast to this I argue that any kind of action in world society is embedded in the context of modernity.

Second, while I describe governmentality as an explicitly modern way of exercising power, I reject any notion of modernization as a linear, teleological or homogenizing process. Accordingly, due to decoupling dynamics, processes of global diffusion do not lead to any kind of homogenization or Westernization. In other words, it is important to take into account that global norms are always translated into local contexts, thus accounting for a great variety of how globally prevalent structures are actually manifesting themselves practically in different contexts. Therefore, in line with Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000), this book adheres to the notion of 'multiple modernities' and emphasizes the variations of societal evolution and their different, contingent trajectories in world society.[14] Hence, by no means, modernization can be equated with Westernization. From such a perspective, it is possible to reject a simplifying distinction between modernity and tradition which is often utilized in order to distinguish the modern West from the traditional (e.g. Middle Eastern) rest (see Huntington 1993). Rather it is reasonable to argue that world-cultural norms and isomorphisms point to a horizon of a globally shared modernity. At the same time, however, decoupling leads to a variety of interpretations of these norms so that we can speak of multiple modernities. The multiplicity of modernities is also mirrored in the complex constitutions of subjectivity. In this sense, there are also multiple or hybrid forms of collective and individual identity (Reckwitz 2006). For instance, the renowned Palestinian artist Steve Sabella reflects on his own identity and its relationship to Palestine and globality in the following way: "I was born as a citizen of the world under occupation, and I had to free myself from feeling occupied. I found a way to become a citizen of the world and made my peace with Palestine."[15]

As a result, the proposed conceptualization of world society allows for a reconciling of the global and the local and avoids the reification of these dichotomies by displaying context-sensitivity in three respects. First, by taking into account the role of historical developments in shaping contemporary power

[14] Koenig (2007) stresses the compatibility between Eisenstadt's research on multiple modernity and the Stanford School's work on world society based on similar theoretical premises.
[15] Author interview with Steve Sabella, Berlin, 29 April 2014.

dynamics. Second, by acknowledging that politics in world society is neither exclusively characterized by trends of homogenization or heterogenization but rather by the simultaneous co-existence of worldwide structural similarities and great variations in their local manifestations. Finally, by stressing that there are multiple pathways towards modernity, the chosen approach rejects a Eurocentric research perspective.

Based on the notion of 'Multiple Modernities' and borrowing from Stetter it can be argued that Palestine "is constructed wherever it is communicated" (2008b: 27). Accordingly, one can speak of multiple Palestines in the sense that there are multiple different understandings of what Palestine encompasses. Hence, adherents of the two-state settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict perceive Palestine as being composed of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. By contrast, Hamas followers relate to historic Palestine of the era of the British Mandate while some right wing Israelis see Jordan as the natural Palestinian homeland. In addition to these territorialized understandings, especially for Palestinians living in exile/diaspora Palestine is constructed through their personal narratives of loss and expulsion (Peteet 2007). As a result, there are multiple, potentially de-territorialized, understandings of Palestine.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that only by relocating Palestine into a global context it is possible make sense of the complex power dynamics at play. Put simply, what is going on in Palestine can only be understood if contextualized with a world societal horizon. Or, in other words, the world observes Palestine and Palestine observes the world. For that purpose, I have critically evaluated the existing literature on Palestinian politics and society and pointed to its limitations, such as methodological nationalism, a preoccupation with structures as opposed to processes, Eurocentrism as well as the risk of reifying the distinction between the inside and the outside of Palestine. In order to overcome these limitations I have referred to the many examples of Palestine's global integration. I have suggested a contextualization of these empirical observations by utilizing the Stanford School of Sociology's understanding of world society. Accordingly, the global diffusion of world-cultural principles considerably impacts what is going on in Palestine. The chapter's final section has emphasized that these dynamics

possess a strong historical rootedness that is also observable in Palestine so that they cannot be regarded as superficial developments. At the same time, I have clarified that global diffusion cannot be equated with global homogenization because the phenomenon of decoupling leads to significant differences between a global norm and how it is translated into a local context. As a result, there is good reason to adopt the concept of 'Multiple Modernities' in opposition to an understanding of modernity as being teleological, Westernizing and homogenizing. Applied to Palestine, one can infer that it makes sense to speak of multiple understandings of what Palestine means. Based on these elaborations, I will introduce modern governmentality as a particular power configuration that is perceived as legitimate in world society. Accordingly, modern governmentality relates to those world-cultural norms that determine how populations are legitimately governed in world society. In this context, it is crucial to emphasize that even though governmentality theory offers the tools to analyze micro-phenomena of power, these need to be regarded within the overarching context of world society in order to be fully comprehended. Hence, the Stanford School's conceptualization of world society is crucial in order to make sense of modern governmentality.

3 Conceptualizing Governmentality in World Society[16]

Introduction

With the English publication of Michel Foucault's seminal lecture on governmentality in 1991, the Anglophone academic world witnessed a *Foucault Effect* (Burchell et al. 1991) that triggered the birth of governmentality studies. Strikingly, however, even though the discipline of International Relations (IR) had been familiarized with Foucault-inspired research already since the late 1980s, it took until the 2000s until IR experienced its *governmentality-related Foucault Effect* (see Walters 2012: 82–83). Ever since, there has been increasing research on governmentality in the context of IR encompassing many different issue areas. Relying on this rich stock of knowledge, this chapter is interested in the question of how order is generated in world society. Addressing this question from a Foucauldian poststructuralist framework as opposed to more traditional theories in IR helps make sense of a multiplicity of power relations. In other words, the question of global order is inextricably linked to the question of how power is exercised in world society. In this regard, my research perspective follows existing governmentality studies of the international/global (such as Larner/Walters 2004; Neumann/Sending 2010). At the same time, however, my approach differs from these studies as I argue that in order to properly make sense of power dynamics in global politics requires embedding governmentality into the overarching context of world society. In this context, I will connect governmentality research with the world society theorization of the Stanford School's sociological neo-institutionalism. In this regard, as clarified in the introduction, I literally use Foucault's work in the sense of a 'tool box' as he stated it, thus rejecting any theoretical orthodoxy or exegesis. At the same time, this theoretical synthesis rests on the insight that, from an IR perspective, governmentality lacks a coherent reference to global order in a structural sense. Accordingly, I am introducing *structuralist* elements from world society theory to post-*structuralist* governmentality research. This appears not only legitimate because, as highlighted in the introductory chapter of this book, both Stanford

[16] Parts of the theoretical framework of this book have first been outlined as Busse (2015b). In this publication, I have also presented fragments of the empirical findings that will come up in Chs. 4-6.

School and Foucauldian governmentality operate on very similar epistemological and ontological foundations. It also appears necessary as governmentality research does not sufficiently take into account overarching societal structures in which power relations often are embedded. My understanding of governmentality therefore relies on existing governmentality studies, but at the same time it considerably goes beyond them.

On this basis, I will argue that modern governmentality represents a constitutive pattern of political order in world society. My conceptualization of modern governmentality in world society differs from existing approaches in three major respects. First, instead of locating governmentality either in national societies or on the international level, I embed governmentality into the structural horizon of world society. Thereby, the chosen research perspective avoids reifying the Eurocentrism that is inherent in many governmentality studies. This is the case because while modern governmentality has its origin in eighteenth century Europe, since then we can observe the global diffusion of modern political rationalities and technologies in world society as a whole. By contextualizing governmentality with world society it is also possible to overcome over-simplistic dichotomies such as global/local because all power dynamics are observed as occurring within world society. Second, rather than limiting the scope of governmentality only to advanced liberal democracies, I argue that governmentality is a modern feature of political ordering that is globally pervasive and thus also existing in political contexts that do not qualify as liberal. Therefore, I reject the label *(neo-) liberal* and instead speak of *modern* governmentality. Third, I will argue that a defining feature of modern governmentality is a specific underlying conception of subjectivity. Accordingly, modern subjectivity relies on the autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization of the self.

In order to substantiate this argument, I will proceed in the following way. First, I will point to the limitations of both 'governance theory' and existing IR theories in dealing with power. These two research perspective have been chosen because the former displays a preoccupation with governance and concomitantly political order while the latter appears important due to its emphasis on power on the one hand and due to its interest in questions of world order on the other. Subsequently, I will introduce Foucault's original elaborations on power and

governmentality. The next section critically reviews the state of governmentality studies that are inspired by Foucault's original work. Note that this exercise is meant as an 'immanent critique' (Walters 2012) instead of a fundamental rejection of these approaches. In this section, I will show how different strands of governmentality studies attempt to analyze political power beyond the state. Hence, first, I will discuss some crucial features of governmentality studies that remain within the framework of the state, such as the analytical distinction between technologies and rationalities of government, the importance of freedom for governmentality and the governmentalization of the state. I will argue that these studies of governmentality have made important advancements concerning the understanding of political power. At the same time, however, they remain trapped in a framework of methodological nationalism that they actually attempt to overcome. Therefore, in the second part of this section, it is important to turn to governmentality studies of the international. Here, I will examine the contributions of governmentality to the field of IR. I will show that two main readings of governmentality exist in this regard, using either power in a repressive or a more productive sense. Consequently, I will discuss how the different studies conceptualize the international, what role they ascribe to liberalism, and what follows from this for agency and subjectivity. Related to these approaches and based on their critical evaluation, I will introduce my own understanding of modern governmentality as a constitutive pattern of political order in world society. Thereby, this conceptualization prepares the ground for engaging in detail with empirical phenomena of modern governmentality in the context of Palestine in the following chapters.

'Governance Theory' and its Limitations

Both within practical global politics and the discipline of International Relations we can observe pervasive attempts to make sense of political order by referring to 'governance'. This trend can also be witnessed with regard to Palestine where academic and policy literature often addresses processes of political ordering via the lens of governance; be it concerning Palestinian state-building efforts, international governmental or non-governmental organizations or the destructive effects of the Israeli occupation (see for example International Crisis Group 2004; Néfissa 2005; Schenker 2000; Seitz 2001).

The concept of governance has been approached in political science from different directions. On the one hand, in the context of public administration and public policy R.A.W. Rhodes developed a definition that was based on observations of the British political system. According to him,

> "*governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks* characterized by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state" (Rhodes 1997: 15, emphasis in the original; see also Benz et al. 2007; Kjaer 2004).

In this sense, Rhodes introduces a definition of governance as self-governing networks in which governance is the opposite of hierarchical government by the state. On the other hand, the insight that in the face of increasing global interdependence the exclusive reference to the state is analytically insufficient is apparent in liberal-institutionalist theories of International Relations. On this basis, James Rosenau argues that

> "governance is here conceived at a very abstract level as spheres of authority (SOAs) at all levels of human activity – from the household to the demanding public to the international organization – that amount to systems of rule in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control" (1997: 145).

Governance, therefore, is more comprehensive than government and thus does not represent the opposite of government but rather includes it as one form of governance (Rosenau 1992: 4; for a similar conception see Kooiman 2003). Furthermore, Rosenau has a broad conception of the actual mode of governance as referring to all forms of formal and informal systems of rule pursuing a specific goal from the local to the global level. In this sense, for Rosenau global governance denotes what Robert Latham termed governance "in the global" (Latham 1999: 28) – i.e. from the local to the global level (Rosenau 1995: 13) – as opposed to an understanding of global governance exclusively referring to the global level (see for example Willke 2007).[17] It is also worth pointing to Hooghe and Marks who address the existence of multi-level governance. They distinguish between hierarchical governance in the context of the nation state (type I governance) and issue-area specific governance on multiple levels (type II governance) (Hooghe/Marks 2003: 236–39; see also Bache/Flinders 2004). However, Hooghe and Marks seem too narrowly focused on formally

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[17] For an overview over the emergence of the concept of global governance see Weiss/Wilkinson (2014).

institutionalized jurisdictions with clearly allocated responsibilities (such as e.g. the European Union) thereby neglecting less formalized arrangements of governance.

In a narrower sense than above, the term *governance* was also adopted in the German context by actor-centered institutionalism whose origin also lies, as similarly claimed by Rhodes, in the field of administrative science. The conceptual development originally started with questions of political planning, evolved with reference to political steering[18] and eventually led to the adoption of the concept of governance (Mayntz 2008). In this context, governance can be understood as "the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods" (Börzel/Risse 2010: 114).

In this sense, governance possesses both a structural as well as a procedural component and encompasses "governance by government" (hierarchical governance by the state), "governance with government" (involving both governmental and non-governmental actors being based on cooperation), and, "governance without government" (non-hierarchical governance without the involvement of a superior governmental authority) (Zürn 1998: 169–70, 2002: 81).

It follows that different conceptions of governance differ regarding their scope, or in other words, the degree to which they take into account government as being part of governance on the one hand and regarding their consideration of different levels of governance on the other. In addition, the role that is ascribed to non-state actors varies widely. While some authors consider non-state actors as genuine governance authorities (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall/Biersteker 2002), others primarily see their role as accompanying the work of governmental actors (e.g. in the form of public-private partnerships) and thus as being subordinate vis-à-vis the state (e.g. Reinicke 1998). Moreover, there are differences concerning the question what forms of social coordination qualify as

[18] For a related debate on the limits of political steering see: Luhmann (1989) and Scharpf (1989); see also Luhmann (1997).

governance. In this sense, a wide and a narrow understanding of governance can be distinguished.

To summarize, located in the liberal-institutionalist tradition of IR, these approaches are characterized by an attempt to shift the focus of attention from the state as a structure (government) to the analysis of governance as a process in which both state and non-state actors can be involved on multiple levels. In addition, governance theory highlights the importance of non-hierarchical forms of governance.

Despite its acknowledgeable merits, in particular when it comes to overcoming the state-centrism of classical IR theories by taking into account a multitude of configurations of governance, the following limitations of liberal-institutionalist governance theory need to be addressed.

First, these approaches are characterized by what Renate Mayntz (2009) describes as a problem-solving bias. Accordingly, governance is often conceptualized as being preoccupied with solving political problems in a technocratic sense, emphasizing questions of legitimacy and effectiveness of governance. Thereby, a necessary problematization of governance is missing as these approaches most often refrain from asking how a political problem is constructed in the first place and as such becomes subject to political intervention. As a consequence, such a perspective uncritically internalizes and reifies the scripts that are predominant in its object of analysis; namely the instrumentalist and normative understanding of governance as *good* governance epitomized by international organizations such as the World Bank or the IMF (Joseph 2012: 89–101; Walters 2012: 66). In contrast to this, on an epistemological level, governmentality operates on the basis of second-order observations (Andersen 2003). This means that this perspective is aware that it observes observations (see Luhmann 2012). In this way, it helps overcoming the technocratic bias of governance theory as it asks how political problems become constructed as such in the first place.

Second, an instrumentalist understanding of governance results in the inadequate consideration of power in liberal-institutionalist governance approaches. In this sense, the problem-solving bias contributes to a power-blindness because power is mainly contextualized with regard to the formulation

and implementation of solutions of governance problems but not as a political goal itself (Mayntz 2009: 33–34). Underlying is thus often a Habermasian understanding of governance which assumes that political problems can be regulated in consensual manners letting the best argument prevail (Risse 2000), thereby ignoring potential conflicts or power struggles. By contrast, as governmentality observes governance from a second-order perspective, it can ask how power is exercised and which underlying technologies and rationalities of power are at play.

Third, and closely linked, even though a liberal-institutionalist governance perspective tries to overcome methodological nationalism by analytically separating governance from statehood or government, this perspective is still very much influenced by an implicit or explicit reference to the state and its territoriality as the ultimate point of reference (see e.g. Börzel/Risse 2010). Hence, the constant contextualization of governance with statehood, even if limited, as being observed in particular in formerly colonial contexts, leads to a reification of the methodological nationalism that these approaches attempt to overcome. Instead, governmentality as analytical perspective would allow considering the state as a particular, historically contingent, institutionalization of power relations.

Fourth, as Sending and Neumann argue, even though governance-approaches emphasize the conceptualization of governance as a process as opposed to a structure (government), they fail to offer the appropriate analytical tools to make sense of these processes. Instead, these approaches eventually resort to descriptions of institutions and actors in order to make sense of processes of governance (Sending/Neumann 2006: 653–4). A governmentality perspective, instead, focuses on the processes which eventually contribute to the formation of particular institutional arrangements or actors. In this way, governmentality can succeed in overcoming the adherence to conceptual dualisms – such as state/society, public/private, international/domestic, global/local – which are pervasive in governance theory and significantly limit its analytical potential (see Walker 1993; Lemke 2007: 56).

Fifth, while liberal-institutionalist governance approaches regard 'governance without government' as a novel phenomenon that coincides with globalization, Barry Hindess points out that this is not the case. Rather, according to him,

"nonstate agencies have played a major role in governing the populations" (2005: 406) ever since the seventeenth century, be it as mercenaries or colonial trading companies, or religious authorities.

Finally, governance theory can be described as an 'ontologically over-determined theory' (Andersen 2003: XI), emphasizing the ontological foundations of the objects it is supposed to study, for instance by ascribing a strong sense of rationality to political actorhood. By contrast, for governmentality, "[t]he focus is on the regimes of truth, the practices and strategies that ontologize the world in the first place" (Walters 2012: 57).

As a result, governance theory tend to neglect the role of power relations for the constitution of world-societal order. It follows that due to this neglect of power these approaches also seem inadequate to properly capture power dynamics in Palestine.[19]

Governmentality as a Theory of Power

IR and the Study of Power

In order to make sense of political ordering in Palestine and world society it is important to give power appropriate consideration. In this regard, however, IR faces a twofold dilemma. On the one hand, the analysis of power is often limited to classical accounts of power, exemplified by the writings of, amongst others, Thomas Hobbes, Niccolò Machiavelli and Max Weber. The discipline of IR, on the other hand, tends to display a preoccupation with power, but most often it fails to provide satisfactory conceptualizations of what power is supposed to mean.

Even though the discipline of International Relations seems preoccupied with questions of power, most often it is lacking the proper means to conceptualize it. If power is addressed in a conceptual manner at all, it is limited to the classical understanding described above. Hence, even though power is an omnipresent phenomenon in IR, it seems at best a fundamentally contested concept and at worst a blatantly under-theorized one. Felix Berenskoetter is therefore right when he states that in IR and beyond, "we need to think about power" (2007:

[19] Detlef Sack (2014) is a rare exception that examines potentials for complementarity between governance and governmentality theory.

1). In the discipline itself, Berenskoetter follows Steven Lukes's three-dimensional view and identifies three major ways of dealing with power; namely, power as winning conflicts, power as limiting alternatives, and power as shaping normality (Berenskoetter 2007: 4–12). Following this distinction, it is possible to relate the first dimension to the theory of (neo-) realism in IR. One could even get the impression that realism demands an exclusive monopoly of dealing with power in IR. Interestingly, however, while claiming that "[r]ealists are the theorists of power politics" (Schmidt 2007: 43), we can find a lot of reference to power in realist IR but only very little theorizing.[20] This is especially the case in the Middle East, a region often exclusively characterized in terms of (hard) power politics.

Liberal-institutionalism, and thereby also governance theory, can be associated with the second dimension which stresses the interdependence of global politics (see e.g. Keohane/Nye 1977). Here, power is not limited to prevailing in immediate conflicts of interests. Instead, liberal-institutionalism conceives of power as a means to reduce potential options of choice. In direct opposition to the conception of power as 'hard' power in realism, Joseph Nye therefore introduces the concept of 'soft' power. While hard power primarily relies on negative means of coercion, realizing someone's interest with the help of soft power works through positive attraction or co-optation (Nye 2004). As a result, such a conception of power implies, for instance, that certain states are capable of shaping the international agenda.

The third dimension of power in IR attempts to offer a more comprehensive understanding, as it addresses the social environment in which power is exercised. However, even conceptions of power that attempt to overcome some of the limitations of the first two conceptions often remain entangled in very similar foundations. Most prominently, Steven Lukes (2005) offers a somewhat more sophisticated conception of power which tries to go beyond the inter-personal relationship of power holder and subordinate by embedding his view into a social and political environment. In spite of this advancement, however, Lukes remains within the conceptual framework of classical theories. This is the case because he does not offer a critique of the foundations on which classical

[20] For a comprehensive critique see especially Guzzini (1993) but also Ashley (1984).

accounts of power rest. Instead he extends the existing approaches by providing power with the additional dimension of a social environment. In addition, as Barry Hindess (2008) observes, Lukes completely ignores how power is exercised in the international sphere. In the discipline of IR this last strand of 'shaping normality' can primarily be attributed to social constructivism. Apart from rare examples (Guzzini 1993, 2005; Barnett/Duvall 2005) social constructivism displays a preoccupation with norms that is accompanied with a striking disregard of power (Neumann/Sending 2010: 6–7). If this is not the case, conceptualizations of power often lack a disregard of the overarching societal context in which power relations occur.

In contrast to these approaches, I argue that in order to properly make sense of political order and power dynamics in Palestine and world society, it is necessary to engage much more thoroughly with Foucault's conception of power. According to Stefano Guzzini, it is necessary to analytically distinguish power from governance if the latter is supposed to make sense of the nature of international political order (Guzzini 2012: 6–8). Instead of such a separation, however, I argue that in order to make sense of political order in Palestine and world society, it is necessary to explore the intertwined and interdependent relationship of power and governance. In other words, I will argue that it is crucial to conceive power as being concomitant with governance, as governance always involves the exercise of power.

The Power of Governmentality

Foucault has developed his understanding of power as an explicit alternative to classical approaches. He therefore states that "[i]n political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king" (Foucault 1978: 88–89). When addressing power, Foucault is primarily interested in ***how*** it is exercised as opposed to ***why,*** thereby basing his perspective on a thin ontology (see Dean 2010: 33; Lemke 2007). In his words, "to begin the analysis with a 'how' is to suggest that power as such does not exist" (Foucault 1982: 786). Such an approach is therefore not primarily interested in causal mechanisms related to power but in its underlying modalities. It follows that Foucault's specific conceptualization of power, which is central to governmentality, understood

here as a theory of modern societal and political order(ing), differs greatly from classical definitions.

According to Foucault, power is, first, relational.[21] In other words, such a perspective rejects the notion that power can be possessed which is closely related to the conceptualization of power as a zero-sum-game, pervasive in many IR theories. Power, therefore, is not possessed but exercised (Foucault 1977: 26; see also Lemke 1997: 99). Second, a relational understanding of power opposes the assumption that power can be identified in specific locations, such as the state. Rather, according to Foucault, power is not plainly exercised in a top-down fashion, but also 'comes from below' (Foucault 1978: 94). Power is, thus, polycentric (see Miller/Rose 2008: 53). Related to this is, third, that power relations are inscribed in any kind of societal relations. The analysis of these intricacies of power Foucault calls the 'micro-physics of power' (Foucault 1977: 26). It needs to be noted, however, that "although power is every*where*, it is not every*thing*, since there are any number of things and levels and types of relation against which to differentiate" (Kelly 2009: 73, emphasis in the original). If power were everything, it would not have any analytical value. Therefore, it can be argued that social relations are co-extensive with power relations in the sense that "*all* phenomena (within the domain of social reality) are shaped by the workings of social power" (Weberman 1995: 207, emphasis in the original). Power relations are, fourth, not necessarily repressive but can have productive effects (Foucault 1978: 94). Hence, power not only restricts certain options but always opens up new ones. David Weberman highlights the crucial difference between negative and positive power:

> "In the case of negative power, prohibition is explicit and conflict or the frustration of desire ensues, while in the case of productive power, the exercise is unperceived and conflict or desire-frustration is avoided. Where negative power leaves beliefs and desires intact and only prohibits certain actions, positive power impinges directly on beliefs and desires" (1995: 195).

Hence, by transforming individual positions, productive power serves as a means to avoid open conflict. Fifth, "power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective" (Foucault 1978: 94). In this sense, power is strategic without

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[21] Interestingly, in this regard, there is a connection between Weber and Foucault: Even though Weber distinguishes the person of the power-holder from the subordinate person, he talks of "social relationships" in which power is exercised (Weber 1978: 53).

being exercised by a subject. At a first glance, this seems contradictory, as Kelly points out, because intentionality is often associated with conscious agency. This contradiction can, however, be resolved by considering power as consisting of non-subjective macro-strategies (such as the predominance of certain hegemonic discourses in specific social contexts) on the one hand and a diversity of micro-tactics that are exercised by subjects on the other (Kelly 2009: 48). Power as a strategy "is non-subjective just in the sense that its operation, development and directedness lie beyond individual or collective design" (Weberman 1995: 202). Power, accordingly, is understood as a self-organizing principle which is composed as a network of multiple, often opposing, tactics (Foucault 1978: 95). Finally, power always inherently contains the potential of resistance to it (Foucault 1980a: 142). It is inconceivable without its potential contestation in the way that the contingency of power relations is an underlying feature of political order in modern society. In other words, following Ernesto Laclau, "[p]ower is, thus, not a material capacity (...) but an *empty signifer* for all those world societal communications which observe themselves on the basis of the distinction power/powerlessness" (Stetter 2008b: 72, emphasis in the original; see also Stäheli 2000).

To varying degrees, these characteristics of power can be identified in all three forms of power, introduced by Foucault, namely: sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality. While the primary target of sovereign power is a given *territory*, controlled by a sovereign ruler, discipline and governmentality target the *population*. Sovereignty as a traditional form of power – 'the old power of death' – has not been replaced by modern forms of power. Rather, sovereign power has been complemented by discipline and governmentality as explicitly modern forms of power so that Foucault speaks of a triangle of these three forms of power (Foucault 2007a: 107, 2003: 240, 1978: 139–40). Discipline and governmentality are modern in the sense that they are forms of productive power. In the case of discipline this means that "it aims not only to constrain those over whom it is exercised, but also to enhance and make use of their capacities" (Hindess 1996: 113). As a result, it is important to highlight that my decision to analytically focus on governmentality does not mean that I disregard the potential existence of sovereign and disciplinary power which are clearly relevant in world society in general and in Palestine in particular.

In order to prepare the ground for Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality, it is possible to relate it to his understanding of power by describing governmentality very generally as "a strategic field of power relations in their mobility, transformability, and reversibility" (Foucault 2005: 252). Accordingly, governmentality represents a distinct configuration of power in the sense that potentially contingent, unstable and reversible power relations become temporarily stabilized and institutionalized, materialized, for instance, in the form of the state or international organizations (Hindess 1996: 105–113). Based on this particular understanding of power, it is now possible to introduce Foucault's understanding of governmentality which serves as the foundation for the discussion of governmentality studies and the subsequent presentation of my own conception of modern governmentality as a specific pattern of political ordering in world society.

Conceptualizing Governmentality

Many authors who make use of governmentality distinguish between at least two meanings of governmentality: governmentality as analytical perspective and governmentality as an explicitly modern form of governing (see e.g. Dean 2010: 24–30). But it is possible to add a third understanding which relates to governmentality as the history of the art of government (Walters 2012: 11–13; Walters/Haahr 2005). While the second understanding of governmentality is most relevant for my line of argument, I will briefly introduce the others as well because all three are analytically interrelated.

First, governmentality can be conceived as a second-order perspective to analyze modalities of governance. In the words of Laura Zanotti, governmentality utilized this way serves as a "*heuristic* tool to explore modalities of local and international government and to assess their effects in the contexts where they are deployed" (2013: 289, emphasis in the original). In this sense governmentality refers to the analysis of "the way in which one conducts the conduct of men," thus serving as an "analytical grid for (…) relations of power" (Foucault 2008: 186). Governmentality is then understood as *conduct of conducts* (Foucault 1984a: 314, see also 2007a: 192–193),[22] encompassing both the conduct of others and

[22] Despite often being quoted by scholars, the exact phrase 'conduct of conduct' does not seem to appear in any of the English translations of Foucault's writings and can only be found in the above quoted French original as 'conduire des conduites.' However, this fact does not decrease

the conduct of oneself, or, in other words, *government of the self* and *government of others* (Foucault 2010).

Second, governmentality, understood as the history of the art of government, refers to "the question how, at different times, in specific places, and always in connection with particular political issues, certain experts, authorities, critics and dissidents have come to reflect on the problem of *how* to govern the state" (Walters 2012: 20, emphasis in the original). The state in this perspective can be seen as a particular institutional manifestation of governmental rationalities and technologies. In this sense, by referring to the 'governmentalization of the state' (Foucault 2007a: 109), Foucault "comprehends the state itself as a tactics of government, as a dynamic form and historic stabilization of societal power relations" (Lemke 2002: 58).

The third understanding of governmentality denotes a historical formation of a particular regime of power that has originally gained predominance in advanced liberal democracies since the 18th century. Governmentality, in this sense, serves as a '*descriptive* tool' in order to examine a "particular trajectory of global liberalism" (Zanotti 2013: 289). Therefore, it is often described as (neo-) liberal governmentality. This system of thought represents a specific, contingent form of governmental rationalities and technologies and is defined as

> "the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument" (Foucault 2007a: 108).

Consequently, first, not territoriality but the population is the main address or reference point of governmentality and related technologies of government. In political science and IR, the term is traditionally limited to the affairs of the state and related agencies and bureaucracies. Foucault, however, makes use of government in a much wider way so that it refers to multiple forms of human interactions and the related conduct of conducts. At a first glance, this might appear unconventional. Foucault, however, explains this specific utilization of the term government by referring to its historical origin. He stresses that the terms government and to govern originally referred to a number of different

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the importance of this term. I owe this discovery to Jeremy Crampton's Foucault blog: http://foucaultblog.wordpress.com/2007/05/15/key-term-conduct-of-conduct.

aspects such as spatially moving items, "supporting by providing means of subsistence" (Foucault 2007a: 121) or spiritually governing someone's soul. On this basis, Foucault concludes:

> "Before it acquires its specifically political meaning in the sixteenth century, we can see that 'to govern,' covers a very wide semantic domain in which it refers to movement in space, material subsistence, diet, the care given to an individual and the health one can assure him, and also to the exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity. It refers to the control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone's body, soul, and behavior. And finally it refers to an intercourse, to a circular process or process of exchange between one individual and another" (Foucault 2007a: 122).

Thus, the crucial insight in this regard is that government/governance addresses questions related to the population as opposed to territoriality and substantially goes beyond the common understanding of relating governance exclusively to matters of the political in general and the state in particular.

While technologies of discipline target the individual, technologies of government consider the population as a whole as its target. In this sense, governmental practices intend to make the population manageable. This 'discovery of the population' (Foucault 2007a) in the 18th century, as Foucault puts it, cannot be underestimated: "population will appear above all as the final end of government. What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health" (Foucault 2007a: 105). As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, it follows, that the discovery of the population as an empirical phenomenon for governmental intervention is unthinkable without the concomitant birth of modern statistics.

Second, the political economy and its underlying expertise is the predominant knowledge base of governmentality. In other words, economic calculations and the related idea of the *homo economicus* are the defining and limiting factors for political intervention. The rationalization of political problems is thus a characteristic feature of governmentality. To put it differently, "the population will be the object that government will have to take into account in its observations and knowledge, in order to govern effectively in a rationally reflected manner" (Foucault 2007a: 106).

Third, as the means to achieve the end of societal order, apparatuses (*dispositifs*) of security – i.e. mechanisms monitoring the condition of the population as a whole – are essential. These are the result of rationalized knowledge about the population and can be described as a "relatively durable network of heterogeneous elements" (Walters 2012: 36), such as "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" (Foucault 1980a: 194) and are directed at the overall living conditions of the population. In particular, apparatuses of security enable the identification of political problems related to the population. The underlying process of *problematization* is itself a political one, because what is considered as a problem and the way it should be dealt with depends on underlying political considerations. Crucially, Foucault makes clear that a problem does not have an ontological core. Rather,

> "[p]roblematization doesn't mean representation of a preexisting object, nor the creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It is the totality of discursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.)" (Foucault 1988b: 257).

Furthermore, apparatuses of security do not take for granted an ideal projection of how the population should be. Rather they take the population as an empirical reality so that "the operation of *normalization* consists in establishing an interplay between (…) different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable" (Foucault 2007a: 63, emphasis added). Decisive are therefore average conditions in the population and projections about its future developments. While Foucault originally introduced the idea of normalization in the context of disciplinary power, it also plays a significant role for governmentality, having both homogenizing and individualizing effects. Thus, normalization creates

> "a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank. In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another" (Foucault 1977: 184).

A distinctive feature of governmentality is the combination of direct and indirect mechanisms to govern the population. In this regard, Foucault highlights that freedom is an essential feature of governmentality:

> "When one defines the exercise of power as a mode of action upon the actions of others, when one characterizes these actions by the government of men by other men - in the broadest sense of the term - one includes an important element: freedom" (Foucault 1982: 790).

Even more so, without freedom there would be no power relations but mere domination (Hindess 1996: 102–105). Inspired by Foucault's rather rudimentary elaborations on governmentality, many researchers have made use of these basic ideas and developed them in different directions. On this basis, the following sections will critically evaluate both domestic and international governmentality studies.

The *State* of Governmentality Studies

Governmentality beyond but within the nation-state

While Michel Foucault held his main lecture on governmentality in February 1978 at the Collège de France in Paris, it took until 1991 when its English publication in the volume 'The Foucault Effect' (Burchell et al. 1991) triggered the birth of governmentality studies in the Anglophone academic world. A major achievement of governmentality studies lies in the emphasis of the importance of power relations *beyond* the state (see Barry et al. 1996). Despite certain awareness of different understandings of governmentality, most of these studies make use of governmentality as (neo-) liberal governmentality and share an analytical focus on 'governing advanced liberal democracies' (Rose 1996a). Even though Foucault himself provided crucial insights concerning the exercise of power, these ideas were not very elaborate and therefore offer considerable potential for interpretation, extension and further development. Accordingly, the 'Foucault Effect' not only represented a re-discovery of Foucault's work on governmentality, but it also heralded the advent of important conceptual innovations related to governmentality research.

Rationalities and Technologies of Government

In line with Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller it is reasonable to focus on the complex interplay of specific political rationalities *(savoirs)* and technologies

(appareils) and how these condition the exercise of governmentality (Rose/Miller 1992: 175–6; see also Dean 2010: 42–3; Merlingen 2006: 183–4). Put simply, political rationalities are systematic considerations about governance that take shape in particular programs or strategies. In order to implement such rationalities specific political technologies are required. It follows that there is an interdependent relationship between the way a political phenomenon is perceived and the way it is dealt with (Miller/Rose 2008: 15). While Rose and Miller developed these insights with reference to (neo-) liberal governmentality, they are also relevant for analyzing other power formations.

Rose and Miller identify three key features of political rationalities, or, in other words, rationalities of government: First, they are *moral* with regard to what is perceived as proper and legitimate authority. Second, political rationalities are *epistemological* in the sense that they are based on a certain conception of the target of governance. Third, they are expressed in a particular kind of terminology (Rose/Miller 1992: 178–9) which is why language is constitutive of governance (Rose 1999b: 28). On this basis political rationalities can be defined as

> "discursive fields characterized by a shared vocabulary within which disputes can be organized, by ethical principles that can communicate with one another, by mutually intelligible explanatory logics, by commonly accepted facts, by significant agreement on key political problems" (Rose 1999b: 28).

Political technologies, or technologies of government, in turn, put into practice political rationalities and can be described as "assemblages of persons, techniques, institutions, instruments for the conducting of conduct. For, to become operable, rationalities had to find some way of realizing themselves, rendering themselves instrumental (…)" (Miller/Rose 2008: 16). If we understand governmentality as the complex interplay of political rationalities and technologies, the combination of direct and indirect mechanisms of rule is of crucial importance. In this sense, borrowing from Bruno Latour, Miller and Rose term these indirect mechanisms of rule as 'government at a distance' referring to "devices, tools, techniques (…) that enabled authorities to imagine and act upon the conduct of persons individually, and in locales that were often very distant" (Miller/Rose 2008: 16). Similarly, sociological neo-institutionalism describes local actors as 'enactors' of world culture (Lechner/Boli 2005: 13).

Governmentality, defined this way, fundamentally relies on the 'conduct of conduct', denoting

> "*any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes*" (Dean 2010: 18, emphasis in the original).

Accordingly, governmentality refers to "the conduct of conduct, aiming to affect the actions of individuals by working on their conduct – that is, on the ways in which they regulate their own behavior" (Hindess 1996: 97). Hence, from this perspective, the exercise of power in the form of governmentality depends on the interplay and combination of direct and indirect mechanisms of power.

Governmentality and Freedom

In this context, it is important to highlight that, opposed to sovereign or disciplinary power, governmentality is not primarily based on pressure or coercion. Rather, governmentality as a mechanism of rule is unthinkable without the freedom of the individual. This becomes evident in Rose's description of governmentality as 'actions upon actions.' Accordingly,

> "[t]o govern is to act upon action. This entails trying to understand what mobilizes the domains or entities to be governed: to govern one must act upon these forces, instrumentalize them in order to shape actions, processes and outcomes in desired directions. Hence, when it comes to governing human beings, to govern is to presuppose the freedom of the governed. *To govern humans is not to crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and to utilize it for one's own objectives*" (1999b: 4, emphasis added).

Governmentality is thus characterized by simultaneous processes of empowerment and subjection. In other words: "Subject-positions empower individuals, while subjecting them at the same time" (Bröckling et al. 2011: 14). Hence, power and freedom are inseparably linked in the sense that freedom is essential in order to involve the individual in the dynamics of political and societal order.[23] The utilization of these 'powers of freedom' (Rose 1999b) only becomes possible by the construction of the individual as a subject in modern (world) society. Only through processes of *subjectification* individuals and

[23] By contrast, Barry Hindess argues that even in liberal contexts there are clear limits to 'governing through freedom' (2005: 403).

collective actors are constructed as part of modern society and can thereby participate in the establishment of societal order through forms of self-governing as "autonomous and responsible individuals" (Miller/Rose 2008: 18; see Foucault 2005). Rationalities and technologies of government contribute to subjectification by "invoking and legitimizing certain images of the self while excluding others" (Bröckling et al. 2011: 13). In this regard, it is important to note that governmentality is concomitant with a particular configuration of subjectivity. As I will argue further below in this chapter, modern subjectivity fundamentally relies on processes of responsibilization, entrepreneurialization and autonomization of the self. Accordingly, the modern self is responsible for his/her own actions and well-being, the modern self becomes an entrepreneur of his/her life course and perceives him-/herself as being autonomous in individual life choices.

The Governmentalization of the State

From an ontological perspective, the state is not the focus of primary attention of governmentality studies. Even more so, the state and the exercise of power become analytically separated. In Foucault's words, "the state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power" (Foucault 2008: 77). This, however, does not result in denying the relevance of the state in world politics. Rather, governmentality research starts with an analysis of power that might result in examining the state as a particular, contingent, temporarily stabilized configuration of power relations. In this sense, the "state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities" (Foucault 2008: 77). As a result, governmentality research de-ontologizes the state in the sense that it does not treat the state as a given object but rather as both "effect and instrument of political strategies and social relations of power" (Lemke 2007: 50; see also Biebricher/Vogelmann 2012).

In this regard, Rose et al. (2006) highlight that from this perspective, the state is not considered as the center or origin of power. Instead, they point out that it is crucial to ask "how, at a certain historical moment, had the formal apparatus of the state come to embroil itself with the business of knowing and administering the lives and activities of the persons and things across a territory?" (Rose et al. 2006: 87). Hence, from such a perspective, the focus lies on a multitude of power

configurations of which the state is only one among others. As noted above with reference to the understanding of governmentality as the history of the art of government, the exercise of power and governance is not an exclusive domain of the state.

Crucial from this perspective is what Foucault describes as the 'governmentalization of the state', meaning that, beginning in the 18th century, the state has started to increasingly exercise power on the basis of governmentality (see Dean 2010: 122–132; Miller/Rose 2008: 69–71; Walters 2012: 25–26). Therefore, "[w]hat is important for our modernity, that is to say for our present, is not then the state's takeover *(étatisation)* of society, so much as what I would call the 'governmentalization' of the state" (Foucault 2007a: 109). Here, Foucault clearly meets with sociological neo-institutionalism which posits that the globally pervasive model of the modern nation-state is characterized by a considerable degree of rationalization and standardization, epitomized, for example, in ministerial bureaucracies (Meyer et al. 1997). In any event, governmentality research qualifies the importance of the state for politics and for the establishment of political order. Instead of placing the state into the center of attention, as most approaches in IR do, Miller and Rose argue that "[p]olitical power is exercised today through a multitude of agencies and techniques, some of which are only loosely associated with the executives and bureaucracies of the formal organs of state" (Miller/Rose 1990: 1).

In some cases however, governmentality research tends to assume a perspective that is preoccupied with political power beyond the state and thereby neglect the state as a whole. In this regard, for example, Bob Jessop criticizes existing governmentality research for neglecting Foucault's interest in the state as an object of analysis. From his point of view, such a focus can lead to privileging micro-practices of power at the expense of the state. By contrast, according to Jessop,

> "Foucault's approach is scalable and can be applied to the state, statecraft, state-civil society, or state-economy relations just as fruitfully as to the conduct of conduct at the level of inter-personal interactions, organizations, or individual institutions" (2011: 63).

In this regard, I agree with Jessop insofar as a total neglect of the state is clearly problematic. At the same time, however, Jessop risks ascribing too much

importance to the state when he claims that the state colonizes other power relations (Jessop 2011: 68). Rather, it is crucial to emphasize that the state is not ontologically pre-existent but a particular arrangement of power relations and by no means the only one (see also Lemke 2007). At the same time, Jessop points to a crucial feature of a governmentality perspective; namely its capacity to transcend and simultaneously take into account different levels of analysis.

Governmentality and IR – The Field of International Governmentality Studies

While the ideas of Michel Foucault had been introduced to IR already since the late 1980s (see Ashley/Walker 1990; Bartelson 1995; Der Derian/Shapiro 1989; Edkins 1999), research on governmentality in IR is a rather recent phenomenon which has only emerged since the early 2000s.[24] Thus, as Walters observes, it is striking that, even though political science experienced a governmentality-related 'Foucault Effect' already in the 1990s, this development arrived in IR with a delay of a decade (2012: 82–83). As a result, since the early 2000s we can witness increasing research on governmentality in a global context in a variety of issue-areas, spanning from globalization studies (Perry/Maurer 2003) to the field of security (De Larrinaga/Doucet 2010; Dillon/Neal 2008) to global civil society (Lipschutz/Rowe 2005).

It is the case with both governmentality studies and studies of international/global governmentality that they either employ a reading of Foucault related to the predominance of (neo-) liberal governmentality, or they make use of an emphasis on repressive aspects of Foucault's definition of biopolitics. Therefore, as Michael Merlingen observes, "[t]here is a curious bifurcation in Foucauldian interpretations of world politics" (Merlingen 2008: 273).[25] Even though I primarily relate my own research to the liberal version of

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[24] Weidner (2010: 8) notes that in many cases, advancements concerning the relationship of governmentality and the international have originated in disciplines such as anthropology (Inda 2008) or critical geopolitics (Crampton/Elden 2007).

[25] It is also important to note that Foucault himself did some work on the international sphere that IR scholars most often tend to have neglected (notable exceptions are Dean 2010: 230–236; Dillon/Neal 2008; Walters 2012). Even though his ideas on the international remain rather vague, in his lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault not only addresses the relationship of war and politics (Foucault 2003) but he also turns to the historical emergence of *raison d'état* as a specific political rationality in the context of inter-state relations in Europe (Foucault 2007a: 285–310).

governmentality it is important to also examine the repressive reading of Foucauldian biopolitics, especially in order to contextualize my own research vis-à-vis the field of Foucauldian IR and international governmentality studies. Even more so, this is important since most analyses that turn to Palestine/Israel from a Foucault-inspired perspective do so based on such a repressive version of biopolitics/governmentality. This might not be surprising given the conflictive nature of Palestinian-Israeli relations and especially the repressive character of the Israeli occupation. In contrast to such a perspective, however, I argue that even though repressive rationalities and technologies of power undeniably exist in Palestine, approaches that exclusively focus on them neglect the existence and importance of productive modes of power. Therefore, the productivity of power and its emphasis on freedom is central for my understanding of governmentality. On this basis, I argue that the establishment of political order in world society and thus Palestine fundamentally depends on productive modes of power.

Before I will address governmentality studies that rely on a (neo-) liberal conception of governmentality, I will now discuss the repressive version of governmentality in general and especially with reference to Palestine.

Biopower as Repression

The repressive interpretation of governmentality tends to over-emphasize the importance of biopolitics/biopower and focuses on mechanisms of population control and domination. In particular, this can be witnessed in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* (2000) which is an exemplary work of this biopolitical reading of governmentality. In their neo-Marxist adoption of Foucault, Hardt and Negri observe a shift from *disciplinary society* to a *society of control* so that the contemporary global order is described as an all-encompassing *empire* that is structured by a "new global form of sovereignty" (Hardt/Negri 2000: xii). In this sense, *empire* is understood as a "*decentered* and *deterritorializing* apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers" (Hardt/Negri 2000: xii, emphasis in the original). According to the authors, this totalizing capitalist predominance, embodied by global sovereignty, needs to be countered by resistance (Hardt/Negri 2000: 205–

218).[26] Giorgio Agamben (1998) is also preoccupied with the repressive dimension of biopower that, according to him, leads to a normalization of a state of exception (see Bigo 2006) which allows for the unrestrained exercise of sovereign power over disenfranchised individuals.

Contributions following this biopolitical tradition tend to exclusively focus on sophisticated mechanisms of population management and control in the context of global politics. For instance, Ronnie Lipschutz presents the contemporary global order as an "American-dominated system of neo-liberal governmentality" (2002: 215). In this global American 'imperium' "[o]rder is maintained through the self-disciplining of behaviour, on the one hand, and the policing function of surveillance and law, on the other" (Lipschutz 2002: 219). François Debrix also uses such a repressive conception of governmentality. He argues that international governance is characterized by a "disciplinary regime of UN surveillance" (1999: 287) that results in the global exercise of 'disciplinary panopticism' in order to control states and populations according to the norms of the United Nations. In a similar fashion, De Larrinaga and Doucet connect the work of Foucault and Agamben by arguing that the discourse on human security combines sovereign power and biopower and relies on a logic of exceptionalism that contributes to the "exercise of sovereign power on a planetary scale" (De Larrinaga/Doucet 2008: 534; see Dillon 2007a). Related, Julian Reid (2013) considers sustainable development as a doctrine that contributes to the global expansion of neoliberalism on the basis of biopolitics.

If approached from a Foucauldian perspective, scholarship on Palestine and the Israeli occupation most often follows this biopolitical reading of governmentality.[27] For example, in the tradition of a 'repressive Foucault', the volume on 'The Power of Inclusive Exclusion', edited by Adi Ophir et al. (2009b) addresses the occupation "as an unstable set of technologies of power

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[26] For a similar analysis with a focus on globalization, though with a stronger focus on practices of subjectification see Bayart (2007).

[27] If we broaden the regional scope from Palestine/Israel to the Middle East, at least a few studies analyze the region by using a governmentality perspective that goes beyond such a repressive biopolitical reading. This is the case, for instance, in the case of the contributions in the volume on *Neoliberal Governmentality and the Future of the State in the Middle East and North Africa,* edited by Akcali (2016), which are based on an understanding of governmentality that takes into account the role of productive power and the importance of the freedom of the individual (see also Tagma et al. 2013). Another notable example is Helle Malmvig's (2014) analysis of governmentality and power in the context of the EU's democracy promotion in the Arab world.

that open and limit a space of action and reaction for their subjects" (Ophir et al. 2009a: 17). The book offers important insights into the different mechanisms of power on which the occupation is based and points, for instance, to the role of bureaucracy, architecture and law as power techniques. It thereby highlights that even though the occupying power occasionally resorts to brute force, its everyday operation uses much more subtle instruments in order to control the Palestinian population. In other words, "sheer, brutal military violence may be one operational conduit of the occupation regime, but does not represent the sophistication of means and diversification of ends involved in its control of the population as a whole and of each individual within it" (Ophir et al. 2009a: 17).

In addition, studies that draw particular attention to the role of architecture and geography in order to sustain the Israeli occupation often utilize a repressive reading of governmentality.[28] For example, the contributions compiled in Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman's volume (2003) show how seemingly unpolitical practices like architecture and planning yield profound political implications. This is not only the case due to the book's analytical perspective but also regarding its realization. The volume was originally designed as a catalogue of what was chosen to be the Israeli contribution to an international architecture congress. The Israeli umbrella organization of architects which had originally commissioned the exhibition, however, cancelled it, obviously due to its political nature. As a result, "[t]the very act of censoring the catalogue was proof that the denial of the political dimension of architecture is in itself a clear political statement" (Rotbard 2003: 15–16). Moreover, Eyal Weizman (2007) offers a detailed and comprehensive study of Israel's architecture and geography of occupation, describing various 'spatial technologies' which aim at colonial control on the one hand and separation on the other. In this context, Weizman vertically dissects the occupation and its geographic scope so that he examines a variety of spatial practices ranging from ground water aquifers of the West Bank, to settlement construction to the control of the airspace by drone technology. Even though Weizman's research clearly addresses the patterns of domination and control exercised by the occupation, he is at least not unaware of potentials

[28] From the perspective of critical geography, Derek Gregory's (2005) analysis of Palestinian space considerably relies on the work of Agambem and thus a repressive reading of Foucauldian power.

of Palestinian (counter-) agency to affect the 'dynamic morphology of the frontier' between occupiers and occupied:

> "Although it often appears as if the frontier's elastic nature is shaped by one side only (…) the agency of the colonized makes itself manifest in its success in holding steadfastly to its ground in the face of considerable odds, not only through political violence, but in the occasional peace of skillful diplomacy and the mobilization of international opinion" (Weizman 2007: 7).

The Israeli occupation, according to Neve Gordon (2008) relies on the simultaneous exercise of different modes of power with varying emphasis. In this sense, Gordon, who offers an elaborate genealogy of the occupation, analyzes how the occupation makes use of changing compositions of disciplinary power, sovereign power and biopower in order to control the Palestinian population (see Hanafi 2013). According to his perspective, while the occupation had originally been characterized by a paradigm of colonization, as a consequence of the first intifada Israel opts for a principle of separation which is very compatible with the establishment of Palestinian self-governance, embodied by the PA. This is the case as "with the adoption of the separation principle, Israel loses interest in the lives of the Palestinians and focuses almost solely on the occupied resources" (Gordon 2008: 212). Therefore, as Gordon points out, "the Oslo Accords (…) signified the *reorganization* of power rather than its withdrawal and should be understood as the continuation of the occupation by other means" (2008: 170, emphasis in the original).

Addressing the nexus of occupation and democracy, Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir (2013) present an interesting perspective. Their assessment of the techniques of power exercised in the context of the occupation is similar to that of Neve Gordon. At the same time, however, they reject the distinction between an *inside* of Israel in the borders of 1948 and an *outside* of the occupied territories. Instead, they highlight that it is necessary to acknowledge the 'One-State Condition' which is based on "differential rule over populations of differing status (…)" (Azoulay/Ophir 2013: 13), distinguishing between Jewish citizens, Palestinian citizens of Israel (Israeli Arabs), Palestinians in the occupied territories and refugees. Combined with the seeming temporariness of the occupation, this leads to a system of rule that allows maintaining the control over

the occupied territories without questioning the existence of democracy in Israel proper (Azoulay/Ophir 2013: Chapter 6, in particular).

Furthermore, several studies that address the role of surveillance for managing the populations of Israel and Palestine rely on a repressive understanding of biopolitics. For example, the contributions in the comprehensive volume edited by Elia Zureik et al. (2011) turn to the question how Israeli and Palestinian populations are controlled and regulated with the help of surveillance techniques. The volume thus contextualizes surveillance with biopower and covers a wide range of topics, such as citizenship and identity cards, population control by means of data collection, or links between surveillance and the armaments industry. Even though the book locates its contributions in the context of colonialism, it addresses practices of surveillance both in Palestine and Israel and thus does not limit its focus to the occupation. In addition, the book is also sensitive to the means of surveillance exercised by the Palestinian Authority towards the Palestinian population.

Moreover, the state of exception serves as a major topic in the volume edited by Ronit Lentin (2008b). In the volume's introductory chapter, Lentin shows that he is well aware of the problems resulting from the use of Agamben's concept of *bare life* that is exposed to sheer and rampant sovereign power in the context of Palestine: "[S]uch analysis runs the risk of erasing the active agency of the Palestinian subject, represented as either passive victim of Israeli dispossession or aggressive insurgent, but with interpretative control wrested away" (Lentin 2008a: 2). Even though he correctly identifies the risk of such a research perspective, he does not offer a solution for this problem. In this sense, the volume faces a contradiction as Lentin declares that "all the contributors to this collection (…) are also politically committed to Palestinian liberation (…)" (Lentin 2008a: 14).

Apart from that, several authors analyze the West Bank separation barrier according to its biopolitical purpose. In this sense, Parsons and Salter (2008) highlight that the barrier contributes to the biopolitical control of the Palestinian population as it does not prohibit but rather regulates the movement of the population. In this sense, "Palestinians can still pass through the barrier – the issue is then not enclosure, but control of porosity" (Parsons/Salter 2008: 703).

In a similar manner, Samer Alatout describes the barrier as a technology of government but also stresses its reflexive nature. Hence, he makes the important observation that this technology not only affects the spatial regulation of Palestinians but also that of Israelis, with different consequences. At the same time, the separation barrier conceals both the misery caused by the occupation and the potential dangers existing behind the wall. As a result, "[t]he wall acts as a technology of discipline and containment on the Palestinian side, but it is meant to act as a technology of freedom (of movement, travel, economy) on the Israeli side" (Alatout 2009: 967; see also Torpey 1998).

These works in the biopolitical tradition – both theoretical/conceptual ones and those focusing on Palestine – have their merits in highlighting some of the 'dark sides' of contemporary global politics. They make a useful contribution to the understanding of repressive context such as the Israeli occupation and its underlying sophisticated exercise of power. In particular, in Palestine/Israel, such an emphasis on the biopolitical reading of governmentality, and an emphasis on control and domination, seems plausible due to the omnipresence and predominance of the Israeli occupation and its effects on the daily lives of the Palestinian population. At the same time, however, these perspectives fail to relate the existing power dynamics to an overarching global context. Furthermore, these contributions suffer from a tendency to use totalizing visions of social reality. Therefore, while I agree that governmentality has a potential to control populations, such a perspective ignores the 'powers of freedom' (Rose 1999b) that are essential for governmentality as a modern form of power in world society. As a result, they possess a dual selectivity: on the one hand, there is a selectivity regarding their reading of Foucault which neglects his emphasis of freedom and the productivity of power. On the other hand, they are selective in their description of the contemporary global order as being characterized by a certain kind of totalizing domination. In this sense, these authors nearly exclusively focus on the disciplinary elements of Foucault's conceptualization of power which even leads to the equation of governmentality and discipline (in the case of Debrix 1999). By emphasizing domination and control, such a perspective does not leave any space for political agency. Therefore, while I do not deny the existence of Israeli mechanisms of control and domination, exclusively focusing on them would mean ignoring the potentials and existence

of Palestinian agency. Rather, as this book argues, Palestine clearly serves as an example to counter a perspective that is limited to repressive elements of governmentality. Besides this repressive version of biopower, international governmentality studies often relate to (neo-) liberal rationalities and technologies of governmentality in order to make sense of global political dynamics.

International Governmentality Studies and the (Neo-) Liberal Global Order

Contributions taking governmentality beyond the state to the global/international sphere often rely on Foucault's understanding of governmentality as a particular regime of power that encompasses (neo-) liberal political rationalities and technologies. In order to prepare the ground for my own conceptualization of governmentality, this section will identify and critically discuss the main features of these approaches. This endeavor represents an 'immanent critique' in the sense that it is not about a fundamental rejection but rather "an engagement with inconsistencies, limitations and contradictions embedded in the specific concepts and architecture of [International Governmentality Studies]" (Walters 2012: 93). Consequently, it is my intention to subsequently present a refined conception of modern governmentality in world society in a way that is capable of taking into account these elements of criticisms that appear justified. In particular, I will, first, present and discuss how these approaches go beyond the state, second, how they address liberalism and, third, what follows from the chosen perspectives for agency and subjectivity. At the same time, however, as will become evident in the following section, I will also considerably go beyond prevailing studies of international/global governmentality and develop my own understanding of modern governmentality in world society in distinction from the existing approaches.

First, it is useful to examine how global/international studies of governmentality perceive and conceptualize *the international*. Explicitly designed as contribution to IR scholarship and as a critique of existing theories of International Relations (especially those associated with 'global governance'), Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending describe 'the international as governmentality' in the sense that "[a] conceptualisation of the international as a socially embedded realm of governmentality sees the international as a structure (defined by relations of

power) that generates different and changing practices of political rule (defined as governmental rationality)" (Neumann/Sending 2010: 68). While the authors are aware that this realm of governmentality not only affects states but also individuals (Neumann/Sending 2007: 699), their analysis primarily addresses the role of the state in a changing international sphere. Thereby, the authors remain within the boundaries of the discipline of IR as they consider the international as a distinct level of analysis which is situated "above the state" (Neumann/Sending 2010: 1). In this sense, Neumann and Sending explicitly reject the pervasiveness of international anarchy that is common in IR. Instead they stress that "there does exist a rationality of government with matching principles that adds up to government over governments" (Neumann/Sending 2010: 164). This, in turn, has implications for state sovereignty as an ordering principle of world politics, because, as a form of power it is accompanied by governmentality that exerts effects on states.[29] Interestingly, in this regard, their conception of sovereignty as an international norm is compatible with the work of the Stanford School of Sociology. This is the case as Neumann and Sending distinguish between sovereignty as a universal form of political authority and its potentially diverse contents (2010: 6). Similarly, the Stanford School highlights global pervasiveness of structural similarities, or isomorphisms, such as the model of the nation-state, while stressing the existence of great variations regarding the content of these global structures. At the same time, Neumann and Sending point out that the increasing importance of IGOs and NGOs in world politics does not signify an 'eclipse of the state' (Evans 1997) but rather a change in the mode in which power is globally exercised. Regarding the often constructed opposition between the state and the amorphous concept of 'civil society' they argue that "the self-association and political will-formation characteristic of civil society and nonstate actors do not stand in opposition to the political power of the state, but is a most central feature of how power operates in late modern society" (Sending/Neumann 2006: 652). Furthermore, Neumann and Sending put an effort into identifying a Weberian ideal type of a global polity as 'the relational practices of governing' (Neumann/Sending 2010: 172), characterized by the predominance of a liberal rationality of

[29] It is important to note, here, that Neumann and Sending utilize sovereignty both in the common fashion of IR as an international norm as well as in the Foucauldian sense as a specific mode of power.

governmentality but accompanied by disciplinary and sovereign modes of power. It follows that, by deviating from Foucault's nominalist approach (Walters 2012: 37) in this regard, Neumann and Sending are guided by a notion of governmentality that is rather a descriptive tool than a heuristic device (Zanotti 2013). While utilizing the ideal type of a global polity might help embed their arguments into the discourse of IR, this happens at the expense of potentially limiting the analytical strength of their research perspective (see Corry 2013).

In contrast to this perspective, Wendy Larner and William Walters frame global governmentality "as a heading for studies which problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states" (Larner/Walters 2004b: 2). Thereby they stress the different spheres of governmentality 'in the global' (Latham 1999: 28) as opposed to an exclusively international macro-level. As a result, Larner and Walters try to offer a "less *substantialized* account of globalization" (2004a: 496, emphasis in the original). To a certain extent at least, however, they share with Neumann and Sending a primary focus on the state as the main agent of global politics. Furthermore, there are several studies of governmentality with a global orientation that follow a Neo-Marxist interpretation of global order (Kiersey 2008, 2009; Weidner 2009). From such a perspective, global governmentality is equated with imperialism so that the state is both subjected to the forces of and a driving force of global imperialism.

By identifying a major limitation of governmentality research as presented in the previous section, Barry Hindess (2005: 405) introduces his conceptualization of international governmentality. He is critical of the focus on dynamics within states that result in a neglect of international politics. On this basis, Hindess argues that "[t]he modern art of government has thus been concerned with governing not simply the populations of individual states but also the larger population encompassed by the system of states itself" (Hindess 2005: 407). It follows that Hindess is aware of the importance of governmentality on the international level. At the same time, however, he treats governmentality within states and on the international as separate spheres. Thereby, his analytical

perspective risks overlooking the interdependencies between both dimensions and instead reifies the difference between domestic and international.

Apart from these endorsements of global governmentality, the discipline of IR has yielded considerable criticism against such a 'scaling up' of governmentality to the international level. As part of this line of critique, Jan Selby (2007) stresses that Foucault was primarily engaged in the analysis of micro-practices of power in domestic societies. Therefore, according to him,

> "while the international arena is (…) a densely structured social space inhabited by all manner of discursive, bodily and material relations, it is nonetheless one in which these relations are in large part between powerful political and economic structures – whether states, international institutions, or large corporate actors – and where power thus tends to be more concentrated and centralised than within the domestic social arena" (Selby 2007: 338).

As a result, Selby rejects the idea of 'scaling up' governmentality research to the global as it represents an ontologically distinct level of analysis. In other words, what is going on at the international level cannot be compared to and equated with political dynamics in domestic societies. Similarly, Jonathan Joseph (2010, 2012) draws an ontological distinction between the global and the national level. He states that a key feature of governmentality is that it targets populations. On the international level, however, according to Joseph governmentality focuses on the state as the target of governmentality (Joseph 2010: 421–425). Therefore, he concludes that "the application of governmentality to the field of IR works best when it is attempting to explain the mechanisms of global governance" (Joseph 2012: 71). In turn, Joseph rejects utilizing governmentality beyond this very limited scope on the global level. Furthermore, David Chandler (2010) identifies a fundamental gap between Foucault's work and Foucauldian IR. This is the case as "[f]or Foucault, the contestation of governing rationalities (…) was the essence of politics" (Chandler 2010: 141). Therefore, according to Chandler, instead of criticizing the disconnection between politics and power on the global level, which is characteristic of the contemporary global order, Foucauldian IR contributes to its reproduction. Thus, in contrast to being a critical approach of existing global power relations, governmentality leads to their legitimation (Chandler 2009, 2010).

To counter these criticisms, I argue that such readings of Foucault seems problematic, in particular as they ontologize and essentialize the state, international organizations or corporations in a way that entirely runs counter to a Foucauldian analysis of power relations. Thereby, neglecting its anti-essentialist research orientation and practically misreading Foucault, Selby, Joseph and Chandler falsely treat governmentality as an "*ontologically over-determined* theory" (Andersen 2003: XI). It is important to highlight that Chandler constructs a separation of politics from power in a way that locates politics and thus political legitimacy exclusively on the state level and power, in turn, on the global level. As a result, Chandler not only ontologizes statehood but he also displays a normative bias towards the state as he perceives it as the genuine locus of politics and thus political legitimacy (see Kiersey et al. 2010). By contrast, the specific strength of a Foucauldian analysis of power lies in its nominalist approach which makes it adaptable to different configurations of power relations. Therefore, if states or international organizations are understood as the contingent institutionalization of particular power relations, there is no plausible reason to exclude the analysis of international politics from a governmentality perspective. Such an approach also does not contradict governmentality's focus on populations. Rather, its emphasis on different political rationalities and technologies and underlying multifaceted power relations makes governmentality especially suitable for examining the international (see Walters 2012: 97–100).

Second, beside questions of the state and the international, it is important to assess the role liberalism plays in international/global studies of governmentality. While many researchers relate to Foucault's version of (neo-) liberal governmentality they do so with different emphases. In some cases, often associated with a Neo-Marxist reading of Foucault and following the tradition of a repressive reading of governmentality referring to the works of Agamben as well as Hardt and Negri, we can observe an over-emphasis of the global predominance of (neo-) liberal governmentality (Kiersey 2009; Weidner 2009). Such a perspective primarily utilizes governmentality in order to describe what is perceived as a totalizing vision of global liberalism. Hence, there is a focus on the supposed ubiquity and sophistication of liberal governmentality, resulting in an inescapabilty of liberalism. This, however, leads to an ontological reification

of the order that these approaches actually intend to critically deconstruct (Chandler 2009). The main problem of such a reading of governmentality is therefore a 'substantialist ontology' (Zanotti 2013) in which the diagnosis of global liberalism serves as the ontological starting point of analytical inquiries as opposed to their outcome. At the same time, it is equally problematic that, from such a perspective, the result of the analysis, namely the imperial force of global liberalism, seems to be predetermined (see also Vrasti 2013).

By contrast, we can observe a reflexive notion towards liberalism in other works on global governmentality. According to Neumann and Sending global governmentality is characterized by the simultaneous tendencies to govern less (in the liberal sense) and to govern more if necessary. They attempt to show "how an increasingly effective liberal rationality of government is establishing itself worldwide, exerting structural pressure on the state to govern indirectly" (Neumann/Sending 2010: 157). Liberal governmentality, accordingly, exists as a guiding principle of global politics that clearly affects states' behavior. In this sense, in addition to the classic notion of liberal restraint of governance, global governmentality also displays an expansive tendency to address ever new fields of intervention in order to contribute to the global spread of liberal rationalities of government (Neumann/Sending 2010: 174–176). Hence, as opposed to Neo-Marxist conceptions of governmentality, both Neumann/Sending and Hindess are aware of the limits of liberalism on a global scale. Hence, Neumann and Sending highlight that in order to facilitate the global spread of liberalism, international organizations, such as the IMF or the World Bank, tend to resort to rather illiberal mechanisms of governance. Therefore, Hindess argues that "[w]hat is required for the liberal government of populations, then, is a capacity to distinguish between what can be governed through the promotion of liberty and what must be governed in other [illiberal] ways" (Hindess 2004: 28, see also 2001). Despite many similarities, however, there is a difference regarding how Neumann/Sending and Hindess perceive the relationship of liberal governmental rationalities towards the international and the domestic sphere. Neumann and Sending identify a qualitative difference of how governmentality works in the international sphere and within the state. They stress that internationally, governmentality is exercised through international organizations and primarily addresses states and that the expansive tendency of liberalism on

the international level differs from the restrictive tendency on the domestic level (Neumann/Sending 2010: 156). Accordingly, they have a similar conception of governmentality in the international as Joseph, while they do not share with him the notion that this makes governmentality inapplicable beyond national societies (see below).

In a similar manner, Mitchell Dean makes a qualitative distinction between the international and the domestic level when he states that

> "[t]here is a social form of government concerned to govern the life and welfare of the populations that are assigned to certain states; and there is also a kind of international bio-politics that governs the movement, transitions, settlement and repatriation of various populations – including refugees, migrants, guest workers, tourists and students. This international bio-politics is a condition of the assignation of populations to states and thus of social government of any form" (Dean 2010: 119).

By contrast, Hindess does not draw the distinction between liberalism in the international and domestic sphere. Rather, he argues that the same liberal rationalities of governmentality are at play within and above the state since they eventually have the population as their target (Hindess 2004: 33).

In addition, there are studies that primarily subscribe to governmentality as an analytical perspective, or heuristic device as Zanotti puts it. Governmentality thereby does not serve as a means to describe global liberalism. Instead, analyzing political dynamics this way can lead to the conclusion that liberal rationalities of government are important in the global sphere. For instance, Larner and Walters make use of Foucault's concept of governmentality as an analytical perspective in order to make sense of the diverse phenomena subsumed under the label of globalization (Larner/Walters 2004b). Thereby, in contrast to many other studies, they do not limit their observations to "a particular ontology of power relations" (Walters 2012: 157, fn. 3) such as 'liberal' governmentality. Hence, by emphasizing the contingency of power relations and governmental rationalities, they are not preoccupied with global liberalism but at the same time do not exclude its importance (Larner/Walters 2004a: 504).

As is the case with the relationship of the state and the international, Selby (2007) and Joseph (2010) reject using governmentality at a global level as Foucault's ideas originated in the context of liberal western societies. In other words,

governmentality is perceived as being inextricably intertwined with liberalism and therefore inappropriate for analyzing parts of the world that do not qualify as liberal. As a result, as Joseph states, "because the international domain is highly uneven, contemporary forms of governmentality can only usefully be applied to those areas that might be characterized as having an advanced form of liberalism" (Joseph 2010: 224). In other contexts, however, governmentality can only be imposed, for instance through international organizations, and is therefore destined to fail or takes the shape of a 'new type of imperialism' (Joseph 2010: 237, 2009: 418). A somewhat related criticism comes from Stephen Collier who points out that in governmentality studies there is a problematic tendency to infer from individual cases a global logic of neoliberal power relations that do not hold out against empirical observations (Collier 2009: 97–98). As a consequence, Collier denies the usefulness of governmentality as it "is not a helpful tool for analyzing a topological field comprised of heterogeneous techniques, procedures and institutional arrangements that *cannot* be made intelligible through reference to common conditions of possibility" (2009: 98, emphasis in the original).

This criticism requires careful consideration as it raises some important points. In particular, I share the concern that a totalizing conception of global governmentality which leaves no room for variance and diversity of power relations is problematic. By utilizing governmentality in such a manner one would make the same mistake of determinism which a Foucauldian perspective is actually equipped to overcome. Both Selby and Joseph, however, fail to offer a satisfactory response to the shortcomings they identify in global governmentality research. By contrast, similar to Larner and Walters, it is useful to refer to Rose et al. (2006) who contradict a totalizing understanding of governmentality. Instead, they refer to its contingency and stress that the (re-) configuration of governmental power relations is a constantly ongoing process. Hence, according to such a dynamic conception of governmentality and power, "[r]ationalities are constantly undergoing modification in the face of some newly identified problem or solution, while retaining certain styles of thought and technological preferences" (Rose et al. 2006: 98).

How governmentality studies deal with the state and the international on the one hand and liberalism on the other has important consequences for how these approaches conceptualize agency. Therefore, third, it is important to address the implications for political agency and subjectivity emanating from the different studies of international/global governmentality. Utilizing governmentality as a totalizing vision of global liberalism, which is very close to a biopolitical reading of Foucault as mentioned above, has important consequences for how these approaches understand agency. These approaches present the individual as a disenfranchised subject subjugated to globally pervasive power relations. Due to the predominance that is ascribed to liberalism and its underlying power techniques, such a perspective risks dispossessing subjects of any sense of agency. Instead, individuals are merely subject to the superior forces of inescapable and all-embracing liberal forces (Kiersey 2008). According to these interpretations, capitalism fundamentally determines subjectivity (Weidner 2009). While scholars adhering to this perspective seem aware of this problem, they do not offer convincing solutions for it (Kiersey et al. 2010).

Equally problematic, however, are critiques that neglect Foucault's emphasis of freedom as an import dimension of governmentality and consequently limit their criticism exclusively to a repressive reading of governmentality. In this sense, David Chandler (2010: 140–141, 2009) offers a distorted conception of Foucauldian power and a selective reading of governmentality studies that is only limited to conceptions that potentially deny agency in the face of global liberal predominance. Therefore, Chandler's critical engagement with governmentality only makes sense if it is directed towards a biopolitical reading of governmentality in the tradition of Agamben as well as Hardt and Negri who themselves make use of Foucault's elaborations in a very selective manner (see Bruff 2009). Accordingly, even though Chandler is correct that certain authors tend to over-emphasize the disciplinary potentials of biopolitics that result in a disempowered individual, he either misreads or neglects those authors who use governmentality in a way that takes into account the agency of individuals.

As a result, both a repressive reading of governmentality as well as its narrow critique are problematic, as they misread a Foucauldian understanding of power for which the emphasis of freedom is crucial. In other words, it is crucial to

highlight that governmentality rests on an understanding of power that clearly enables the agency of the individual. Governmentality thus depends on the idea of the free individual. In this sense, governmental rationalities and technologies have the potential to both simultaneously subjugate and empower the individual.

In contrast to a denial of agency or its blunt critique, Neumann and Sending are much more sensitive to the importance of freedom for governmentality, and they emphasize that "governing through freedom" (e.g. Neumann/Sending 2010: 9–15) is a defining feature of governmentality. By referring to Mitchell Dean's concept of 'technologies of agency' (2010: 196–197), the authors point out that it is a typical feature of international governmentality that both governmental and nongovernmental organizations exercise agency and thus transform from a "passive object of government to be acted upon (…) into an entity that is both an object *and* a subject of government" (Neumann/Sending 2010: 115, emphasis in the original). In a similar manner, Larner and Walters highlight that concerning globalization, "the question of freedom as the modality of liberal power is central" (2004a: 507). What is more, since Larner and Walters operate on the basis of a non-substantialist ontology and utilize governmentality as a heuristic device instead of a descriptive one (Zanotti 2013), they do not display any analytical prejudices regarding the status of the subject but present "a view of agency in terms of contingent rather than fixed subjectivities" (Larner/Walters 2004b: 3).

Based on this critical evaluation of existing studies of international/global governmentality, I will now present my own understanding of modern governmentality as a pattern of political ordering in world society. For that purpose, I will show how my own conceptualization is equipped to overcome some of the main limitations of international governmentality studies.

Modern Governmentality and Political Order in World-Society

Based on the preceding elaborations, I will now present my own specific understanding of modern governmentality in world society. My conceptualization addresses the three main elements that have been discussed in the previous section. Accordingly, I will first address the question of how governmentality relates to the international level. Second, I will deal with the

question of liberalism in the context of governmentality. Third, I will focus on agency and subjectivity.

The Overarching Context of World Society

The first element of my conceptualization relates to the scope and scale of governmentality. Instead of situating governmentality in the context of national societies, rejecting its utilization beyond them, or applying it exclusively on a global scale, I argue that in order to make sense of governmentality as a distinctly modern feature of political order we need to contextualize it with world society as the structural horizon into which it is embedded. In this sense, as has been highlighted in Chapter 2, sociological neo-institutionalism highlights that the world represents a unitary social system, or 'singular polity' (Boli/Thomas 1997: 171). Using world society as the overarching context in which modern governmentality is exercised is useful for various reasons. First, as was argued in Chapter 1, poststructuralist governmentality theory benefits from being embedded into the structural horizon of world society because power relations do not exist in a structural vacuum. Second, following the Stanford School, governmentality can be regarded as a universalist – as opposed to a universal – pattern of political ordering in world society. This is reasonable because even though there are striking similarities on a structural level concerning patterns of political order in world society, these structures are significantly decoupled from their respective content. Decoupling, in this sense, serves as a strategy to be perceived as a legitimate actor in modern world society in spite of the failure to entirely adopt governmentality. Thereby, according to the Stanford School the 'enactment of the rationalized myth' of governmentality serves as a legitimation strategy. In other words, governing according to the model of modern governmentality contributes to the legitimacy of actors in world society. Modern governmentality in this sense is not globally universal regarding its actual reach but universalistic in the sense of its claim for universal validity. In other words, even though governmentality as a mechanism of rule is not exercised everywhere in world society in the same manner, governmentality as a particular rationality and technology of power is at least globally available as an idea or benchmark according to which proper governing is assessed. Wanda Vrasti captures this insight very clearly:

> "Global governmentality manifests its force not through the actual number of people or states it controls, but by acting as a standard of reference against which all forms of life (individual, communal, political) can be assessed according to modern conceptions of civilisation and order" (2013: 64).

It follows that the ideational availability of governmentality is more important than its actual realization in world society, and that these aspects must not be confused with one another. Thereby, using modern governmentality as a theory of political order in world society rejects both a teleological understanding of modernization and a totalizing understanding of global (liberal) governmentality.

Closely related is the potential of such a perspective to overcome both an analytic and historic Eurocentrism that potentially can be found in governmentality studies. As stated above, referring to liberal governmentality is problematic as on the one hand it suggests exclusively limiting the analysis of governmentality to liberal context in world society. In this sense, there is an analytical Eurocentrism inherent to such a perspective. On the other hand, a liberal focus possesses a historical Eurocentrism in the sense that it relates to the historic emergence of modern governmentality since 19th century Western Europe. Contrary to this, by replacing a determinist linkage of governmentality and liberalism with a focus on potentially contingent patterns of modern governmentality in world society it is possible to overcome Eurocentrism. This is the case, in particular, given that such a research perspective relies on a thin ontology which takes into consideration the heterogeneity and contingency of power configurations in world society that result from dynamics of decoupling. At the same time, this perspective is aware of the historic origins of modern governmentality in Western Europe in the 18th century. However, although, these patterns of modern political order have since then diffused in world society, this process primarily relates to the level of structures as opposed to their content. Thus, isomorphisms exist on a structural level while at the same time there is great diversity and contingency in how modern governmentality is adopted, interpreted and altered when being translated from a global norm into multiple localized contexts in world society.

Moreover, embedding modern governmentality in a world-societal context helps to go beyond dichotomies, such as global/local, international/national or more generally, inside/outside, that can contribute to simplistic conclusions of power

dynamics in global politics. At the same time, overcoming an analytical perspective that is influenced by dichotomous thinking also helps to reject methodological nationalism that tends to be reified in governmentality studies. In this regard, it is striking that even though many studies of governmentality are directed at examining 'political power beyond the state' they ontologize the state as if it were a primordially existing unit of the political. As an alternative to this, I argue that by embedding modern governmentality into the horizon of world society, all kinds of political dynamics and power relations can be understood as internal developments within world society.[30] Thereby, governmentality is neither limited to an exclusively global or international level, nor does it replicate methodological nationalism. Instead, the suggested perspective allows for examining power dynamics 'in the global' (Latham 1999) as opposed to an exclusively global/international level.

The Modernity of Governmentality

The second crucial element of my specific understanding of governmentality addresses the role that is ascribed to liberalism. In this regard I argue that the common preoccupation of governmentality studies with liberalism, be it in a totalitarian or reflexive form, carries some problematic implications. This is the case as many analyses rely on the assumption that particular rationalities and technologies of *liberal* governmentality should both conceptually and empirically be distinguished from non-liberal settings. This is problematic as the label *liberal* obscures that modern political rationalities and technologies also exist in global contexts that do not qualify as liberal. Accordingly, also authoritarian states relate to modern governmentality when they establish, for instance, statistics offices in order to acquire knowledge about their populations. Hence, applying governmentality to a non-OECD context seems to be very useful[31] since all states, or formations of centralized political authority in general, are exposed to similar political dynamics in world society (see Albert 2007). Therefore, the distinction between '(neo-) liberal' and 'illiberal' political configurations does not

[30] This argument is clearly similar to the contribution to IR of the theory of world society in modern systems theory as advanced in particular by Mathias Albert (e.g. 2005, 2007) and Stephan Stetter (2008).

[31] See for example Jeffreys (2009) on China, Corbridge et al. (2005) on India, Christie (2006) on education policies in post-apartheid South-Africa, and Piotukh (2015) on governmentality in Afghanistan and Belarus.

seem to be very helpful as its potential normative implications lead to a watering down of the analytical strengths of governmentality. As a result, instead of treating the pervasiveness of global liberalism as a given, I argue that modern governmentality can be perceived as a norm or benchmark that prescribes how to govern in a legitimate manner. These patterns of political ordering cannot properly be captured by reducing them to liberalism, neither in a reflexive nor in a totalitarian reading as described above. Rather, governmentality is modern in the sense that what is perceived as legitimate governance fundamentally rests on a specific social construction of modernity that possesses potential global reach. It also needs to be noted, however, that modern governmentality represents a contingent and constantly evolving configuration of power relations besides which 'other governmentalities' (Walters 2012: 95) are also conceivable or actually existent but in a less hegemonic manner.[32] Therefore, while originally the emergence of governmentality was primarily studied with reference to 'advanced liberal democratic capitalist societies' (Rose 1991: 673) there is good reason to overcome this inherent Eurocentrism and move the study of governmentality to a genuinely global scale (Walters 2012: 71).

Modern Subjectivity and Governmentality

The third element that is crucial for the conceptualization of modern governmentality in world society refers to agency and subjectivity. I have shown that even though the strand of governmentality research as it is primarily advanced by Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (Miller/Rose 2008) emphasizes the 'powers of freedom', this reading is only rarely taken up when it comes to governmentality in IR. In most of these cases, the individual is either disregarded or portrayed as being subjugated to the superiority of governmentality. By contrast, I argue that modern governmentality in world society is unthinkable without the freedom of the individual. Even more so, the individual makes a fundamental contribution to political order in world society so that sociological neo-institutionalism describes it as the "sacralization of the modern individual" (Meyer 2010: 7).

[32] The repression of individual freedom and comprehensive political and economic planning in communist regimes such the Soviet Union would be an example of what could be termed 'totalitarian governmentality'.

Modern governmentality, therefore, relies on a specific conception of subjectivity. As I will elaborate in further detail in Chapter 6, the constitution of subjectivity results from a simultaneous process of empowerment and subjection. In this regard, I argue that it is possible to observe a globally hegemonic pattern of modern subjectivity in world society, or in other words, a cultural hegemony of modern subjectivity (see Laclau/Mouffe 2001; Reckwitz 2006: 68–72). Modern subjectivity is hegemonic insofar as it tries to make invisible its potential contingency by presenting itself without conceivable alternatives (see Reckwitz 2007: 75). Related, as highlighted in Chapter 2, according to sociological neo-institutionalism, individualization as a world-cultural principle affects the constitution of modern subjectivity. At the same time, however, in spite of its universalist claim of validity, modern subjectivity is by no means unifying or homogenizing. Rather, according to Reckwitz (2006: 15), modern subjectivity is characterized by a particular hybridity composed of a combination of different overlapping historic patterns of subjectivity.

Following the works of Nikolas Rose, I argue that it is possible to identify three distinct and interrelated features of modern subjectivity, namely autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization (Rose 2007: 4). While, however, Rose, limits his observations to 'advanced liberal democracies', I argue that these characteristics are crucial for defining modern subjectivity in world society as a whole. First, modern subjectivity in world society relies on *autonomization.* In other words, the autonomous and autonomized self is a fundamental element of modern subjectivity. Accordingly, empowered subjects are equipped with the idea of having free choices over their life courses (see Meyer 2004). The individual biography thereby becomes a project that constantly needs to be filled with sense. This autonomous self is capable of independent decisions, takes care of himself/herself and thereby contributes to societal order. In this sense, the autonomous self is "freed from all moral obligations but the obligation to construct a life of its own choosing, a life in which it realizes itself" (Rose 1999a: 258). Two aspects are crucial for the autonomization of the self. The autonomous self is capable of both critical reflection and self-transformation (Allen 2008: 47). Critique, according to Foucault allows for the "permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy" (Foucault 1984b: 44).

Second, related to autonomization is the *responsibilization* of the self as another crucial feature of modern subjectivity in world society. It follows, therefore, that responsibilization is not only an important mechanism in the context of surveillance as it will be presented in Chapter 5 (see Löwenheim 2007), but that it is crucial for modern subjectivity as well. It is important, in this regard, that the autonomous self is responsible for his/her own actions. This responsibility cannot be delegated to any other authority in society as was the case in pre-modern societies. Accordingly, modern subjectivity, in the words of the Stanford School, yields "responsible and empowered human actorhood" (Drori et al. 2006: 13). Thereby, for example, individuals are responsible for their own health, their career or provisions for their retirement (see O'Malley 1996: 199–202). As a result, it can be argued that freedom comes with responsibility so that individuals need to take care of themselves (see Rose 1999a: 258). As Thomas Lemke clarifies: "[t]he strategy of rendering individual subjects 'responsible' (…) entails shifting the responsibility for social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc., and for life in society into the domain for which the individual is responsible and transforming it into a problem of 'self-care'" (Lemke 2001: 201). Hence, problems that were originally the domain of state or of spiritual authorities now lie in the responsibility of the individual. The responsibilization of the modern subject therefore relates to "new forms in which the governed are encouraged, freely and rationally, to conduct themselves" (Burchell 1993: 276).[33] As a result, the responsibilized self constantly strives for self-optimization and is in an ongoing process of self-evaluation.

Third, and directly linked to autonomization and responsibilization is *entrepreneurialization* and concomitant technologies that shape modern subjectivity in world society. Put simply, due to his/her empowerment, the autonomous and responsible self also is an enterprising self. In order to realize the autonomy and act responsibly, the modern subject relies on technologies of entrepreneurialization. In this sense, the modern subject is an "*entrepreneur of himself*, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (Foucault 2008: 226, emphasis added; see also Reckwitz 2006: 516–524; Rose 1999b: 144). When making choices affecting the life course, the enterprising self considerably relies on the

[33] For an analysis of the responsibilization of individuals as consumers see Barnett et al. (2008).

mindset of the *homo economicus* or rationalized individual actorhood (see Frank/Meyer 2002; Meyer/Jepperson 2000). This orientation in rational choices is also emphasized by Bröckling:

> "The individual appears here as an economic institution whose existence, similar to a business venture, is dependent upon a plurality of choices of action. Whatever one does, one could also leave it undone or choose to do something else. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that one will choose the option that one assumes corresponds best to one's preferences" (Bröckling 2005: 11).

Furthermore, as Bröckling points out, the enterprising self only exists as a model *(Leitbild)* towards which the modern subject is oriented without being able to fully realize it. The modern subject thus can only strive for becoming an enterprising self (Bröckling 2005: 12, 2007a: 7). Therefore, the enterprising self is "both an active self and a calculating self, a self that calculates *about* itself and that acts *upon* itself in order to better itself" (Rose 1996b: 154).

In this quest for becoming an enterprising, autonomous, responsible self, the modern subject is not alone. Rather, it receives guidance from authoritative sources. In this sense, what the Stanford School of Sociology terms as 'modern-day incarnations of priesthoods' (Meyer et al. 2006a: 262) also can be described as 'experts of subjectivity' (Rose 1996b: 151) or 'engineers of the human soul' (Rose 1999a: 3), such as therapists, or life-coaches who provide the modern subjects with directions for how to lead their lives. Thereby, these 'engineers of the human soul' considerably influence the subject's relationship to oneself as the self constantly feels compelled to evaluate his/her attitude. Thus, it is the judgment of these experts that gives meaning to the lives of the modern subjects. In the words of Rose:

> "Through self-inspection, self-problematization, self-monitoring and confession, we evaluate ourselves according to the criteria provided for us by others. Through self-reformation, therapy, techniques of body-alteration, and the calculated reshaping of speech and emotion, we adjust ourselves by means of the techniques propounded by the experts of the soul" (Rose 1999a: 11)

As a result, autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization are crucial features of modern subjectivity. Modern subjectivity is a key feature of governmentality. The modern subject contributes to world-societal order by means of technologies of the self that are based upon these three elements. How

the individual is involved in dynamics of world societal order in Palestine will be the subject of Chapter 6.

Biopolitics, Surveillance, and Technologies of the Self

In order to make this conceptualization of governmentality empirically more tangible, I suggest to infer three central dimensions from it, namely, biopolitics, surveillance, and technologies of the self. First, biopolitics is crucial for modern governmentality as it is a technology of power that is directed at the population. Biopolitics attempts to manage the biological features of the population. As will become evident in the Chapter 4, statistical knowledge can be regarded as a key biopolitical technology of modern governmentality that substantially contributes to societal order in Palestine. Surveillance represents a second crucial technology of power that is of great relevance for modern governmentality. In this context I will point out that the presented understanding of surveillance goes beyond an emphasis on security-related aspects. Therefore, surveillance should not be equated with repression. Rather, as in the case of biopolitics, this technology of power encompasses both empowerment and subjection. In this context, Chapter 5 will show how the surveillance of good governance contributes to political order in Palestine. Third, it follows from the centrality of modern subjectivity described above that technologies of the self are essential for the exercise of modern governmentality in world society. Technologies of the self are mechanisms by which individuals are actively involved in the constitution of political order by appealing to their freedom. On this basis, Chapter 6 will engage with self-technological everyday spatial practices and their contribution to Palestinian societal order in the context of business entrepreneurship and refugee camp self-governance.

Conclusion

This chapter served the primary purpose of developing my particular understanding of modern governmentality in world society. I have argued that power dynamics in global politics in general and in Palestine in particular can best be captured by conceptualizing modern governmentality as a constitutive pattern of political order in world society.

This chapter is a contribution to debates about how to theorize power and governance in IR, in particular as it offers a coherent conceptualization of power dynamics that traditional theories in the discipline fail to offer. At the same time, this chapter has attempted to overcome certain limitations of international governmentality studies. For that purpose I have conceptualized governmentality in relation to three dimensions. First, regarding the question of how governmentality relates to the international, I have argued that embedding governmentality into the structural horizon of world society is sensible for various reasons. Contextualizing governmentality with world society allows overcoming Eurocentrism that is inherent in many governmentality studies. In addition, this perspective helps in going beyond over-simplistic dichotomies such as global/local because all power dynamics are observed as occurring within world society. Second, I have argued that it makes sense to present governmentality as an explicitly modern pattern of political ordering instead of distinguishing between liberal and illiberal political configurations. Third, I have highlighted that modern governmentality in world society relies on a specific conceptualization of subjectivity that properly takes into account the freedom of the individual. Accordingly, modern subjectivity is based on the autonomization, responsibilization, and entrepreneurialization of the self.

In the context of this chapter it has become evident that such a utilization of Foucault's original work is not designed to identify the 'real Focuault'. Rather, in line with Foucault's own emphasis on conceptual pragmatism, I make use of his ideas as a tool box. Such an approach relies on the insight that a theory is not an end in itself but supposed to be utilized in order to address 'real world problems'. What sometimes tends to be forgotten due to his particular working style, is that Foucault himself was first and foremost an empiricist who was interested in singular empirical micro-phenomena. Therefore, even though this chapter has been a predominantly theoretical one, the underlying ideas are well equipped to be confronted with empirical phenomena of global politics. I will turn to this endeavor in detail in the following chapters where I will analyze how world-societal power dynamics affect the political order of Palestine. Furthermore, the chapter has laid the foundation for the subsequent chapters by introducing the core dimensions of biopolitics, surveillance, and technologies of the self and their relevance for the presented conceptualization of modern governmentality.

4 Contested Numbers: The Biopolitics of Statistics in Palestine[34]

Introduction

It has been highlighted above that it is a key feature of governmentality to target the population. To put it differently, the focus on the population, its features and especially its freedom, makes governmentality a particularly modern form of power that is distinctive from pre-modern ones. Accordingly, modern governmentality relies on biopolitics in order to impact and regulate various features of the population. As in the case of surveillance and technologies of the self, biopolitics possesses both empowering and subjugating capacities. For this purpose, modern governmentality makes use of statistical knowledge which serves a biopolitical technology of power. This reliance on statistical data and its biopolitical utilization is a crucial feature of modern governmentality that is globally pervasive. In this sense, it is important to stress that, following sociological neo-institutionalism, modern statistics is fundamentally based on the norms of rationalization, standardization, scientization and universalism. It follows that these world-cultural norms have contributed the global diffusion of modern statistics.

On the basis of these insights, this chapter addresses the importance of social statistics[35] for governing populations in the context of Palestine. Accordingly, the focus on demographic statistics is due to the fact that governmentality is directed at the population. On the basis of Foucault's understanding of governmentality, I will argue that social statistics represent crucial biopolitical technologies of modern governmentality in world society. While statistical knowledge as a modern phenomenon had its origins in Western Europe in the late 18th and early 19th century, the analysis of the case of Palestine clearly gives evidence for the global diffusion of modern statistics in world society beyond the OECD context.

Before examining in detail the biopolitical importance of social statistics in Palestine, I will first elaborate on the emergence of social statistics as modern

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[34] This chapter relies in parts on insights that have first been published as Busse (2015a).

[35] It should be noted that in this chapter I primarily focus on statistics related to the population, i.e. demographic statistics. Therefore, when using the term statistics, it should generally be understood in this way.

phenomena for governing populations. In this regard, it will become evident that the 'discovery of the population' was a fundamental prerequisite for the systematic utilization of statistical data for governing purposes. As such, processes of problematization, normalization, and objectification are of particular importance. Next, I will point out that the 'birth of modern statistics' is linked to major empirically observable events and that statistics significantly contribute to the simultaneous empowerment and subjection of the population, both collectively and individually. Furthermore, I will address how modern statistics contribute to societal inclusion and exclusion. On this basis, I will argue that social statistics are of crucial importance for governing Palestine. In a first step, I will introduce statistical endeavors that existed before the establishment of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) in 1993 on which the focus of the present analysis lies. Subsequently, I will argue that the emergence of Palestinian statistics can best be contextualized as a global phenomenon due to Palestine's integration into a global statistics community and that the internalization of global standards plays a key role in this regard. In other words, the phenomenon of modern statistics in Palestine can only be understood with reference to Palestine's integration into world societal dynamics of political ordering. In what follows, I will show how statistical knowledge serves as a biopolitical technology of governmentality in Palestine. It will thus become evident that social statistics and inferred demographic politics are essential for the sustainment of societal order in Palestine and provide Palestinians with a sense of political agency. In particular, I will address the inclusionary and exclusionary dynamics of census-taking. In this context, the way in which statistics contribute to Palestinian nation-building and identify formation will be highlighted. At the same time, the importance of the Palestinian-Israeli demographic contestation will be examined in detail. In conclusion, the chapter will summarize the distinctiveness of Palestinian statistics and point to the potential of applying the generated insights to other political contexts.

The Power of Numbers

This chapter considers statistics as technologies of power. To put it simply, it is based on an understanding of governmentality as being characterized by political rationalities and technologies which (a) target the population based on (b)

economic calculations as a major form of knowledge and (c) apparatuses of security as technical instruments for political interventions (Foucault 2007a: 108). Governmentality, in this sense, can be described as the 'conduct of conducts' (Foucault 1984a: 314) of populations. In this context, biopolitics can be considered a core dimension of governmentality. Thomas Lemke stresses the interconnectedness of biopolitics and governmentality. According to him, "[t]he "birth of biopolitics" is closely tied to the emergence of liberal forms of government" (Lemke 2011: 173). It is a technology of power to manage the conditions of life of populations as opposed to those of individuals (Dean 2010: 266). In other words, biopolitics refers to "the attempt (…) to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race (…)" (Foucault 2008: 317). In this sense, the basic biological features of human beings are the focus of political strategies. Social statistics, therefore, can be considered as a biopolitical technology of governmentality which is essential for governing populations. Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose identify three main features of biopower, namely "knowledge of vital life processes, power relations that take humans as living beings as their object, and the modes of subjectification though which subjects work on themselves qua living beings - as well as their multiple combinations" (2006: 215). Moreover, while Foucault was by no means clear about the difference between the two terms, Rabinow and Rose consider biopolitics as a specific realization of biopower. In this way, they suggest that, "within the field of biopower, we can use the term 'biopolitics' to embrace all the specific strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality; over the forms of knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of intervention that are desirable, legitimate and efficacious" (Rabinow/Rose 2006: 197).

By contrast, as highlighted in the previous chapter, two prominent conceptualizations of biopower with a very different emphasis are presented by both Hardt and Negri and by Agamben. Hardt and Negri (2000) exclusively focus on the disciplinary elements of Foucault's conceptualization of power. Biopower, in this reading, is as a central element for the realization of a global society of control that the authors label *empire*. Hardt and Negri's understanding of biopower is thus limited to aspects of control, domination and exploitation

of the biological features of individuals (Hardt/Negri 2000: 22–24). Thereby, the authors assume a very biased perspective that neglects the productive capacities of power and its implications (Rabinow/Rose 2006: 198–200). Similarly, Giorgio Agamben describes biopolitics as being constitutive for the control of bare life (life exposed to death) in the sense that the *"production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power"* (1998: 11, emphasis in the original). Hence, according to Agamben, the totalitarian state – with its attempt of normalizing the state of emergency – and its creation of the concentration camp are "the exemplary places of modern biopolitics" (1998: 4). As with Hardt and Negri, Agamben's account of biopolitics appears to be too much focused on aspects of force while ignoring the 'powers of freedom' (Rose 1999b) that are characteristic for the understanding of governmentality as it is used in the present analysis.

The Discovery of the Population

As was already indicated in Chapter 3, for the emergence of governmentality as a constitutive principle of modern political ordering in world society the 'discovery of the population' (Foucault 2007a) as the primary problem of and target for political interventions at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century was of crucial importance.[36] This discovery is inextricably linked to the systematic use of statistics as a modern phenomenon for political purposes:

> "In fact, statistics, which had hitherto functioned within administrative frameworks, and so in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents" (Foucault 2007a: 104).

It follows, therefore, that from originally being a peripheral phenomenon, statistics have developed into a central feature of modern societies. Hence, there was an expansion of statistics to all spheres of society, or, in other words, a societalization of statistics. This expansion of statistics, however, went even further, from a conceptual perspective. As pointed out in Chapter 2, if society is

[36] In this regard, it is noteworthy that Curtis (2002: 507–509) points out that Foucault does not offer a consistent account of the term "population" as he does not distinguish between the concepts of populousness, social body and the statistically constructed population, each having a different connotation. The important shift, however, that Foucault observes is that in pre-modern times the only concept the sovereign ruler had of the population was that of populousness in the sense that the territory over which the sovereign ruler had authority was populated by a collection of obedient subjects. This view shifted to an understanding of population as an empirical phenomenon and problems related to the population becoming the primary target of political interventions.

not understood in national terms, for example as German, French or Palestinian societies, but instead according to constructivist theories of global order, such as sociological neo-institutionalism, it can be argued that the idea of modern statistics has expanded, or diffused, to all spheres of world society. This global diffusion of modern statistics will be discussed in detail below.

Problematization, Normalization, Objectification

It thus can be argued that the actual *discovery* of the population in this sense both necessitated and was dependent upon the emergence of apparatuses of security that made possible rational calculations about the living conditions of the population. As a crucial element of modern governmentality (see Chapter 3), apparatuses of security are therefore closely linked to modern statistics. I suggest that three interrelated processes are at play here: processes of *problematization,* processes of *normalization*, and processes of *objectification*. First, apparatuses of security enable the identification of political problems related to the population. This process of problematization is itself a political one as it is based upon specific rationalities and technologies of government. Before an issue can be expressed in the form of statistics it needs to be identified as a certain problem that requires governmental intervention. In other words, "[n]umbers are integral to the problematizations that shape what is to be governed, to the programmes that seek to give effect to government and to the unrelenting evaluation of the performance of government that characterizes modern political culture" (Rose 1999b: 199).

Second, apparatuses of security do not take for granted an ideal projection of how the population should be – as is the case with disciplinary power directed at the individual. Rather they take the population as an empirical reality so that "the operation of *normalization* consists in establishing an interplay between (…) different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable" (Foucault 2007a: 63, emphasis added). Average conditions among the population and projections about future developments are therefore decisive (see Deflem 1997 on criminal statistics). It is clearly evident that these apparatuses of security can only function on the basis of systematic statistical data about the living conditions of the population. Only

with the help of this data is it possible to make rational calculations that can eventually lead to political interventions. This is the case given that statistics make regularities and characteristics of the population, such as fertility, mortality, unemployment, or crime apparent.

Finally, in addition to processes of problematization and normalization, statistics contribute to the *objectification* of the population (see Foucault 1991: 86; see also Porter 1996: 74–78). This objectification has two dimensions: On the one hand, statistics generate a sense of objectivity that can enhance the legitimacy of governance since statistics "appear to depoliticize whole areas of political judgement" (Rose 1999b: 198). On the other hand, on an instrumental level, "[n]umbers turn people into objects to be manipulated" (Porter 1996: 77).[37] In this regard, Hansen and Porter point out that statistics can generate a unique sense of assumed objectivity, truth and transparency that increases the credibility of governance (Hansen/Porter 2012: 415). Hence, due to the fact that the process of objectification relies on scientific knowledge there is a close link to what the Stanford School describes as 'scientization' (Drori/Meyer 2006). The authority of statistics thus is often accepted without being questioned. As a consequence, statistics, or "numerical operations produce and reproduce relations of power" (Hansen/Porter 2012: 416). Hence, statistical facts are not only a part of social reality but highly political. Therefore, "[statistics as a science] may think of itself as providing only information, but it is itself part of the technology of power in a modern state" (Hacking 1991: 181). In this sense, "[n]umbers have achieved an unmistakable political power within technologies of government" (Rose 1999b: 197). It is clear that this understanding of governance is based on a typically modern optimism regarding the success of political interventions. In this sense "there is a strong implication that any imperfections in the statistics can be treated as a purely *technical* problem" (Miles/Irvine 1979: 114). As will become clear with regard to Palestine, the politicization of seemingly objective statistical data can create circumstances in which statistics offices are confronted with the option of taking sides in a conflict setting or adhering to their professional impartiality. In any event, statistics thus

[37] For a comprehensive critique of both positivist and phenomenologist approaches to official statistics see Hindess (1973).

can be regarded as important technologies of power (see Rose 1999b: 197; Miller 2001; Fioramonti 2014; Sokhi-Bulley 2011).

The Birth of Modern Statistics

Historically, as Shaw and Miles show, the very first attempts of identifying the population as a political problem itself can be traced back to 16th century London when urbanization contributed to epidemic diseases that led to the compilation of the first data on mortality. One crucial insight drawn from such tables that focused on the population was "that death itself was orderly" (Shaw/Miles 1979: 30). Closely related, Foucault presents the example of the emergence of apparatuses of security of health care with regard to vaccination against smallpox. Smallpox was a widespread disease in 18th century Europe (Foucault 2007a: 58–60). The availability of statistical data regarding the effects of smallpox on the population enabled the construction of smallpox as a political problem to which vaccination represented a suitable response:

> "When quantitative analyses are made of smallpox in terms of success and failure, defeats and successful outcomes, when the different possibilities of death or contamination are calculated, the result is that the disease no longer appears in this solid relationship of the prevailing disease to its place or milieu, but as a distribution of cases in a population circumscribed in time or space" (Foucault 2007a: 60).

This example shows that politically dealing with problems affecting the population such as diseases in a preventive manner on the basis of statistics is historically rooted. Statistics as a form of systematic, rationalized knowledge about the population are a fundamental prerequisite for the emergence of the modern territorial state and thus the exercise of governmentality as one of its most distinctive features. The actual 'birth of statistics' as a modern phenomenon can be related to major empirically observable developments. These interconnected events, of which Ian Hacking (1991: 184–189) highlights three, had a significant impact on all societal spheres and can temporally be located at the end of 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. First, determinism as a predominant paradigm was gradually replaced by a positivist epistemology as one of the defining features of enlightenment. As a result of this 'erosion of determinism' the role of chance in shaping societal developments received increasing attention. The second development, the 'taming of chance' can be seen as a response to this newly discovered insecurity. In this sense,

statistical knowledge represents a means to systematically deal with the insight that probabilities have a significant impact on societal developments. Finally, Hacking observes an exponential increase in the publication of figures between 1820 and 1840 in Western Europe that he describes as the 'avalanche of printed numbers' (Hacking 1982: 281, 1991). This development is concomitant with the expansion and centralization of statistical bureaucracies in this period as signs of this 'birth of modern statistics' (see Desrosières 2002). According to Jürgen Osterhammel, therefore, "[t]he nineteenth century was the founding age of *modern* statistics (...)" (2014: 25, emphasis in the original). It should be noted, that while the birth of modern statistics can be localized in 19th century Western Europe and North America, ever since statistical knowledge has become a pervasive phenomenon in world society due to processes of diffusion. In this regard, the establishment of colonial administrations was one mechanism that contributed to the globalization of modern statistics. In these cases, however, as will be further explained in the next section, the main purpose of statistics was one of colonial control emphasizing repressive aspects of power.

Empowerment and Subjection

According to Foucault, "managing the population does not mean just managing the collective mass of phenomena or managing them simply at the level of their overall results; managing the population means managing it in depth, in all its fine points and details" (Foucault 2007a: 107). Hence, in order to manage the population, the population has to be known, or in the words of James C. Scott, the population had to be made *legible:* "The more static, standardized, and uniform a population or social space is, the more legible it is, and the more amenable it is to the techniques of state officials" (1998: 82). For Porter, in this regard, the element of standardization is of vital importance as the "bureaucratic imposition of uniform standards and measures has been indispensable for metamorphosis of local skills into generally valid scientific knowledge" (Porter 1996: 21), and thus, in line with sociological neo-institutionalism, for the emergence of modern social statistics since the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century and its subsequent global diffusion.

While statistical data had already been utilized for political purposes before the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century, this data had served primarily

for purposes of political domination. The crucial difference of statistics as modern technologies of governance lies in their quality of simultaneously subjecting and empowering the population, both individually and collectively (see Butler 1997). Statistics, on the one hand, serve as an instrument to exercise control over the population. Subjection, in this sense, refers to the passive subordination of the population and individuals. On the other hand, statistics lead to the empowerment of the population or its subjectification, denoting "the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject" (Foucault 1988a: 253). This is the case as subjectification equips the population and individuals with agency. For instance, census-taking empowers a population as it allows for the self-imagination as a national collective (Anderson 1991: 164). Hence, the increased importance and widespread use of statistical data contributed to the construction of the population, because it made possible for the first time (self-) envisioning the population – under a specific territorially defined political authority – as such and as a whole. In this regard, the political use and public dissemination of statistical data also functioned as a catalyst for the global availability of modern ideas such as nationalism, given that with the help of statistical data – and the unity of difference they displayed – the population could think of itself as a political community with common features. Hence, in the words of sociological neo-institutionalism, modern statistics contribute to the global diffusion of these ideas (see Meyer et al. 1997). At the same time, statistics thereby function as mechanisms of self-observation of society that facilitate political interventions (see e.g. Luhmann 2013: Ch. 5). In this sense, in his seminal global history of the nineteenth century, Jürgen Osterhammel points out that "[i]n the second half of the nineteenth century, statistics became what it is today: the most important tool for the constant self-monitoring of society" (2014: 26).

Therefore, statistics not only helped in discovering the population and its features but also in constructing the population as such (see Porter 1996: 37). In the words of Anat Leibler (2004: 135): "Statistical mapping, therefore, may not be a reflection of 'society'; rather, it is the process by which society is defined." In this sense, statistics lead to the simultaneous empowerment and subjection of the population. In other words, statistics both cause and depend on processes of subjectification that lead to the inclusion of the individual into society (see

Starr 1987; Buck 1982). In summary, social statistics rely on the freedom of these individuals, thereby empowering individuals while at the same time subjecting them to governmental power (Bröckling et al. 2011: 14).

Standardization: Societal Inclusion and Exclusion

In particular with regard to the census it becomes evident that statistics can serve as powerful mechanisms of both exclusion and inclusion given that certain people are counted as being part of a collective while others and their distinctive features are ignored and thereby excluded. In general, a census can be defined as "a totalizing procedure that involves establishing equivalences between bodies (categories) and statistical operations to make up and see populations, watch their patterns and regularities and identify their probable trajectories." (Ruppert 2012: 214). At the same time, however, the apparently objective operations of statistical data collection are preceded by politically influenced decisions about who to count and how (Porter 1996: 33–35).

In this context, three interconnected aspects of statistical standardization are of importance (Leibler 2004): First, statistics *create categories* that have not preexisted in society. This form of statistical mapping of the population is closely related to, second, the *elimination of anomalies* by means of standardization and classification. Both cases represent an attempt to create categories into which the population is made to fit. This is what Hacking calls 'making up people' (Hacking 1986, 2006), referring to the fact that these categories often did not exist before but are socially constructed. While these categories might seem artificial when they are originally introduced in statistical reports, they often become societally internalized through cultural practices over time. As Osterhammel puts it: "Categories that statistics made technically necessary – classes, strata, castes, ethnic groups – acquired the power to mold reality for administrative departments and, indeed, in society's perception of itself" (Osterhammel 2014: 29). Or, in the words of Scott: "Statistical facts were elaborated into social laws" (Scott 1998: 92; see Starr 1987: 53; see also Hindess 1973). Leibler gives an example for the creation of categories by showing that the category of *Mizrakhim* did not exist as a distinctive social group before the first Israeli census in 1948 (Leibler 2004: 140–142). In this census, *Mizrakhim* referred to Jews originating mainly in various Arab and Muslim countries in Asia.

So, while originally it represented a statistical construction, "the category Mizrakhim came into being and became an a-historical category and a solid social, political, and cultural phenomenon" (Leibler 2004: 140). That related attempts of 'demographic engineering' do not necessarily lead to the internalization of the newly constructed categories can be seen in the case of Yugoslavia after the Second World War. In line with Tito's attempt to create a unifying national narrative for the diverse ethnic groups of the Balkans, 'Yugoslavs' and 'Muslims' were introduced as census categories. In the census of 1961, many Muslims referred to the 'Yugoslavs' category in order avoid being counted as being part of the Serbian and Croat national groups. When, however, the category of 'Muslim' was introduced in 1971, there was a decline in the percentage of people identifying themselves as Yugoslavs. All in all, the number of people identifying themselves as 'Yugoslavs' was rather marginal, peaking in the census of 1981 with 5.4 percent in all of Yugoslavia (Sekulic et al. 1994: 84-85).

An attempted elimination of anomalies can be witnessed in France where, due to its egalitarian political culture on the one hand and the political objective of assimilation on the other, law prohibits the collection of statistical data based on ethnic or racial backgrounds. This leads to a situation where statistics literally do not take into account the diversity of French society; with the consequence that "[t]he gap between the statistical categories and the terms used in everyday discourse is huge" (Simon 2008: 12). Finally, in addition to categorization and eliminating anomalies, statistics can have exclusionary effects by what can be termed *un-counting* (Leibler 2004). In this sense, it depends on the *a priori* created categories if someone is considered as being part of the population that is to be counted or not (such as gender, race or religion).

The Global Diffusion of Modern Statistics

Even though modern statistics have their origin in 18th and 19th century Europe, there is no reason to limit its importance to the OECD-world as many scholars do. In this regard, Rose (1991, 1999) and Starr (1987), stress a causal relationship between statistics and democracy. Rose argues that "[d]emocratic power is calculated power, and numbers are intrinsic to the forms of justification that give legitimacy to political power in democracies" (1999: 200). While the legitimizing

character of numbers in general and statistics in particular is obvious in liberal democracies, I would argue that this is also the case beyond the OECD-world. Accordingly, as with modern governmentality in general, there is no need to limit the political importance of statistics only to what Rose describes as 'advanced liberal democratic capitalist societies' (Rose 1991: 673).

Rather, in line with the Stanford School's sociological neo-institutionalism I argue that modern statistics are part of a globally valid script or world-societal norm. Therefore, in line with my understanding of governmentality as being constitutive for modern political ordering, it makes sense to argue that the ideas related to statistical thinking have globally diffused and are thus in their availability ubiquitous (i.e. universalist) in world society. In the context of this global diffusion, rationalization, standardization and theorization/scientization are important driving forces for the globalization of modern statistics in world society. On a global level, therefore, "[t]hese *world data* serve as a rational and scientific basis for mobilization, and world policies are organized to deal with the problems involved – to solve global health, educational, economic, or security problems" (Meyer et al. 2006b: 32, emphasis added). Empirically, this this can be seen with regard to the numerous databases compiled by UN-institutions such as UNDP, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[38] These statistical databases relating to indicators such as poverty, development, or economic performance are not limited to advanced liberal democracies but attempt to statistically map the whole world in exhaustive detail. These statistics of a global scope compiled by institutions with a global horizon can already in and of themselves be considered as mechanisms of self-observation of the political system of world society. In other words, they can be considered as empirical manifestations of the structural emergence of world statehood (see Albert et al. 2012; Albert/Stichweh 2007). At the same time, however, the qualification needs to be made that most of these statistics and indicators are primarily divided according to nation-states in whose statistics bureaus they were produced.

[38] For the statistical integration of the Middle East into world society see e.g. the Arab Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2009.

To sum it up, the systematic utilization of modern statistics for political purposes is inextricably linked to the emergence of governmentality as a constitutive principle of modern political ordering. The discovery of the population was accompanied by the problematization of the population as an issue for governmental intervention. For that purpose, processes of normalization aim at identifying regularities within the population that can be used as the basis for further projections and preventive measures. Moreover, statistics contribute to the objectification of the population, by both creating a sense of objectivity and turning the population into countable units. At the same time, statistics contribute to the empowerment and subjection of the population. Finally, statistical standardization has significant inclusionary and exclusionary effects in the sense that certain categories of persons are counted while others are ignored.

In the following section, I will take up the insights generated in this section in order to analyze in detail the role of social statistics as biopolitical technologies of governmentality in Palestine.

Social Statistics and Political Order in Palestine

The Emergence of Modern Statistics in Palestine

Historically, the global diffusion of modern statistics to the Middle East and Palestine can be traced back to the influence of the Ottoman and subsequent British rule over Palestine since the 19th century. The first reform attempts in the Ottoman Empire which aimed at improving taxation and conscription can be witnessed already since the 1820s when population counts were primarily conducted for these two reasons (McCarthy 1990: 2; Zürcher 2004: 43). The *Imperial Edict of the Rose Garden* of 1839 facilitated an era of comprehensive reform in the Ottoman Empire, to be known as the period of *Tanzim* (reforms) (1839-1876). The reformist Sultan Abdülmecid I and a European-educated reformist bureaucracy instigated reforms that first and foremost led to the establishment of a modern bureaucracy based on rationalized procedures. These reforms can explicitly be seen as attempts to imitate patterns that had proven successful in Europe and to avoid colonization (Zürcher 2004: 50–75). Without going into detail here regarding successes and failures of these reforms, the Tanzimat era represents a clear example of the diffusion of world-cultural principles originating in Europe and their attempted translation into the context of the

Ottoman Empire. In that period, there was growing interest in knowing the population not only for taxation and conscription but also for social development purposes in general, leading to a systematic utilization of modern statistics towards the end of the century, comparable to the developments in Western Europe some decades before (McCarthy 1990: 2). The encounters of the population of Palestine with modern statistics were intensified during the period of the British Mandate. In this sense, the British presence in Palestine represents another important factor for the diffusion of modern ideas to Palestine. According to McCarthy, despite evident inaccuracies, the British census of 1931 corresponded to European standards of that time not only regarding the methods of data collection but also concerning the degree of differentiation of categories and its overall comprehensiveness (1990: 28–30). In addition, political Zionism with its origin in Europe further contributed to the diffusion of statistical thinking as an element of modern governmentality to historic Palestine, as evidenced in particular in the establishment of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 1948 (see Leibler 2004).

While my analysis focuses on Palestinian statistical capacities in the occupied territories that have been developed since 1993, there are notable precursors to the statistical system of the PCBS. Since its establishment in 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has collected an immense stock of data on Palestinian refugees consisting of family files, registration records, and service statistics on education and health. Within UNRWA, there is clear awareness of the importance of statistics on refugees. For instance, Matthias Burchard, UNRWA Representative to the EU, stresses that linking different data related to poverty might lead to a more comprehensive approach towards poverty reduction which goes beyond food provision.[39] As, however, UNRWA has never conducted a census of Palestinian refugees there are no exact figures on the refugee population (Endresen/Øvensen 1994). In the words of UNRWA: "UNRWA's registration figures do not necessarily reflect the actual population due to factors such as unreported births and deaths or false and duplicate registration" (UNRWA 1986: 8). According to Burchard, one way of dealing with this issue might be the

[39] Author interview with Matthias Burchard, Berlin, 13 March 2014.

introduction of personalized magnetic ID-cards for refugees in order to use medical services.[40] Thus far, statistics on Palestinian refugees derive from a mixture of UNRWA records, surveys from the Norwegian institute Fafo and PCBS data (Abu-Libdeh 2007).

It is also important to point to the often neglected fact that genuinely Palestinian experiences with modern institutionalized statistics date back to the 1970s. A first example of the Palestinian nationalist movement addressing the importance of population statistics can be found in a study authored by senior PLO-member Nabeel Shaath in 1972 that deals with the demographic situation of Palestinians in the occupied territories and the rest of the world (Shaath 1972). In addition, during its Cairo session on 13-22 March 1977, the PLO's legislative body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) decided to establish the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Natural Resources (PCBSNR) in Damascus.[41] Already the establishment of the PCBSNR points to the global dimension of Palestinian statistics because the United Nations Population Fund provided financial support for its establishment in 1978. What is particularly remarkable in this regard is that, due to the dispersal of Palestinians in the global diaspora,[42] the office did not define the scope of data collection with reference to criteria of territoriality. Instead, the office was charged with assembling relevant social, economic, and demographic statistical data about *all* Palestinians, be it in the global diaspora, in Israel or in the occupied territories. This function was taken over by PCBS in 1999 when a Presidential Decree[43] extended its mandate to compile statistics not only on the population in the occupied territories but "on *all* Palestinians wherever they reside" (Palestinian National Authority 1999: Art. 2). PCBS reflects this objective with an annual compilation of demographic features of 'Palestinians living all over the world' (see e.g. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011b). Accordingly, due to the globally dispersed nature of the Palestinian population, Palestinian statistics explicitly emphasize the

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Regarding the information on the Damascene predecessor of the Ramallah-based PCBS, I particularly relied on the accounts of the head of the Damascus office, Yousef al-Madi, provided in a personal correspondence with the author on 5 March 2013.

[42] See Ragazzi (2009) for addressing the issue of 'governing diasporas'.

[43] It is should also be noted that this decree points to the formal legal predecessors of the Palestinian legislation on statistics, namely for Gaza the Statistics Law No. 31 of 1947 from the British Mandate, and the Jordanian Statistics Law No. 24 of 1950 that was formally valid in the Jordanian annexed West Bank.

population as the target as opposed to taking territoriality as the primary reference. Since the establishment of the PCBS in 1993, the Palestinian center of statistics has moved to the occupied territories. Moreover, as PCBSNR Director Yousef al-Madi points out, since the early 2000s the Syrian government has started severely obstructing the work of PCBSNR thereby challenging its overall functioning. In spite of this, the statistics office in Damascus and PCBS in Ramallah cooperate on a regular basis.[44] According to Fafo's Research Director for Middle East Studies, Åge A. Tiltnes, the Damascus office maintains great relevance for PCBS Ramallah especially as it at least until the Syrian civil war, has provided the only direct access for the latter to primary data on the living conditions of Palestinian refugees in Syria and Lebanon.[45]

It follows that each agency has a different focus and therefore a different understanding of who (is) counted as Palestinian. While UNRWA exclusively addresses Palestinian refugees, PCBSNR originally focused on all Palestinians worldwide. Even though PCBS has taken over this mandate, its primary focus remains the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.

The Birth of Palestinian Statistics as a Global Phenomenon

From the very beginning, the development of Palestinian official statistics was characterized by a profound exposure to global dynamics.[46] Within the Palestinian national movement clearly existed the awareness that modern statistics are crucial for the project of Palestinian self-determination, nation-building, and self-governance. This insight manifested itself institutionally with the decision to establish the then Palestinian Bureau of Statistics in 1993. According to Hasan Abu-Libdeh, its founding president (1993-2005), Ahmad Qurei, then head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Economic Affairs Department, turned to him on March 13, 1993 with a decree from the PLO Executive Committee to start work on creating a Palestinian statistics office (Abu-Libdeh 1995, 2002). Abu-Libdeh states that the need for establishing a Palestinian statistics infrastructure was also inspired by his personal

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[44] Author email correspondence with Yousef Al-Madi, 5 March 2013.

[45] Author interview with Åge A. Tiltnes, 7 March 2013.

[46] While there are also other relevant producers of statistics in the context of Palestine, such as the Palestinian Monetary Authority, the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Education, this chapter will focus on PCBS as the hub of the Palestinian system of official statistics.

involvement in a comprehensive survey of Palestinian living conditions in the occupied territories, conducted in 1992 by Fafo, the Norwegian institute that initiated the direct Israeli-Palestinian talks that culminated in the Oslo-Accords.[47] This report stresses the "acute need for updated, accurate, comprehensive socioeconomic data which could serve policy-making purposes in the area" (Heiberg/Øvensen 1993: 6). On September 1, 1993, two weeks before the signing ceremony of the Declaration of Principles, the first of the two Oslo-Accords, the establishment of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics was officially announced (Abu-Libdeh 2002).[48] It is especially remarkable that the PCBS was created as the first formal Palestinian institution in the course of the Oslo Process – even before the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994. This mirrors the importance ascribed to the systematic utilization of statistical data for governing Palestine. It is a striking parallel that the Israeli state-building endeavor developed in a similar trajectory, because the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) was one of the first institutions established in the newly founded State of Israel in 1948 (Leibler 2004). Hence, the case of statistics represents one of the many examples of mutual imitation between Jewish Zionism and Palestinian nationalism that Bernard Wasserstein (2008) highlights.

Even before the organizational transformation of the PCBS into a formal PA institution through a Presidential decree on November 10, 1994 (Palestinian National Authority 1994), the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) jointly with the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics organized the first international conference on developing Palestinian official statistics in New York (United Nations Statistics Division 2007).[49] In its establishment phase, PCBS on the one hand received considerable support from foreign countries and international organizations in order to build up statistical expertise and to train PCBS staff. In this regard, foreign technical missions helped implement statistical projects in Palestine. On the other hand, PCBS recruited Palestinian experts working in Arab countries and sent staff abroad for training. In 1996, PCBS established the Palestinian Statistical Training Center which is mandated to train PCBS staff and other users and producers of statistics in Palestine. In addition, PCBS assesses

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[47] Author interview with Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Ramallah, 8 September 2012.
[48] Ibid.
[49] A second decree on statistics from January 1995 only dealt with the renaming of the PBS into its current name PCBS (Palestinian National Authority 1995).

training needs on an annual basis. While technical missions still play an important role in certain sophisticated cases, PCBS also makes use of regional and international opportunities for statistical capacity building.[50]

Adherence to Global Standards

On a technical level, the main reason for PCBS's emphasis of international standards and its deliberate and proactive interaction with the international statistical community lies in the lack of institutional predecessors in the occupied territories upon which the Palestinians could have relied. In the words of Abu-Libdeh: "The PCBS had to be built from scratch" (2002: 164). Hence, from the outset, international expertise and support was instrumental for the organizational development of the PCBS. Abu-Libdeh explicitly refers to the global availability of the idea of modern statistics: "We knew of the existence of an international statistical community within which there has been cooperation across borders for more than 100 years" (1995: 2). This insight is also spelled out in the Master Plan for Palestinian Official Statistics that was developed by PCBS in 1994/1995: "A Palestinian system of official statistics cannot wait to come about through a long process of *evolution*. At the outset, the plan for subject matter statistics must be based on theoretical considerations and international practices" (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1995a: (6), emphasis added). The emphasis of the global dimension of Palestinian statistics in this Master Plan corresponds to the forum of its public presentation at the second international conference on developing Palestinian official statistics in Jerusalem on April 24, 1995 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1995b). The Masterplan, covering the period of 1995-2000, represents an explicitly theory-guided, systematic approach to Palestinian statistics, outlining in detail the functions and the mandate of the PCBS, and clearly shows that PCBS considers itself as being part of world-societal discourses on professional statistics as it stresses the relevance of international standards and expertise (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1995a).

PCBS's professional adherence to global standards and its (quasi-) membership in international organizations illustrate the global diffusion of modern statistics

[50] Author email correspondence with PCBS Staff, 12 May 2013.

to Palestine and Palestine's embeddedness in world society. Since its inception, PCBS has adopted global standards as the basis of its operations, such as United Nations Statistics Division's *System of National Accounts* (SNA 93) and the International Statistics Institute's *Declaration of Professional Ethics*. Moreover, the PA Council of Ministers adopted the United Nations Statistics Commission's *Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics* of 1994, one of the basic documents guiding global statistics, in October 2005 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2005). In addition, PCBS adopted comprehensive internal quality management procedures and received the related ISO 9001 standard certificate in 2010 (see Barakat/Al-Husien 2012). The PCBS also applies global norms and methodologies related to respective issue areas, such as FAO concepts for agricultural statistics or ILO standards for labor statistics (see MEDSTAT II - Occupied Palestinian Territory 2009). Finally, while initially having joined the IMF's General Data Dissemination System (GDDS) on March 13, 2006, most notably, Palestine successfully became member of the IMF's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) on April 19, 2012. This is not only remarkable because of the high requirements of the SDDS but also as Palestine was only the fifth Arab country (besides Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia) and the 71st in the world that fulfilled the requirements of the SDDS. The observance of the SDDS is a proof of the level of sophistication and global embeddedness of the Palestinian system of official statistics and its leading role in the Middle East (Palestinian National Authority 2012a). Concerning the latter, Abu-Libdeh emphasizes the novelty of using modern statistics in the region when the PCBS was established: "We were entrepreneurs. We produced statistics that were never produced before in the Middle East."[51]

The high standard of Palestinian official statistics puts PCBS in a position where it not only receives support from the global statistics community but becomes an active agent of modern statistics itself. PCBS is involved in various international initiatives to advance global statistical capacities thereby assuming a 'leadership role', according to the OECD.[52] Moreover, as the first Arab head of a national statistics bureau, PCBS President Ola Awad has become president-elect of the International Association of Official Statistics for the years 2013-

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[51] Author interview with Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Ramallah, 8 September 2012.
[52] Author email correspondence with OECD staff, 14 February 2013.

2015 and its president for 2015-2017 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2013). PCBS also actively provides expertise to international technical assistance missions, in 2011, for instance, to Iraq, Jordan and various Gulf countries (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2012a: 49–50). Comprehensive external evaluations of the Palestinian statistics system – undertaken for instance by EU's statistics agency Eurostat – give further evidence for the adherence to globally accepted practices and standards and thereby for the deepened integration of the PCBS into global statistical discourses (Hackl et al. 2012; MEDSTAT II - Occupied Palestinian Territory 2009).

The celebration of the United Nations World Statistics Day on October 20, 2010 in Palestine can be seen on the one hand as the epitomization of the Palestinian integration into the global statistics community. On the other hand, the celebration of this event gives evidence to the Stanford School's argument that the world represents a single polity in which structural similarities have globally diffused. Besides public ceremonies on that day, PCBS also dedicated a special website to this global event that had the purpose of "celebrating the many achievements of official statistics" (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2011a: 16–23). The self-awareness of global statistics in world society celebrating its existence is best captured by Paul Cheung, Director of the United Nations Statistics Division: "The notion of a global professional statistical family, that transcends political, economic and cultural differences among countries, is perhaps the biggest achievement of all" (United Nations Statistics Division 2010).

It should also be noted that in developing Palestinian official statistics and internalizing global statistical knowledge for that purpose, its founding director Hasan Abu-Libdeh played a salient role. Due to his personal background, he considered himself in a 'unique position'[53] when founding the PCBS, since he was both senior PLO-member and statistician by training, holding a PhD in Biostatistics from Cornell University and a Master's Degree in Mathematical Statistics from Stanford University (Abu-Libdeh 2010). In this sense, he

[53] Author interview with Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Ramallah, 8 September 2012.

combined the striving for national self-determination with the importance of modern statistical thinking for governing the Palestinian population.

To summarize, therefore, while having a national focus on Palestine, the PCBS is characterized by a great openness to the global diffusion of modern statistics. It can thus be argued that since its creation, the PCBS has inscribed the world-societal horizon of modern statistics into its institutional DNA. As a result, PCBS is involved in an active mutual exchange of expertise with the global statistics community. In other words, PCBS itself is not only a result but also an agent, or norm entrepreneur, of the global diffusion of modern statistics.

Statistics as Biopolitical Technologies of Governmentality in Palestine

The establishment of a Palestinian statistics system was essential for the functioning of the PA and its political institutions. In other words, statistics as modern technologies of power are indispensable for creating Palestinian societal order. This view is unequivocally confirmed by Hasan Abu-Libdeh: "If you want to govern Palestine in an efficient way, you cannot do it without statistics."[54] With regard to the practical utilization of statistics in Palestine, it is reasonable to focus on the interplay of the defining elements of governmentality mentioned above:

First, when the PCBS was established there was increasing awareness within the PLO-leadership that in order to exercise any kind of meaningful self-governance it was essential to acquire knowledge about the Palestinian *population* that is to be governed. This insight was however not self-evident but had to develop within PLO/PA, according to Abu-Libdeh: "We worked hard on educating policy-makers about the importance of statistics. The demand grew when we injected the knowledge."[55] That the establishment of the PCBS was in fact motivated by the need to know the population in order to govern it is explicitly stated by Abu-Libdeh:

> "I realized that the Palestinian side had no means to collect data that related to Palestinian life. (…) It was the feeling of urgency that a future Palestinian Authority should be based on scientific data. The PCBS charged itself with producing a

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[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

> maximum of information for decision-makers. We worked on the basis of the assumption that any PA institution requires statistical data. Creating a statistical function was an important strategic intervention for the PA."[56]

Second, statistical data and inferred *economic calculations* represent the knowledge base for political interventions in Palestine. In particular, this can be observed with reference to the PA's socio-economic development plans that fundamentally rely on statistical data about the Palestinian population. To give one example, in order to measure the achievements in different policy-fields, the PA's National Development Plan 2011-13 sets specific benchmarks based on statistically generated rationalized calculations (Khalidi 2011). Moreover, the PA's continuous monitoring and evaluation practices are a reflection of the political economy as the knowledge base of governmentality in Palestine. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the PA not only issues monitoring and evaluation reports on a regular basis but also established a department of monitoring and evaluation in the Ministry of Planning in 2009.[57]

Third, in Palestine we can clearly observe the pervasive existence of *apparatuses of security* that are based on rationalized statistical knowledge about the population. That the PCBS's main role is exactly to generate the knowledge base for these apparatuses of security can be seen in the General Statistics Law of 2000. It states that the PCBS has the function "to serve Palestinian authorities as an instrument of guidance for diagnosing problems and evaluating progress made" (Palestinian National Authority 2000: Art. 3). In this regard, it is obvious that statistical data is supposed to enable future projection about the situation of the population, such as births, deaths, labor force, education, or health. In other words, statistics allow for the normalization of the conditions of the population. This view is confirmed when looking at the issue-areas in which these apparatuses of security operate according to the General Statistics Law. In this sense, the PCBS is charged to collect statistical data, among others, in the fields of demography, social affairs, and economy. More than half of all mentioned statistical sub-sections relate explicitly to the Palestinian population (Palestinian National Authority 2000: Art. 5).

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[56] Ibid.

[57] Author interview with Bader Abu-Zahra, Ramallah, 17 November 2011.

Governing Palestine through Statistics

The statistical data that the PCBS generates have an impact on every aspect of the life of the Palestinian population, be it as a collective or as individuals. For instance, the data of the PCBS influences how Muslim Palestinians can practice their faith. This is the case as the PCBS is involved in setting the quotas that determine how many people from Palestine can take part in the Muslim pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca each year.[58] In addition, statistical data has an effect on the ideational availability of individual and collective rights. These rights are considered as having universal validity thus enabling populations to demand their compliance by public authorities. In Palestine, this can be observed, for example, in the context of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the implied human, social and economic rights, to which the PA has officially committed itself. In order to achieve these goals the PA devised a "National Strategy to Achieve the MDGs by 2015" (Palestinian National Authority 2012b). The assessment of the progress in realizing these goals is of relevance for the legitimacy of the PA, not only towards the international society of states to which it aspires to belong and international donors but also towards the Palestinian population (see Stetter 2012a). In any event, the PCBS plays an important role for the translation of the MDGs as a global norm into the local context of Palestine as statistical data is essential for measuring progress in realizing the respective goals. Or, as Luay Shabaneh, PCBS president from 2005 to 2010, puts it with reference to the observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "providing comprehensive, comparative and accurate information on the situation of human rights is considered a backbone of the reporting system on human rights" (Shabaneh 2000: 2).

In the context of translating global norms into the local Palestinian context one might expect arguments of cultural traditionalism being used in order to explain why certain MDGs cannot be implemented in the specific context. This, however, is at least not mirrored in the way in which these norms are statistically framed. For instance, the PCBS explicitly addresses potentially controversial questions of gender inequality and collects data regarding the female

[58] Author interview with Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Ramallah, 8 September 2012.

participation in the labor market or domestic violence against women (Palestinian National Authority 2012b: 33–39).

The Census: Governance and Inclusion/Exclusion through Statistics

The Census as a Technology of Governance

The case of the census allows an analysis of both the importance of statistics for governing the daily lives of the population and the inclusionary and exclusionary effects of categorization, elimination of anomalies, and un-counting.

The PCBS faced the challenge that so far, the Palestinian population had historically experienced censuses exclusively as instruments of colonial control, be it in the case of Ottoman or British rule or under the Israeli occupation.[59] More importantly, Palestinians were confronted with Israeli exercises of un-counting in 1948 and 1967 which severely affected the Palestinian population as they contributed to the enduring refugee question. As Leibler (2004) shows, when Israel conducted its first population census in 1948 during the first Arab-Israeli war, a government order stipulated that people were only counted as citizens if they were present in their homes. As a result, the census only counted around 69,000 Palestinians thereby excluding a majority who was expelled of fled from their homes (Abu-Zahra/Kay 2012: 29). Therefore, the census can be seen as "a formal and active procedure of "un-counting" non-citizens (…)" (Leibler 2004: 135), that in this case affected the Palestinians in Israel as the regulation was not applied towards the Jewish population. In other words: "The census was thus a crucial part of the effort to permanently exclude Palestinian refugees from returning" (Abu-Zahra/Kay 2012: 28). Leibler, in this context, documents that the first director of the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics Roberto Bachi admitted that the timing of the census during the war fulfilled the political purpose of freezing demographic picture that was favorable for the Jewish *Ashkenazi* founders of the state of Israel as it had been taken just after Palestinians fled or were expelled from the country and before waves of Jews

[59] Doumani (1994) shows that during the Tanzimat period, the Ottoman rulers of historic Palestine attempted to restore centralized control over local provinces. Therefore, the Ottoman counting of the Palestinian population represented a challenge to local power structures. As a consequence, it was in the interests of the local Palestinian population to be under-counted. The Ottomans themselves faced the dilemma that in order to properly exercise the census they were depending on the willingness of local staff to cooperate.

from Arab countries had arrived (Leibler 2004: 136). Moreover, before the first PCBS census in 1997, the most recent experience of the Palestinian population was that of the census of 1967 that was carried out right after Israel occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967 (see Perlmann 2012). On the one hand, this census provided the Israeli authorities with important knowledge in order to control the population. On the other hand, the census had severe exclusionary effects of un-counting as it caused the withdrawal of residency rights for more than 350,000 Palestinians who were not present during the census, primarily as they took refuge from the war of 1967 (Abu-Libdeh 2001: 10–11). In this regard, it is important to note that the census has served as the basis of the Palestinian population registry which has been under Israeli control ever since, significantly affecting the daily lives of Palestinians (Human Rights Watch 2012). As a result, on the eve of the first Palestinian census that took place exactly 30 years later in 1997, "[t]he country was, in a nutshell, hostile to data collection and statistical activities" (Abu-Libdeh 2000: 4). Therefore, the PCBS had to invest considerable efforts in reducing the population's negative attitude towards the census and encourage its active cooperation.

It can be argued that the census is the most important instrument to acquire knowledge of the population in order to govern it. In this sense, the PCBS describes its 1997 census as "a basic tool that enables the Palestinian decision-makers and planners to diagnose problems, offer advice and guidance, and assess progress made" (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1998: preface). Moreover, the census is portrayed as "evidence on the Palestinian ability to assume their affairs and determination to build the independent Palestinian State" (ibid). In this regard, PCBS highlights the need for reliable data on the Palestinian population in order to enable the PA institutions to function properly: "PCBS has realized that only by carrying out a census, its obligations can be fulfilled in providing various ministries of PNA [Palestinian National Authority] with crucially needed data for effective planning and for the integration of demographic variables into the overall development planning process" (ibid). This insight is also shared by Hamas which had taken over Gaza only a few months before the second Palestinian census was carried out in 2007. Hamas spokesperson Taher Nunu thus stated: "[The census] helps in planning and in making decisions and will be of benefit to everyone" (quoted in Haaretz

2007). At the same time, Hamas feared that PCBS might not be willing to share the data with it and therefore temporarily shut down census activities in Gaza until an agreement was reached that guaranteed Hamas access to the data (Hass 2007). Regardless of this incident, PCBS stresses that the collection of statistical data has not changed in the Gaza Strip after Hamas seized power. In addition, PCBS highlights that it disseminates its data to all users, including Hamas and that there is no competing institution in Gaza that deals with statistics.[60] It follows therefore, that Hamas is clearly aware of the importance of statistics as a technology for governing the Palestinian population.

Inclusionary and Exclusionary Effects of the Census

As argued above, statistics in Palestine are not only important for governing the daily lives of the population. This function is also inseparably linked with mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that contribute to the formation of a Palestinian national identity on the one hand, and that are directly related to demographic contestations between Palestinians and Israelis on the other. The census therefore also serves as an important instrument for constructing a sense of Palestinian national identity. This is also the case with regard to Palestinian refugees. As Julie Peteet points out in her in-depth study of Palestinian refugee camps, classification and enumeration – exercised, in particular by UNRWA – serve as biopolitical techniques that significantly affect the refugees' subjectivity (Peteet 2005a: 70–76).

Abramson (2002: 196) highlights how censuses can contribute to identity formation:

> "state-organized censuses (…) have had a significant impact on how people construct citizenship and collective identities. This impact does not stem from individual responses to census questions such as nationality, but from the ways in which those responses, collectively, are analyzed, inform state policies, are accepted as givens (social facts), and become the basis for political mobilization in pursuit of very practical ends (...)."

In this sense, "[c]ensus-taking becomes the most symbolic act of state-building" (Zureik 2001: 217). Wilkins grasps this symbolic dimension of the census most clearly: "The census, like the stamp and the airport, fosters symbolic

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[60] Author email correspondence with PCBS Staff, 12 May 2013.

representations of this imagined community as a recognized, legitimate, nation-state" (Wilkins 2004: 893). This insight is reflected by Zacharia's "call for a census of the Palestinian People" (1996), a demand that was put into action by the PCBS in December 1997 with the first "Palestinian Population, Housing and Establishment Census" (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1998).

With regard to the inclusionary effects of categorization, it is important to point out that the 1997 census was the first ever opportunity for Palestinians to explicitly identify themselves as such in a census. In previous population counts people were primarily categorized by religion which was also the case in the Israeli conducted census of 1967 (McCarthy 1990; Perlmann 2012). A notable exception was the British census of 1931, "allowing for the first time an ethnic identification of Palestine residents by self-identification (…)" (McCarthy 1990: 37). Hence, as the Superintendent of the Census Eric Mills stated, by providing for the opportunity to declare a 'nationality' the British responded to an explicit request by the Arab population to identify as such. On this basis, the census accounted for 81 percent Arabs and 17 percent Jews (Mills 1933: 73; see also Wasserstein 2008: 18–19). The explicit categorization and self-identification of the population as *Palestinian,* however, only occurred in the census of 1997, conducted by Palestinians for Palestinians. In this context, Edward W. Said described the census as an "act of historical self-realization" (Said 1995: 18) for the Palestinians. As a result, the census in general, "emerged as the most visible, and arguably the most politically important, means by which states statistically depict collective identities" (Kertzer/Arel 2002: 3). The census thus plays an important role in the process of the construction of Palestinian national identity as it enables the Palestinian population to imagine itself as a political community (see Anderson 1991: 164–170). The census, in this regard, serves as an example of the simultaneous *empowerment* and *subjection* of the Palestinian population through statistics. With regard to empowerment, the census enables the population to perceive itself as a national collective of Palestinian individuals. In this sense, the census contributes to the constitution of Palestinians as subjects, or, in other words, to their subjectification. At the same time, the census provides the Palestinian Authority with crucial information about the population. Even more so, as this information is essential for governing the population, the census equips the PA with agency. Thereby, the population gets

subjected to governmental power so that we can observe the simultaneity of empowerment and subjection of the Palestinian population. In addition, the census also contributed to the empowerment of the Palestinian scientific community. In 1994, three years before the census, Palestinian sociologist Salim Tamari identified the lack of demographic data on the Palestinian population as one of the major obstacles for research. In his words: "One of the outstanding methodological problems in Palestine is the absence of a population frame for use in survey sampling" (1994: 73).

An interesting case of un-counting relates to the Bedouin population in Israel/Palestine. Bedouins refused being counted in the 1922 and 1931 censuses during the period of the British Mandate (McCarthy 1990: 28; Mills 1932: preface) thereby defied colonial control and practiced what Scott calls the "art of not being governed" (2011). While Israeli authorities emphasized the comprehensiveness of their census of 1948, large parts of the Bedouin population were not counted. Accordingly, census-takers "chose not to register between thirteen and fifteen thousand Bedouin in the south in order to make it easier to expel many of them before international organizations noticed" (Robinson 2013: 73). Furthermore, according to PCBS, the Bedouins of the West Bank were counted in the Palestinian censuses of 1997 and 2007 but not as a distinct group (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2013). Consequently, even though the Bedouin population is considered part of the Palestinian population, the way they were incorporated into the census represents an elimination of anomalies which prevents Bedouins from being regarded as a distinct group of its own which is potentially entitled to certain minority rights.

Demographic Contestation

Processes of identity-formation in Palestine do not occur in a vacuum but rather in the context of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The construction of the Palestinian *Self* faces a competing Israeli *Other*, and vice versa, thus carrying considerable conflictive potential. This 'institutionalization of antagonisms' (Stetter 2008b: 157) can also be witnessed in the mutual contestation of demographic data which is often framed in antagonistic terms. This also points to the centrality of demography in the conflict. In the face of the conflict setting

in which the PCBS operates, Abu-Libdeh sums up the role of statistics as follows:

> "[S]tatistical development in situations of conflict or post conflict is influenced mainly by strivings for national survival and preservation, empowerment and nationhood, and for qualification for membership in the international community of nations by meeting various obligations to report on the status of the emerging nation relative to various international goals and declarations" (2003: 1).

In this sense, it can be inferred from the mutual demographic contestation that Israel is aware of the empowering effects of statistics for Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, one can often find formulations such as 'demographic war' (Abu-Lughod 1986; Ibrahim 2005) whereas the Israeli side primarily perceives the faster growing Palestinian population as a 'demographic threat' (Bystrov/Soffer 2012; Faitelson 2009). The latter is exemplified in a study published by the American-Israel Demographic Research Group (AIDRG). This study exclusively deals with accusing PCBS of extremely overestimating the Palestinian population in the 1997 census (Zimmermann et al. 2006). What is crucial here, however, is not the actual accuracy of one side or the other. Rather, the study reveals the irreconcilability of the respective Palestinian and Israeli identities which have a profound impact on how people are counted statistically. First, the study claims that PCBS inflates the number of Palestinians by wrongfully adding to the *de facto* population those Palestinians who live abroad but possess residency rights in the West Bank. By contrast, as seen in the example of the PCBS's first Current Status Report (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1994), the Palestinian side refers to the concept of 'permanent population' as opposed to the concept of 'resident population'. This distinction has considerable impact on the total number of Palestinians as it amounts to a figure which is about 325,000 larger than the *de facto* population. Second, the authors of the AIDRG study criticize that the census also included 210,000 Palestinians living East Jerusalem, which is in the Israeli reading part of the State of Israel. As, however, the Palestinians lay competing claims on the city, PCBS counted Palestinians in East Jerusalem as part of the Palestinian population in the census. In addition, there is disagreement about birth and mortality rates and migration patterns. Hence, as a result, the study contests the PCBS projection of 3.83 million Palestinians for the year 2004 and considers a number of 2.49

million as correct (Zimmermann et al. 2006: 1–3). The authors conclude that the "demographic threat to Israeli society has not quantitatively changed since 1967" (Zimmermann et al. 2006: 71). As the results of the study have first been published in June 2005 and received considerable media attention, they can be read as part of a public initiative directed against the unilateral Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip which occurred in August 2005 (Lustick 2013: 1999). Since then, AIDRG has continuously tried to publicly argue against the existence of a demographic 'time bomb', a perspective that has been taken up by Israeli right-wing politicians such as Naftali Bennett and which plays in the hands of those favoring the annexation of the occupied Palestinian territories (Hasson 2013).

The significance ascribed to statistics in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could also be witnessed during the Second Intifada when the Israeli army deliberately destroyed the statistical archives of the PCBS, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Education in the course of the military operation *Defensive Shield* (Rubenberg 2003: 350–353). While many observers criticized this attempt to destroy the knowledge base for governing the Palestinian population (Avnery 2002; Hass 2002), interviewed staff of the respective Palestinian institutions pointed out that all of them were equipped with sufficient backup capacities which prevented a loss of data.[61]

Demographic tensions and resulting competing demographic claims are particularly evident with regard to Jerusalem (Wasserstein 2008). As Zureik puts it, "people counting, considered to be a scientific undertaking, has become part of the ideological war regarding sovereignty claims over Jerusalem" (2001: 216). While Abu-Libdeh described the census as a 'civil intifada' (quoted in Greenberg 1997), Israeli authorities responded to this Palestinian 'sovereignty exercise' (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1998) by passing a law that prohibits the census-taking in East Jerusalem on the very eve before the counting was scheduled to start (Rupert 1997). This shows that Israeli authorities considered the census a challenge to Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. During the 2007 census, however, despite difficulties Palestinians managed to collect census data

[61] Author interview with Hasan Abu-Libdeh, Ramallah, 8 September 2012a Author interview with Munjid F. Suleiman, Ramallah, 24 September 2012.

in East Jerusalem by relying on volunteers who kept a low profile in order to avoid conflicts with Israeli authorities (Haaretz 2008). The PCBS acknowledges the particular importance of Jerusalem by issuing a statistical yearbook that exclusively deals with statistics on Jerusalem. The great importance of Jerusalem for Palestinian identity and the contribution of statistics to identity construction of a Palestinian self can be observed in the fact that the Jerusalem Yearbook series is the only publication series known to the author in which the PCBS makes explicit political references and thereby deviates from its otherwise apolitical working ethics. To give an indication of this politicization, it is worth quoting from the dedication of the first volume. PCBS dedicated the yearbook on the 'Jerusalem Governorate' to "[t]he martyrs of the battles fought to defend the Arab and Palestinian identity of Jerusalem, (…) our people steadfasting in the Jerusalem Governorate and dearly holding its Palestinian identity" and "[a]ll honorable defenders of our everlasting rights in Jerusalem, our eternal capital" (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 1999). In all of the first ten volumes of the yearbook such a dedication to "the soul the martyrs of all battles of Jerusalem" (see e.g. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2007) can be found. This reference needs to be seen in the context of the Second Intifada in which the PCBS saw its role in assuming

> "the responsibility of reporting about the humanitarian needs of vulnerable groups such as children and women, monitoring the impact of socio-economic policies and practices of both belligerent occupiers and indigenous players, and advocating on the basis of quantitative assessments of the basic needs of a population in conflict for international protection of basic rights, notwithstanding the role of maintaining international visibility of the national struggle" (Shabaneh 2009: 1–2).

These references clearly show the importance of statistics for the formation of Palestinian identity vis-à-vis the antagonized Israeli *Other*. In addition, since the second volume of the yearbook, the PCBS president concludes the preface with a reference to Palestinian independence which points to the importance of statistics for building a Palestinian state: "We are looking forward to issue the next volume under a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital" (see e.g. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2012b).

Furthermore, a great deal of the demographic contestation in Jerusalem focuses on the question of which population possessed what kind of majority in the city

at what time. In this sense, both Israelis and Palestinians try to legitimize their territorial claims through the reference of historical presence. To give some examples, a report by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) claims that "Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority since the middle of the nineteenth century" (Choshen 1998: 24). This narrative is challenged by the Palestinian Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ) which argues that "[f]rom the second until the twentieth century, the Philistines and Canaanites constituted the main element of the population in Jerusalem" (Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2010: 9), referring to the fact that the biblical Israelites were a distinct group from Canaanites and Philistines from whom the Palestinians are descendants. Moreover, according to ARIJ: "Up until 1948, Arab Palestinians predominantly controlled the Jerusalem District and constituted the majority of the city's residents" (Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2010: 18). This statement reflects the insight that "Palestinian leaders have long recognized that demographic dominance potentially translates into increased power and moral authority" (Abunimah 2008: 5).

It is remarkable, though, that despite the potentially politicized nature of demographic data and the sensitivity of this issue, both the Palestinian and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics emphasize their adherence to professional ethics and their refusal to be exploited for political purposes. In this sense, there is a certain decoupling of the political and the professional level. Even though the PCBS does not deny the political nature of its data on Jerusalem, it still emphasizes the objectivity of this data and the bureau's compliance with statistical standards. In this regard, the PCBS stresses its independence from political intervention. In a personal interview PCBS president Ola Awad stresses the independence of PCBS from political interference and states: "We have a policy of disseminating our data regardless of the political impact."[62] There were several cases in which the PA contested the accuracy of PCBS data and also unsuccessfully tried to prevent its publication. For example, PCBS came under fire from the PA as the number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem in the 2007 census was with 208,000 lower than expected by the PA and thus politically inconvenient (Haaretz 2008). Moreover, in spite of the conflictive context of

[62] Author interview with Ola Awad, Ramallah, 6 September 2012.

data-collection the Palestinian and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics seem to maintain a professional working relationship and have exchanged data in a couple of instances. Even more importantly, ICBS explicitly rejected the findings of the above mentioned AIDRG study which questioned PCBS data based on the 1997 census. In this context, the head of the demography department at ICBS, Ahmad Halihal, states: "The Palestinian census was conducted according to accepted international procedures and the census process was correct" (quoted in Ilan 2005). Moreover, the renowned Israeli demographer Sergio DellaPergola, head of the Jewish People Planning Institute, criticizes that none of the authors of the AIDRG study is a professional demographer, accusing them of fabricating a politicized argument based on a selective reading of demographic data (2007). In addition, DellaPergola portrays the PCBS as a professional institution which rejects political exploitation. Accordingly, the cleavages in the contested field of statistics do not necessarily allow the clear-cut distinction between Palestinians/Israelis. Rather, at least to a certain degree, it seems reasonable to distinguish between attempts to politicize statistical data by political leaders on the one hand and the attempt to maintain the professional independence and assumed objectivity of the data by the respective statistics offices on the other.

All in all, though, Wasserstein is right in pointing to the political dimension of the contestation of demographic relations which extends to statistics: "The controversy is of more than technical interest. It forms part of the armoury of statistical data that Zionist and Arab nationalist political antagonists in the struggle for Palestine draw on as each attempts to prove that it is the more deeply rooted in the country" (Wasserstein 2008: 10).

Conclusion

This chapter highlighted the biopolitical importance of statistics for governing the Palestinian population. It has become evident that statistics represent crucial technologies of governmentality which significantly contribute to the establishment of world-societal order in Palestine. Hence, the emergence of modern statistics in Palestine can best be contextualized by stressing the profound integration of Palestine in world society as the overarching structural horizon.

At the same time, statistics are important in order to equip Palestinians with a sense of agency, in particular vis-à-vis Israel. While the underlying power dynamics are also relevant for other global contexts, the case of Palestine is characterized by specific factors. First, from the outset, Palestinian statistics have emerged in a context of continuous political contestation. Second, on a formal organizational level, Palestinian statistics did not develop through a process of historical evolution but had to be established from scratch without institutional predecessors. Third, as a result, we can observe an extraordinary degree of global integration of Palestinian statistics. Fourth, due to the ongoing aspirations of becoming recognized as a fully-fledged member of the international society of states, the PCBS represents a significant symbol of Palestinian statehood. Finally, demographic contestations and related mechanisms of societal inclusion and exclusion are a central dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, constantly posing the challenge of statistical data becoming politicized. Despite the distinctive nature of Palestine as an object of analysis, the insights generated in this chapter about the political importance of statistics are clearly equipped to be transferred to other contexts because governmentality can be conceived as a universal pattern of political ordering.

5 The Surveillance of Good Governance in Palestine

Introduction

While the focus on the population and concomitant biopolitical technologies of power are crucial for the political and societal order in Palestine, this chapter will point out that modern governmentality also fundamentally relies on mechanisms of surveillance. Biopolitics and surveillance are closely interlinked in particular in the sense that both utilize what Foucault terms apparatuses of security that are involved in monitoring the condition of the population as a whole (see Chapter 3). Whereas statistics, as was argued in Chapter 4, provide the knowledge base for these apparatuses of security, surveillance makes use of this statistical knowledge in order to function. In this sense, this chapter will show that as part of modern governmentality, the exercise of surveillance as a technology of power contributes to political and societal order in Palestine. As I have highlighted in the previous chapter concerning biopolitics, the capacity for both empowerment and subjection is inherent in surveillance. In this context, I will point out that good governance represents as a particular formation of modern governmentality which considerably relies on surveillance. As will be further elaborated below, the surveillance of good governance is, in the Stanford School's parlance, based upon the world-cultural norms of standardization and rationalization. In this context, it will become clear that the good governance discourse also gives evidence to the diffusion of modern governmentality in world society due to the fact that the discourse claims for itself universalistic validity. This insight is further underpinned by the existence of various international and Palestinian organizations that demand the adherence to good governance.

On this basis, this chapter will address how the globally predominant discourse of good governance affects Palestinian political and societal order. For that purpose, it will focus on an analysis of the discourse of good governance and its diffusion in Palestine. In this sense, my research interest primarily lies in the adoption of good governance as opposed to the materialization of good governance on a micro level. Hence, even though I will also address the dynamics of decoupling between good governance as a global norm and its localization in Palestine, the main focus is on the discourse of good governance

and its adoption at an organizational level. On an empirical level, therefore, I will primarily make use of document analysis.

Theoretically, this chapter will relate governmentality research to elaborations of sociological neo-institutionalism on global norm diffusion in world society. Accordingly, I will present good governance as a particular formation of modern governmentality which considerably relies on mechanisms of surveillance. Its predominance in world society rests on underlying world-cultural principles which spread due to mechanisms of diffusion, promoted by agents of these principles functioning as norm-entrepreneurs. As part of modern governmentality, surveillance of good governance can be understood as a technology of power which forms a fundamental ordering principle in world society in general and in Palestine in particular. On this basis, I argue that on the level of formal organizations good governance has become a pivotal paradigm of political ordering in Palestine. This is mirrored both in the way in which international organizations assess Palestinian political institutions and ascribe legitimacy to them as well as with regard to patterns of self-legitimization of the PA and Hamas.

In order to develop this line of argument, I will proceed as follows: In the first section of the chapter, I will point out that good governance is based on certain world-cultural principles which get globally distributed through mechanisms of diffusion. In this context, I will refer to the role agents of these world-cultural principles play for the global diffusion of good governance. It will become evident that surveillance, relying on practices of benchmarking and evaluation, serves as a central mechanism for the diffusion of good governance as a part of modern governmentality. While surveillance practices are also relevant with regard to the Palestinian population and their everyday lives, in the context of this chapter I will primarily focus on how surveillance impacts the organizational level of Palestinian politics. I will argue that surveillance is closely related to two strategies which promote the diffusion of good governance, namely the politics of responsibilization and legitimization. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that there is great diversity in how global scripts – in the specific case embodied by good governance – translate into local contexts, therefore displaying a great deal of decoupling. In what follows I will present a detailed

examination of good governance in Palestine. I will argue that good governance understood as a specific configuration of political rationalities and technologies based on modern governmentality represents an essential mechanism for generating a Palestinian political order. In this sense, good governance is a particular arrangement of world-cultural norms which have emerged in Palestine due to global diffusion. The diffusion of good governance in Palestine is promoted and catalyzed by 'agents of world-cultural principles' such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN-organizations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and expert communities. Surveillance as a technology of power significantly contributes to the diffusion of good governance by continuously benchmarking and evaluating the Palestinian Authority (PA). It is important to note, however, that good governance is not imposed on the Palestinian Authority by these norm-entrepreneurs. Rather, the PA has voluntarily adopted the discourse of good governance into its practices. In this regard, responsibilization and legitimization come into play: By adhering to good governance the PA is made responsible for its progress in achieving such. At the same time, the PA is constructed as a legitimate actor as it gets legitimized by the agents promoting good governance in world society. In other words, agents of good governance both responsibilize and legitimize the PA. The analysis would, however, be incomplete without taking into account the role of good governance for Hamas's rule of the Gaza Strip. While Hamas is often simply displayed as a traditionalist Islamic organization which aims at armed resistance against the Israeli occupation, such a reading would omit that Hamas endorses certain modern principles of political ordering and tries to reconcile them with political Islam. In this sense, I will argue that elements of good governance form an essential feature of Hamas's political agenda and can primarily be related to Hamas's desire to be considered a legitimate political actor vis-à-vis various others in world society. Both with regard to the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip we can observe attempts of rationalizing the failure of translating good governance as a world-cultural norm of governmentality into the local context of Palestine. Rationalized decouplings thus often refer to the Israeli occupation, the intra-Palestinian division and traditional values as obstacles for the realization of good governance.

Good Governance as a Technology of Power

Since the early 1990s good governance has emerged as a core paradigm of development discourses. Especially the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been instrumental in framing the global good governance discourse which has gained considerable standing both as a political practice and an academia concept. The end of the Cold War and the failure of the structural adjustment programs based on the Washington Consensus can be regarded as major events out of which the good governance discourse emerged (see e.g. Abrahamsen 2000: 32–42; Nuscheler 2009; Zanotti 2005). As a specific configuration of modern governmentality good governance highlights the importance of accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness of governance, based on transparent bureaucratic procedures and the rule of law. It is thus characterized by an apolitical, instrumental understanding of governance which focuses on institutional reforms as the foundation for economic development and societal progress (United Nations Development Programme 1997; Weiss 2000). It therefore clearly resembles liberal-institutionalist conceptions of governance in IR. At the same time, good governance carries heavy normative weight as it attempts to prescribe the proper way of establishing political orders (Doornbos 2001: 94). It can be argued, that due to its pervasiveness on the one hand and its vagueness on the other, 'good governance' serves as an 'empty signifier' (Laclau 1996), its actual meaning depending on the act of ascription by agents of world-cultural principles (see Offe 2009). In order to realize the governmental rationality of good governance, political technologies

> "focus on institutional reforms, based on the belief that they are the motor for social change; the promotion of mechanisms of rule aimed at fostering predictable, efficient, and regulatory administrations within states; and the proliferation, at the national and international level, of regulatory mechanisms and monitoring instruments for steering performance" (Zanotti 2005: 478; see Merlingen 2003: 368).

At the same time, as a technology of power the good governance discourse substantially relies on the utilization of standardized indicators in order to benchmark and evaluate progress (Larner/Le Heron 2004). Even more so, indicators themselves can be regarded as a 'technology of global governance' (Davis et al. 2012a, see also 2012b; Buduru/Pal 2010). In any event, "rankings

and ratings have increasingly become integral to the fabric of global governance (…)" (Cooley 2015: 17; see also Cooley/Snyder 2015).

In the academic literature, we can find different assessments of the use and desirability of good governance. On the one hand, there are authors endorsing the basic ideas of good governance but criticizing the way it is put into practice. In this sense, certain elements of good governance should be recalibrated. There are studies, for instance, stressing that policy assessments of good governance rely on problematic assumptions regarding the use of governance indicators, therefore suggesting the utilization of more reliable ones. Christiane Arndt (2008), for example, analyzes the dominant role of the World Bank in the utilization of governance indicators and concomitant ratings of governance performance. Based on in-depth interviews with World Bank staff she points out that the

> "World Bank produces governance ratings to help identify areas of reform and measure the success of governance reforms, create incentives in developing countries to improve governance and put governance on the agenda, to facilitate country dialogue, to enhance the transparency and objectivity of aid-allocation decisions, to enhance quantitative governance research, and for institutional reasons" (Arndt 2008: 291).

Moreover, Arndt stresses that there exists an awareness regarding the limitations of these indicators within the World Bank and as such she argues in favor of robust and meaningful indicators which are based on substantial qualitative research (Arndt 2008: 291–293). Arndt and Oman (2006) thus highlight the need for greater transparency of governance indicators. Other authors consider good governance problematic because the lack of an underlying theoretical framework leads to inappropriately promoting uniformity in diverse contexts. Andrews (2008), for instance, argues that with its focus on indicators the good governance discourse relies on a flawed understanding of effective governing. According to him, the "main reason for these weaknesses is the lack of any theoretical framework on which the indicators are based" (Andrews 2008: 397). On the other hand, we can find authors who are fundamentally critical of the good governance discourse in and of itself. With a focus on state-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, David Chandler sees in the good governance agenda a form of 'Empire in Denial' denoting attempts to legitimize external intervention as "new

forms of international control attempt to evade responsibility and accountability for the exercise of power" (2006: 10). In particular, thus, Chandler rejects the apolitical, technocratic nature of state-building interventions: "External regulation is legitimized independently of the political process of the domestic state but is presented in the depoliticized terms of technical and administrative expertise" (Chandler 2006: 166). Closely related, Jonathan Joseph argues that "good governance is about promoting a new kind of discourse and an apolitical way of seeing world problems" (2012: 99). Similarly, in dealing with the disciplining effects of democratization in Africa, Rita Abrahamsen argues that "[t]he good governance agenda can (…) be regarded as a discursive transformation that, while claiming to liberate the poor, enables the West to continue its undisputed hegemony on the African continent under the changed conditions of the new world order" (2000: 44). In addition, Erkkilä and Piironen highlight the fact that that the utilization of indicators leads to the "numerical objectification of good governance" (2014: 356) which results in the depoliticization of the good governance discourse. Moreover, from a neo-Gramscian perspective, Ian Taylor (2004) puts the IMF's promotion of good governance in the context of the hegemonic power of neo-liberalism. In this sense, "[g]ood governance is part of a broader attempt to legitimize the political authority of liberalizing elite fractions in the South" (Taylor 2004: 135). This perspective is taken up by Julie L. Mueller's critical analysis of the IMF's role in the Middle East. By focusing on the case of Jordan she stresses the IMF's role in contributing to a global neo-liberal hegemony (Mueller 2010).

While not attempting to embark on an in-depth discussion of the notion of hegemony, this chapter nonetheless follows the second strand of approaches in the sense that it shares a critical attitude towards good governance. In this sense, I will conceptualize good governance as a specific configuration of modern governmentality which represents a pervasive norm of political ordering in world society.

The Global Diffusion of Good Governance in World Society

Based on the notion of governmentality developed above, in order to understand the global pervasiveness of good governance I suggest turning to sociological neo-institutionalism and its conception of world society and global norm

diffusion. Accordingly, as presented in detail in Chapter 2, world society is characterized by the global pervasiveness of world-cultural principles which have spread globally due to mechanisms of diffusion resulting in global isomorphism. In this sense, I argue that good governance is based on certain world-cultural principles which promote norm diffusion in world society; namely rationalization, theorization, and universalism. As such, the global diffusion of good governance as a world-cultural script can be related to the emphasis on rationalization, for instance, by referring to economic calculations and the efficiency and effectiveness of governance. In addition, the global governance discourse is characterized by a high degree of theorization and a scientific basis relying on elaborate models and substantial research. In this sense, the theorization of good governance as a concept and the concomitant degree of abstraction significantly enhances global diffusion (Strang/Meyer 1993). Finally, good governance as a norm claims global validity and is thus based on the world-cultural principle of universalism (Boli/Thomas 1997: 180–182; Meyer et al. 1997). As Zanotti puts it, "good governance is universal. The methods (…) it proposes are considered to be valid across borders and in all situations" (2005: 472). Based on these principles, good governance conveys a particular conception of legitimate actorhood. In other words, the adherence to the global discourse of good governance equips actors in world society with legitimacy.

According to the Stanford School's understanding of agency, it can be argued that crucial for the global diffusion of good governance are agents of world-cultural principles. In this regard, the World Bank, the IMF, UN-organizations and INGOs but also local Palestinian NGOs serve as agents of good governance as a world-cultural principle and are thus instrumental for its global diffusion (see Drori 2006: 101–105).

As has been explained in Chapter 2, the global diffusion of world-cultural models is accompanied by a decoupling of structural similarities from their respective content. In this sense, we can observe the failure to translate global scripts – such as good governance – into local contexts. It follows that, while good governance as a norm of modern governmentality in world society is globally pervasive, its translation into local contexts differs greatly due to decoupling.

The Surveillance of Good Governance

The global diffusion of good governance significantly depends on mechanisms of surveillance. Surveillance as a technology of power contributes to the establishment of societal order in particular through forms of standardization and rationalization (see Lyon 2006). Even though Foucault's work on surveillance is closely related to disciplinary power (Foucault 1977), there is good reason for emphasizing the interrelation between surveillance and governmentality (Haggerty 2006: 39–42). Surveillance can be conceptualized as a core dimension of governmentality. Accordingly, my understanding of surveillance goes beyond security-related issues and explicitly takes into account the interplay of empowerment and subjection of the population which is typical for modern governmentality (see Merlingen 2003).

It is evident that with regard to good governance, benchmarking and evaluation are crucial elements of surveillance. Accordingly, benchmarking and evaluation techniques are exercised – primarily but not exclusively by agents of world-cultural principles – in order to ensure the adherence to good governance. In this sense, "[t]hrough the creation of databases, standards, and indicators of performance, each government is placed within a mechanism of constant scrutiny, comparison, and discipline" (Zanotti 2005: 467). There are numerous examples of indices by which the World Bank, the IMF, and the UN monitor the performance of countries concerning their observation of good governance criteria.[63] With reference to Palestine, I will show below how the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) contribute to good governance through surveillance mechanisms. Moreover, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measure some core dimensions of good governance, namely voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2014). Another instrument for monitoring good governance is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) which is also issued by the World Bank. This index is based on four categories: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions (World Bank 2015). Moreover, as

[63] For an overview over 'composite indices measuring country performance' see Bandura (2008). Tony Porter (2012) offers an analysis of indices from the perspective of actor-network theory.

there is a clear linkage between good governance and human development it is worth mentioning that UNDP publishes the Human Development Index (HDI) which ranks countries according to very high, high, medium or low human development (United Nations Development Programme 2013). In addition, INGOs play an equally important role in scrutinizing the performance of countries according to good governance. For example, Transparency International's annual 'Corruption Perceptions Index' (CPI) which is designed to measure the perceived levels of corruption in the public sector worldwide receives considerable public attention. Moreover, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) provides a ranking of 128 developing and transition countries based on their quality of political and economic transformation. In this regard, the BTI distinguishes between different levels of transformation, thereby labeling countries as highly advanced, advanced, limited, very limited, failed (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014a). The BTI is explicitly designed to measure good governance. Its initiators state that "the BTI has become a trusted and well-known measure of good governance for scholars and decision makers alike" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014b: 3). Similar to the BTI, Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index categorizes countries according to their degree of freedom as being free, partly free, or not free, distinguishing between political rights (including functioning of government) and civil liberties (e.g. rule of law).[64] Another interesting example is the Fragile State Index issued by the U.S. NGO Fund for Peace, annually assessing 178 states according to their state vulnerability that is based on a total of 12 social, economic, and political indicators (The Fund for Peace 2015). As is the case with the other indexes described above, this index can be criticized for various reasons. Besides a preoccupation with state-building according to good governance principles, in particular its dichotomous labelling between failed and not failed states is problematic (Beehner/Young 2012). Labelling a state as failed legitimizes various forms of external interventions, ranging from the prescription of good governance via the World Bank or IMF to humanitarian interventions. Although the underlying flaws persist, it is remarkable that the Fund for Peace renamed

[64] For an application of such indicators with reference to good governance in the Arab World see for example Schlumberger (2008).

the index from the *Failed* State Index to the *Fragile* State Index, thereby recognizing the problematic normative implications of the term 'failed'.

Regardless of the usefulness and shortcomings of these indexes, it is evident that "[international organizations] play a central role in governing the globe inasmuch as they are involved in setting up authoritative indexes and grids through which societies are analyzed, rated, and compared with regard to everything from the capacity of the state and human rights records to the costs of doing business" (Neumann/Sending 2010: 139).[65] Accordingly, various forms of benchmarking and evaluation significantly contribute to the global diffusion of good governance. As a result,

> "[t]he population is subjected to continuous monitoring, comprehensive regulations and precise controls by a heterogeneous alliance that may, in the case of international governance, include IGOs, international non-governmental organizations, governmental authorities and an array of subnational bodies such as local philanthropic organizations" (Merlingen 2003: 368).

Tore Fougner, in this context, identifies four important implications of benchmarking:

> "First, benchmarking constitutes states as competitive entities driven not by internal socio-political processes, but rather by external or global standards of conduct. Second, given the importance ascribed to quantitative measures and comparisons of performance, benchmarking constitutes states as calculative agencies, or entities with a capacity to calculate and rank alternative courses of action. Third (…) benchmarking constitutes states as technocratic agencies acting in accordance with expert determination of what works best. Fourth (…) benchmarking constitutes states as transformative agencies, or entities engaged in a never-ending process of reinventing themselves" (2008: 319).

It is evident that benchmarking and evaluation as surveillance mechanisms are not only based on external examination and performance assessment. Rather, as Zanotti puts it, "they also provide each government with the tools for self-assessment with regard to its achievement of international benchmarks" (2005: 473).

[65] For a postcolonial critique of governance indicators see Koelble/Lipuma (2008).

Responsibilization and Legitimization

Closely related to the surveillance of good governance are the techniques of responsibilization and legitimization. Responsibilization is a crucial element of good governance. By no means good governance primarily diffuses by coercion. Rather, it relies on what Nikolas Rose termed 'powers of freedom' (1999) which are typical for modern governmentality and the implications emanating from this freedom (Abrahamsen 2004; Löwenheim 2007). Accordingly, a state that is subject to surveillance through benchmarking and evaluation is made responsible for both its success and failure regarding the observation of standards of good governance (see Biebricher 2011). In this way, in order to promote good governance, examined states are equipped with ownership (Anders 2005). Barry Hindess in this context highlights that good governance stresses ownership and thereby points to the "governmental use of empowerment, responsibility and self-control as instruments of regulation" (2004: 35). In other words: "The 'subjectification' of developing states as capable, rational, and responsible agents of their own development goes hand in hand with their subjection to standards and performance indicators" (Jaeger 2010: 76). Löwenheim highlights that, while examinations are portrayed as a-political, technical, objective and rational processes, the inherent power relations are of great importance:

> "The examination involves governmental power in at least two ways. First, in terms of the construction of truth, the examination is a hierarchy of knowledge. (…) Through this hierarchy of knowledge, the examiner delineates the boundaries of rational and correct conduct. Second, even though sovereign states are not officially obliged to be examined or to accept the advice of the examiner, it is increasingly difficult for states, especially the poor and less developed, to refuse to be examined or to reject the recommendations of examiners" (2008: 259–260).

Thereby, an examined state is constructed as a responsible actor. It thus can be argued that responsibilization equips actors with agency. It follows that "[d]ecisions or recommendations regarding the examinee are thus not rationalised in terms of power as such (…), but in terms of the supposedly objective nature and capacity of the examinee revealed through the examination" (Löwenheim 2008: 268). As the examination is portrayed as a means to help the state which is subject to surveillance, it depends on the examined state to behave as a responsible and responsibilized actor of world society (see Burchell 1993;

Shamir 2008: 7–10). Abrahamsen identifies partnerships between donor countries and institutions on the one hand and recipient countries on the other as another instrument of responsibilization which promotes the global diffusion of good governance. According to her, "partnerships invoke specific technologies of global liberal governance which help produce modern, self-disciplined citizens and states that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal democratic norms" (Abrahamsen 2004: 1454). As a result, instead of relying on domination or coercion "the power of partnerships is voluntary and coercive at the same time, producing both new forms of agency and new forms of discipline" (ibid: 1454). In this context, focusing on the implications of panopticism and with an emphasis on disciplinary power, Debrix speaks of the "disciplinary regime of UN surveillance" (1999: 287). Related to this, Michael Merlingen makes clear that the management of populations always encompasses both the improvement of their living conditions and their control (Merlingen 2003: 368–369). It follows, therefore, that on the one hand, states are equipped with agency regarding the adherence to good governance. Responsibilization, in this context, relates to empowerment. On the other hand, states are also made responsible for the failure to realize good governance. Responsibilization, thereby, creates a constant pressure to justify government policies leading to the subjection of states to the predominance of good governance.

Responsibilization is closely linked to legitimization which represents another important element of the surveillance of good governance. First and foremost, by adhering to principles of good governance, legitimated agents of world-cultural principles construct states as legitimate actors in world society (Meyer 2000; see Meyer/Jepperson 2000: 105–108; Stetter 2012a). As the principles of good governance are ideationally available everywhere in world society, they equip states with legitimacy in different dimensions. On an external dimension, good governance contributes to international recognition in the international society of states. On an internal dimension, the respective populations demand the observance of good governance from their governments. In addition, good governance is a powerful narrative in the global public sphere to which, for example, INGOs make reference and contribute to the delegitimization of a state if good governance principles are being violated.

The Surveillance of Good Governance in Palestine

On the basis of the preceding elaborations I will now turn to the surveillance of good governance in Palestine. As Palestine is integrated into political dynamics of world society, it is also exposed to the global diffusion of good governance as a mechanism for generating order. In this section, I will show that good governance is essential for understanding the dynamics of political and societal order in Palestine. In particular, I will address the role of agents of world-cultural principles such as the IMF, the UN, and the World Bank for the diffusion of good governance in Palestine. It will become evident that surveillance mechanisms are crucial in this context as they expose the PA to continuous procedures of benchmarking and evaluation and a constant pressure to justify its actions. In this regard, I will examine how the agents of good governance contribute to the construction of the PA as a responsible and legitimate actor in world society.[66] Moreover, a detailed analysis of relevant documents and reports will reveal that good governance is not imposed on the PA by external pressure but that the PA has voluntarily adopted the discourse of good governance. In addition, it is important to point out that Hamas also substantially refers to good governance when it comes to its rule of the Gaza Strip. In both cases, we can witness certain forms of decoupling between the global norm of good governance and its translation into the Palestinian context and the attempts to present rationalized justifications for this decoupling.

A number of authors are fundamentally critical of good governance in Palestine.[67] Among the most outspoken critics are the authors of a volume edited by Khan (2004b). They argue that the good governance framework is not suitable for evaluating political developments of the PA because the propagated principles are mistakenly considered as prescribed means instead of considering them as the desired outcome of an enduring process of social transformation. Therefore, "it is important to focus instead on identifying and developing the state capacities that are required to achieve a rapid transformation of society in the direction of greater economic and political viability" (Khan 2004a: 17). Moreover, Khalidi and Samour (2011) see the PA's endorsement of the good

[66] See Chapter 2 for the difference between actors and agents according to the Stanford School.
[67] For a critical assessment of democratization in the Middle East see Teti (2012).

governance agenda as the support of neoliberal hegemony which does not substitute necessary attempts of national liberation.[68] From a post-colonial perspective, Mandy Turner describes the Western peacebuilding endeavor which advocates principles of good governance in Palestine as part of an "assemblage of colonial practices" (2012: 494).

Norm Diffusion & Agents of World-Cultural Principles

These criticisms show that the debate about good governance is relevant in Palestine. Accordingly, it is evident that good governance represents an essential mechanism for generating societal order in Palestine. Demands for the implementation of good governance have accompanied the PA since its establishment (see e.g. Brynen 1995b; Frisch 1998; Halevi 1998; Jarbawi 1996; Perlmutter 1994; Shain/Sussman 1998).

Agents of world-cultural principles are decisive for the diffusion of good governance as a global norm of political ordering to Palestine. The diffusion of good governance in Palestine cannot only be observed on an ideational level but also with regard to the local presence of international organizations that act as agents of good governance. As highlighted by Udo Kock, IMF Resident Representative for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2010 – 2014, the presence of the IMF and the World Bank in Palestine is remarkable insofar as membership to both is only open to states. The IMF's and World Bank's local offices were established on the basis of a special mandate by the Oslo Accords in 1995 with the consent of the Israeli government.[69] In this context, John Nasir, Lead Economist for the World Bank in Palestine, stresses the institution's objective: "We do capacity building to govern".[70] In addition, as was pointed out in Chapter 2, the UN is present in Palestine with a considerable number of agencies. Most important in this context is UNDP and its "Programme of Assistance to the

[68] This perspective was also shared by Palestinian anthropologist Khalil Nakhleh in a personal interview with the author, held on 17 November 2011 in Ramallah.
[69] Author interview with Udo Kock, Jerusalem, 10 November 2011. The formal legal basis of the IMF's presence can be found in Article XXXI, Section 2(g) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement according to which the IMF considers that Palestine falls under the authority of Israel. It states that by joining the IMF "all governments accept it both on their own behalf and in respect of all their colonies, overseas territories, all territories under their protection, suzerainty, or authority, and all territories in respect of which they exercise a mandate" (http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/#art31).
[70] Author interview with John Nasir, Jerusalem, 22 November 2011.

Palestinian People" (UNDP/PAPP) which works in close coordination with PA institutions.[71]

At the same time there is a plethora of international and Palestinian NGOs which also serve as agents of good governance. For the coordination body of Palestinian NGOs, the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO), which has more than 130 member organizations, good governance represents a central guiding principle for its activities (Palestinian NGO Network n.d.). Moreover, in the Code of Conduct for Palestinian NGOs of 2008, the conviction to good governance figures prominently and represents one of twelve principles to which Palestinian NGOs are supposed to subscribe (Code of Conduct Coalition 2008). In addition, while Palestine is not ranked in Transparency International's CPI, the NGO 'Coalition for Accountability and Integrity' (AMAN) represents its Palestinian chapter and works on combating corruption which represents an important dimension of good governance. For example, in 2013, as an agent of good governance, AMAN awarded a 'Good Governance Certification' to 15 Palestinian NGOs which participated in a program to enhance their adherence to good governance principles (AMAN 2013). Accordingly, there are both international and Palestinian organizations contributing to the diffusion of good governance in Palestine. As a result, a clear-cut distinction between internal and external does not appear plausible in this context. Rather, the involvement of these diverse agents of good governance proofs that instead of culturalizing certain norms as being exclusively local or as being external, it is more reasonable to argue that the good governance discourse is an example for a norm that is pervasive within world society.

Despite the PA's formal endorsement of the global good governance discourse, the case of corruption points to a decoupling between a global norm and its actualization. According to public opinion polls there is a constantly high degree of the population believing that corruption is widespread in the PA. In polls conducted by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC), in November 2012 81.1 percent and in April 2014 75 percent of respondents were of the opinion that there is corruption in the PA (Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre 2012, 2014). Despite some deviation, these figures

[71] Author interview with Gerhard Pulfer, Jerusalem, 4 November 2011.

generally correspond to those of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) according to which in March 2014 80.1 percent of the population in the West Bank and 63.8 percent of the population in the Gaza Strip stated that there is corruption in PA institutions (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2014). These figures are similar to the perception of corruption when the PA was newly established: In November 1997, 82 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that there was widespread corruption (Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre 1997; see Turner 2006: 745–746).

Mechanisms of Surveillance of Good Governance in Palestine

Ad-hoc Liaison Committee Reports

Agents of world-cultural principles are crucially involved in the surveillance of good governance in Palestine. IMF Resident Representative Udo Kock even describes surveillance as one of the main activities of the IMF in Palestine.[72] One important mechanism of surveillance are the bi-annual evaluation reports of the Ad-hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC), which coordinates the donor aid to the PA. As the PA is heavily dependent on donor money, these evaluations can be considered a factor contributing to good governance of the PA. Most relevant in this regard, are the reports by the World Bank, the IMF, and the UN.[73] The World Bank focuses on the economic situation, the IMF monitors macroeconomic and fiscal developments, and the UN addresses the humanitarian situation in Palestine. Particularly remarkable is the fact that in April 2011, the UN, the World Bank and the IMF agreed that Palestinian institutions are ready for statehood. In this sense, the UN pointed out that "[i]n six areas where the UN is most engaged, governmental functions are now sufficient for a functioning government of a state" (Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process 2011: 1). In detail, the UN observed progress in the following areas: governance, rule of law and human rights, livelihoods and productive sectors, education and culture, health, social protection, infrastructure and water. Moreover, the IMF "considers that the PA

[72] Author interview with Udo Kock, Jerusalem, 10 November 2011.
[73] It should, however, also be noted that the PA, the Government of Israel and the Office of the Quartet Representative submit reports as well. The World Bank first introduced the reporting system in December 2005, the IMF followed two years later, and the UN issued its first report three years after the first formal one of the World Bank.

is now able to conduct the sound economic policies expected of a future well-functioning Palestinian state, given its solid track record in reforms and institution-building in the public finance and financial areas" (International Monetary Fund 2011: 3). In addition, the World Bank points out that "if the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains its performance in institution-building and delivery of public services, it is well-positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future" (World Bank 2011a: 5). It thus follows that these agents of good governance equip the PA with international legitimacy due to its responsible adherence to good governance.

Human Development Reports

The concept of human development is closely linked to good governance. In many cases, good governance is described as an essential precondition for realizing human development (see e.g. Norris 2004). UNDP identifies five main elements of human development: empowerment, co-operation, equity, sustainability, and security. As one of the main advocates of the world-cultural norms of good governance and human development UNDP considers both norms as 'indivisible' (United Nations Development Programme 1997). The complementary relation between good governance and human development becomes particularly evident as the former focuses on institutions while the latter puts the individual in the center. The global diffusion of human development is supported by various mechanisms of surveillance. In this regard, while putting his observations into a division between global North and South, Hatem points to the important role of the UN as an agent of world-cultural principles: "Through many reports and initiatives, the UN has played a decisive role in the dissemination of the globalization of discourses, their development models, and their intellectual systems of representation produced by the North and their acceptance as "objective," "common sense,", widely accepted (universal) knowledge" (Hatem 2012: 101; see also Hasso 2009). The surveillance of human development operates on different levels. UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) serves as one of its main instruments. Countries are ranked according to their achievements in key aspects of human development. The HDI encompasses a comprehensive set of statistical indicators addressing issues such as health, education, inequality, poverty,

gender, sustainability, and demography (United Nations Development Programme 2013). It took until 2003 that Palestine was included into the HDI, being ranked 98 of a total of 175 as a 'medium human development' country (United Nations Development Programme 2003a: 238). Since then, we can observe a successive deterioration so that in the 2013 HDR Palestine is ranked 110 of a total of 175 countries (United Nations Development Programme 2013: 145). In 2005's HDR, UNDP states, however, that an important reason for this deterioration lies in the second intifada and the Israeli occupation (United Nations Development Programme 2005b: 102). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that in the HDR of 2013, UNDP for the first time uses the description "State of Palestine" instead of "occupied Palestinian territories" in response to Palestine having obtained the status of UN non-member observer state (United Nations Development Programme 2013).

In addition to the HDRs, there are regional reports, such as the Arab Human Development Reports (AHDR). Finally, national human development reports assess the state of human development in respective countries in detail. The regional and national HDRs contribute to the creation of a sense of ownership as they are authored by researchers originating in the respective region or country. Accordingly, the authors of the series of AHDRs are mostly Arab, and the Palestinian HDRs have been written primarily by Palestinians. As highlighted by Hatem, that their views are not necessarily those of UNDP can be observed in the AHDRs of 2004 and 2005 where UNDP explicitly distances itself from the positions of the authors (Hatem 2012; United Nations Development Programme 2005a, 2006). The sense of ownership is further increased by publishing report summaries in more than 20 languages, among them also Basque, Khmer, and Swahili.[74]

In all of the five AHDR that appeared between 2002 and 2009 good governance plays an important role. The first AHDR of 2002 dedicates an entire chapter to the interconnection of human development and good governance (United Nations Development Programme 2002: Chapter 7). On the basis of a number of different data sources, the report finds that Arab countries with high human

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[74] UNDP, main page of the 2013 Human Development Report http://hdr.undp.org/en/2013-report.

development are also equipped with relatively well developed institutions that characterize good governance. Therefore, achieving good governance is considered a necessary condition for higher human development. (United Nations Development Programme 2002: 110–113). Good governance also figures prominently in 2004's AHDR, subtitled 'Towards Freedom in the Arab World', where it is put into context with freedom and human development (United Nations Development Programme 2005a). Throughout the report, the authors attempt to translate these global norms into the regional context by linking them to historically important Arab thinkers and to Islam. Regarding the latter, they state that

> "Islam may not set out a detailed and comprehensive system for good governance in its sacred text. Yet that text ("bearer of multiple perspectives"), its interpretation (which is multiple), and Islamic history (which reflects great variety) all embody the core principles that sustain freedom and good governance as we understand them" (United Nations Development Programme 2005a: 69).

In addition, the report refers to polls showing that Arab populations are supportive of good governance (United Nations Development Programme 2005a: 68).

The Palestine Human Development Report (PHDR) 1998-1999 was the first national HDR, authored by a group of Palestinian researchers in coordination with the PA and Birzeit University. The report stresses Palestinian ownership by stating that "[t]his *Report* is a *report* for all Palestinians" (Birzeit University, Development Studies Programme 2000: 2). The PHDR represents a form of Palestinian self-evaluation and self-observation of good governance and human development as most members of the team that produced the report are Palestinian. This is emphasized by considering the report as "a genuine Palestinian endeavor, rooted in the demands of the Palestinian public and representing a grass-roots appeal for development and progress at all levels" (ibid: 3). The report not only assesses Palestinian progress in human development on the basis of a detailed set of indicators but also scrutinizes PA institution-building with regard to elements of good governance (ibid: chapter 3). Moreover, the report attempts to provide ideas for a "development vision" for Palestine which takes into account its specific circumstances (ibid: chapter 6). In line with the global HDR of 2005, the PHDR of 2002 stresses the impact

of the second intifada for the deterioration of human development in Palestine (Birzeit University, Development Studies Programme 2002: 9–16). While the 2004 PHDR also addresses the problematic consequences of the second intifada and the Israeli occupation, it primarily focuses on possibilities of empowering the Palestinian people in order to achieve national liberation and human development. In this context, the report mirrors the respective dimensions of human development and the respective indicators (Birzeit University, Development Studies Programme 2005). The fifth PHDR of 2009/10 puts the individual at the center of attention as it focuses on the concept of human security in Palestine (United Nations Development Programme 2010). As a result, it can be argued that the human development reports represent an important mechanism for the global diffusion of the good governance discourse by means of surveillance. In particular, the Arab and Palestinian HDRs also do so by stressing the importance of local ownership.

Millennium Development Goals

Closely related to human development are the Millennium Development Goals. This becomes most evident with the HDR of 2003 which explicitly interrelates both and bears the subtitle "Millennium Development Goals: A Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty" (United Nations Development Programme 2003a). With regard to the MDGs the surveillance of good governance in Palestine becomes clearly observable. As Jaeger points out, "MDGs are a paradigmatic example of governing through benchmarking" (Jaeger 2010: 75). They have a profound impact on the countries that decide to subscribe to them since "the content of the goals requires a mass restructuring of capital- and market-friendly societal, individual and spatial practices and forms, which, though not explicit in the goals themselves, are an underlying and necessary logic to them" (Gabay 2012: 1249). The MDGs which have been approved by the United Nations General Assembly and are supposed to be achieved by 2015 encompass poverty elimination, universal education, gender equality, improving health related to child mortality, maternal health, combating severe diseases, environmental protection, and developing a global partnership for development. While these goals do not explicitly refer to good governance they can be considered as an important part of the good governance discourse.

This interrelation between MDGs and good governance has been taken up for instance by Daniel Kaufmann, who initiated the World Bank Governance Indicators, and Veronika Penciakova (2010). They argue that "poor governance in many countries can significantly constrain their progress on MDGs" (Kaufmann/Penciakova 2010: 3). Accordingly, good governance is presented as a precondition for achieving MDGs. Similarly, the 7th United Nations Global Forum on Reinventing Government highlights that "the achievement of the MDGs is crucially linked to good governance" (United Nations 2007: 16). In order to monitor these goals, each goal is broken down into more specific, measurable targets.

The PA has subscribed itself to the realization of the MDGs. The first report that evaluates the PA's achievement of the MDGs appeared in 2002 and analyzes in detail the progress concerning each of the goals. What is striking in the first place is that the report evaluates all MDGs except goal eight which aims at the development of a global partnership for development. The report argues that this goal cannot be applied to Palestine as it is only valid for states that are full members of the United Nations (United Nations Development Programme 2003b: 11). Remarkably, this goal is included in subsequent reports without any qualification regarding the UN membership status of Palestine (MDG Steering Committee 2005; Palestinian National Authority 2010a, 2012). Besides monitoring the achievements in each of the eight goals, the 2005 MDG progress report identifies the connections between MDGs and the PA's Medium Term Development Plan 2005-2007 (MTDP) and criticizes that these have not been made more visible by the PA in the MTDP (MDG Steering Committee 2005: 16). By contrast, the "National Strategy to Achieve the MDGs by 2015" explicitly highlights that the objectives for achieving the respective MDGs are directly linked to the PA's National Development Plan 2011-2013 (NDP) (Palestinian National Authority 2012b). Accordingly, the PA intends "to ensure an integrated national strategy capable of achieving the MDGs by 2015, along with priorities linked to those defined in the National Development Plan 2011-2013 and relevant sectoral strategies, in partnership with all stakeholders" (Palestinian National Authority 2012b: 11). In order to achieve the MDGs the PA sets out four steps: translating the MDGs to the Palestinian context and developing relevant indicators, defining clear targets and the potential to realize

them, developing necessary policy interventions, and establishing a framework for monitoring and evaluation of the strategy (Palestinian National Authority 2012b: 7). In order to evaluate progress regarding the respective goals in detail, each goal is broken down into a number of objectives and related indicators. For instance, goal one, eradicating extreme poverty, is divided into three objectives, namely reducing the proportion of the population below the poverty line by 50 percent between 1990 and 2015, achieving full employment, and reducing by a half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. These three objectives are measured on the basis of various statistical indicators, such as proportion of population below poverty line, poverty gap ratio, unemployment rate, or percentage of households lacking food security. For each indicator, the year 2010 serves as a base value which is related to a target value for the year 2015. Accordingly, the PA attempts to reduce the percentage of people living under the poverty line from 14.1 percent in 2010 to 12.0 percent in 2015 (Palestinian National Authority 2012b: 25; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2012c). The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) plays a central role in evaluating the progress in achieving the MDGs as it provides the statistical data which is necessary for monitoring the PA's achievements. In 2009, the PCBS published a comprehensive statistical analysis in which the development in realizing the MDGs is portrayed in detail referring to the period 1996 to 2007. Moreover, the PCBS identifies challenges and strengths with regard to the achievements in each goal and gives specific recommendations for making progress in each goal (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2009). As a result, the MDGs represent a significant mechanism to implement the good governance discourse in Palestine via benchmarking and evaluation techniques. As Jaeger puts it, "[t]he MDGs apply the logic of benchmarking to global biopolitical management issues, such as worldwide rates of extreme poverty and hunger, primary school attendance, and infant and maternal mortality" (Jaeger 2010: 75).

Responsibilization and Legitimization in Palestine

Responsibilization and legitimization are closely linked to the surveillance of good governance. It is important to highlight that good governance is not forcefully imposed on the PA. Rather, by adhering to good governance the PA is constructed and constructs itself as a responsible actor in world society. The

responsibilization of the PA by agents of world cultural principles is evident in the following statement taken from a World Bank report of May 2011: "The PA (…) must establish mechanisms to monitor the extent to which its institutions are fulfilling their anti-corruption responsibilities" (World Bank 2011b: 27). In a similar manner, with regard to the evaluation of the Fayyad Plan, IMF Resident Representative Udo Kock highlights: "It is their plan, it is their reform agenda."[75] In this sense, through the utilization of benchmarking and evaluation the PA is made responsible for its own failures and successes concerning the adherence to good governance principles.

This is also reflected by Ali Jarbawi, PA Minister of Planning and Administrative Development 2009 – 2012, with regard to the PA's socio-economic development plan of August 2009, known as the Fayyad Plan after the PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad: "The plan can be seen as a response to external demands to improve our institutions."[76] In other words, by being examined, the PA is made a responsible actor in world society. The PA clearly reflects this insight in its 2005 MDG progress report:

> "Each country is responsible for articulating a national development vision for its future on behalf of its citizens, devising a development strategy to reach this vision and choosing a menu of policies to support it" (MDG Steering Committee 2005: 59).

Concerning the MDGs, Jaeger argues that "the UN 'contracts-out' the responsibility for development to individual states and other 'stakeholders'" (Jaeger 2010: 74). In this context, not only is the PA responsibilized but so too is the Palestinian population, both collectively and individually, given that the MDGs directly refer to the living conditions of the population. In other words, therefore, the MDGs create "responsible development subjects" (Ilcan/Phillips 2010: 856). Underlying this process of subjectification is, as Gabay argues, the idea of the *homo economicus* as the individual identified as the "key productive agent" (2012: 1259). Accordingly, "productive life is envisaged as something which will have to be embodied at the individual level in order for the MDGs to be successful" (Gabay 2012: 1259).

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[75] Author interview with Udo Kock, Jerusalem, 10 November 2011.
[76] Author interview with Ali Jarbawi, Ramallah, 31 October 2011.

Moreover, while agents of world-cultural principles make the PA responsible for the progress in achieving the MDGs, the PA in return responsibilizes these agents themselves:

> "The responsibility of the international community in enabling Palestine to achieve the MDGs and comprehensive development lies in providing political support to establish and recognize an independent Palestinian state and exert pressure on Israel to end its occupation and remove the obstacles imposed on Palestinian society and economy" (Palestinian National Authority 2012b: 15).

Responsibilization is closely intertwined with the politics of legitimization. By adhering to good governance, the PA is not only constructed as a responsible actor in world society but also as a legitimate one. Politics of legitimization are relevant in two main dimensions. On the one hand, the PA portrays itself as a legitimate actor in the international society of states. In this sense, regardless of the actual observation, the subscription to international conventions or the MDGs clearly serves the purpose of seeking international legitimacy (see Hafner-Burton et al. 2008). This is of particular importance for the PA as, while being recognized as a state by 138 countries, its status as a sovereign state is still significantly contested, not least by Israel and the US. On the other hand, due to Palestine's embeddedness into world society, the observance of good governance legitimizes the PA towards its own population which is aware of its existence as a globally valid script even in the absence of its practical realization. This awareness becomes evident, for example, in the context of human rights, since the Palestinian population frequently turns to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR) in order to report human rights violations. The ICHR has been established by presidential decree and possesses an ombudsman function. In 2012, ICHR received a total of 3185 complaints (2373 in the West Bank, 812 in the Gaza Strip) (Independent Commission for Human Rights 2013: 215), 306 of which related to torture (134 in the Gaza Strip, 172 in the West Bank) and 52 allegations of ill-treatment during detention (Independent Commission for Human Rights 2013: 22). These cases show that the global norm of human rights also affects the Palestinian context.

In particular, those agents of good governance whose authority is rooted in their recognized expertise play an important role in the processes of responsibilization and legitimization. These 'rationalized others' are equipped with the authority to

determine the characteristics of responsible and legitimate actorhood in world society. In other words: "The key point here is that the centrality of knowledge-based scripts in modern world society puts certain actors in a privileged position for defining scripts about legitimate actorhood, rational courses of action, and what constitutes proper development" (Nabo/Stetter 2012: 199). The power of these rationalized others lies in their credibility and visibility so that other actors in global politics make use of the knowledge provided by rationalized others and base their decisions on it. As Nabo and Stetter (2012) have convincingly shown for the case of Lebanon, the think tank International Crisis Group (ICG) plays an important role as a rationalized other in the field of conflict governance. This can also be said of the ICG for Palestine with regard to good governance. Even though ICG's primary focus lies on conflict governance, its status as rationalized other provides the organization with the authority to legitimize or delegitimize actors also concerning their good governance performance. In addition, in particular in Palestine, it is clearly evident that conflict dynamics cannot really be separated from questions of governance. Concerning good governance, the ICG quotes a senior PA official who describes "good governance as the highest form of resistance" (International Crisis Group 2010: 4). Moreover, in its reports, ICG includes explicit recommendations towards the PA concerning the adherence to good governance principles. Referring to the rule of PA president Arafat, the ICG presents a mixed picture and notes that

> "the PA admittedly provided an impressive degree of stability at a comparatively low level of internal repression. Yet, it developed at the expense of the rule of law, institution-building, public accountability and other processes critical to Palestinian state formation" (International Crisis Group 2004: 4, see also 2008a, 2008b).

Another rationalized other that plays an important role for the responsibilization and legitimization of Palestine is the think tank RAND Corporation. In 2005, RAND produced an extensive 450-page report on 'Building a Successful Palestinian State'. The report considers good governance as one of four fundamental challenges for success in Palestinian state-building, besides security, economic viability, and social well-being (RAND Palestinian Study Team 2005: 3). Accordingly, "[g]ood governance will be a key measure of success of a new Palestinian state" (RAND Palestinian Study Team 2005: xxix). The report dedicates an entire chapter on governance which itself exclusively focuses on

good governance. The term is mentioned more than 40 times in that chapter. The chapter, authored by Glenn E. Robinson, constructs a causal relationship between legitimacy and good governance and argues that political legitimacy represents a prerequisite for achieving good governance of a future Palestinian state. The author clarifies that the core issue of political legitimacy – based on territorial contiguity, border permeability, and land size – will depend on peace negotiations with Israel. In addition, Robinson identifies certain determinants for achieving good governance, namely "promoting the rule of law, empowering parliamentary democracy, and promoting meritocracy in the civil service" (2005: 22). It follows that both the ICG and RAND represent globally legitimated agents that are involved in constructing the PA as a responsible and legitimate actor in world society. At the same time, it needs to be noted that not only INGOs but also local Palestinian NGOs serve as 'rationalized others' contribute to the responsibilization and legitimization of the PA.

Self-Surveillance: The Adoption of the Good Governance Discourse

The reports by the 'Independent Task Force on Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions' are an interesting example of Palestinians monitoring and evaluating Palestinians with regard to good governance. Sponsored by the US-based Council on Foreign Relations and written by an expert group mainly consisting of Palestinians and headed by the renowned Palestinian scholars Yezid Sayigh and Khalil Shikaki (1999, 2006), these reports extensively address the PA's shortcomings in realizing good governance which is actually identified as a primary goal of the PA. At the same time, the authors consider good governance as a precondition for success in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. The reports critically evaluate the PA's good governance performance and identify the need for further progress. While the authors are critical of insufficient development in a variety of fields, they also acknowledge that the Israeli occupation represents a serious obstacle for advancing good governance principles. In spite of the highlighted deficits, the final report sees the potential in Palestinian institutions and concludes that

> "[t]he Palestinians have the tools necessary to build a successful system of government and a viable independent state, and the PA possesses the basic structures, frameworks, and skills required to formulate coherent policies,

> devise appropriate policy instruments, and deliver effective public services in all domains" (Sayigh/Shikaki 2006: 24).

The PA

While agents of world-cultural principles play a central role in the diffusion of the good governance discourse to Palestine, it is important to note that the PA itself utilizes good governance as a guiding principle of its policies in order to be perceived as a legitimate actor in world society. Thus, good governance is not externally imposed on the PA, but rather good governance is internalized by the PA as it represents a normalized practice. In other words, self-surveillance serves as an important mechanism for the adoption of good governance by the PA. In this context, Ghassan Khatib, director of the PA Government Media Center 2009 – 2012 and Minister of Planning 2005 – 2006, highlights that the evaluation of the PA's governance performance is based on international standards and specialized knowledge.[77] Regarding the motivation for the development of the Fayyad Plan, Samir Abdullah Ali who was among its initiators and who served as Minister of Planning between 2007 and 2009 states:

> "We started from a vision. The lack of law and order is a burden for business. Education should be given priority, moving from quantity to quality; moving towards a knowledge economy. In education we need to establish centers of excellence and we need to be more responsive to market needs. This is also the case in the health sector where efficient management is needed."[78]

Accordingly, Samir Abdullah Ali's statement shows how Palestinians have adopted the global good governance discourse and its reliance on rationalization and economic calculations. The adoption of good governance becomes most visible in the PA's socio-economic development plans.

The Medium Term Development Plan 2005-2007 (MTDP) is the PA's first comprehensive and systematic attempt of policy planning. In this plan, the "investment in institutions of good governance" (Palestinian National Authority 2005: 49) is presented as one of four national programs for which the PA sets out a financing requirement of US$ 97 million for the year 2005 (ibid: 61). Apart from some details on these financing requirements, however, the plan does not include any further reference on the surveillance of good governance. In the

[77] Author interview with Ghassan Khatib, Ramallah, 31 October 2011.
[78] Author interview with Samir Abdullah Ali, Ramallah, 1 November 2011.

MTDP update of 2006, the PA presents six national goals and relates it to four national strategies of which good governance is one. For example, regarding the second national goal, "preparation for state-building through the design (…) of public institutions (…)", the following points are mentioned for the national strategy of good governance: transparency, accountability, countering corruption, and increased administrative efficiency (Palestinian National Authority 2006: 79–84). The comprehensive Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) 2008-10 not only names good governance as one of four national policy goals but also provides the PA's understanding of good governance as

> "a system of democratic governance characterised by participation by citizens, respect for the rule of law and separation of powers, capable of administering natural resources and delivering public services efficiently, effectively and responsively, and supported by a stable legal framework, a robust legislative process and accountable, honest and transparent institutions which protect the rights of all citizens" (Palestinian National Authority 2005: 5).

Furthermore, in August 2009, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad presented the program of the 13th government which was titled 'Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State'. Publicly known as the Fayyad-Plan, this program declares that good governance is one of the guiding principles of the PA and a precondition for achieving any other national goal (Palestinian National Authority 2009). It is important to note, however, that only since 2009 the PA started to develop surveillance capabilities when a presidential decree established the General Directorate of Monitoring and Evaluation in the Ministry of Planning.[79] Accordingly, the PRDP Monitoring Report of April 2010 represents the first attempt to assess progress of the PA regarding the realization of good governance (Palestinian National Authority 2010b). For instance, the report makes reference to Palestine's rank in the World Bank Governance Indicators and measures the progress between 2007 and 2008 for indicators such as government effectiveness (2007: 9; 2008: 7) and control of corruption (2007: 24; 2008: 10) (Palestinian National Authority 2010b: 9). A systematic institutionalization of surveillance mechanisms promoting the adoption of good governance can be observed with the introduction of the PA's National Development Plan (NDP) 2011-13. While the PRDP mainly focused on national

[79] Author interview with Bader Abu-Zahra, Ramallah, 17 November 2011.

policy goals and objectives and the related allocation of financial resources, the NDP 2011-13 attempts to monitor and evaluate progress in different sectors on the basis of statistical indicators (Palestinian National Authority 2011). The NDP 2011-13 is divided into four sectors which mirror the structure established by the international donor coordination group in December 2005; namely, governance, social affairs, economy, and infrastructure. Within these sectors, the plan sets out five to seven concrete goals which are supposed to be assessed on the basis of 22 to 30 indicators per sector, comparing a basis value with a target value for the year 2013. To give an example, in the governance sector, the PA proclaims the objective: "to modernize and streamline public administration" (Palestinian National Authority 2011: 25). For that purpose, it intends to reduce the share of the public sector's wage bill of the GDP from 24.0 percent to 17.4 percent in 2013 (Palestinian National Authority 2011: 32). In addition, the National Development Plan 2014-16 highlights good governance and institution building as one of four key sectors allocating 26 percent of the overall development budget to good governance and institution building (Palestinian National Authority 2014: 95).[80] Similar to the NDP 2011-13, this plan stresses certain objectives related to good governance which are being monitored on the basis of specific performance indicators.

Hamas

An analysis of the surveillance of good governance in Palestine would, however, be incomplete if it focused exclusively on the PA. Rather, there is good reason to also assess what role good governance plays for Hamas's rule of the Gaza Strip. At a first glance, such a perspective might seem counter-intuitive as Hamas is most often portrayed as a traditionalist Islamic organization. It is remarkable, though, that Hamas explicitly refers to principles of good governance and attempts to reconcile them with political Islam.[81]

[80] In January 2013, President Mahmoud Abbas issued a decree according to which all Palestinian government institutions were ordered to use the title 'State of Palestine' instead of 'Palestinian National Authority' in all official documents (WAFA 2013). In spite of this, for the purpose of consistency, I will continue using the terms Palestinian Authority or Palestinian National Authority.

[81] For pointing to the interlinkage of political Islam and modernity see Jung (2011).

Even though the term 'good governance' is rarely used by Hamas, its underlying principles significantly influence its political agenda. First of all, most observers agree that a main reason for Hamas's victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections lies in Hamas's credible display of principles of good governance in general and anti-corruption in particular (see for example Shikaki 2006; Turner 2006; Zweiri 2006). Indeed, Hamas emphasized good governance in the electoral platform of its Change and Reform List in various ways. For instance, the document stresses political freedoms, the fight against corruption, transparency and accountability as well as the need for increased administrative efficiency (Hroub 2006: 11). Khaled Hroub therefore interprets the electoral platform in the following way:

> "The emphasis on reform permeates the entire document; indeed, it could be said that the document was designed to carry out exactly the kinds of reform that had been demanded by Western governments and financial institutions" (Hroub 2006: 11).

Furthermore, the importance of good governance is mirrored in Hamas's National Unity Government Program of March 2006 and in Prime Minister-elect Ismail Haniyeh's inaugural address to the Palestinian Legislative Council on 27 March 2006. Both documents refer to the need for comprehensive reform, including the fight against corruption, promotion of rule of law and political pluralism (Hroub 2006: 18–25). In addition, the 'Development Plan 2011' from the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Planning explicitly refers to the "strengthening the rule of law and good governance" (Bröning 2013: 51).

Despite apparent shortcomings, when it comes to an assessment of Hamas's good governance performance in the Gaza Strip since it has assumed power there in 2007, Yezid Sayigh states that "Gaza ministries and agencies display enviable levels of coordination, information, sharing, and mutual support" (2010: 2). Moreover, he declares that Hamas runs administrative institutions in Gaza with "greater coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency, than had its predecessors" (ibid: 3).

It is remarkable that Hamas ascribes a clear priority to good governance even though agents of world-cultural principles that promote this norm rarely have a physical presence in the Gaza Strip, compared to the West Bank. Accordingly, as the quote from Khaled Hroub above underlines, I argue that Hamas is aware

that in order to be seen as a legitimate actor in world society, it needs to adhere to good governance (see Miller 2016. In addition, however, Hamas's adherence to good governance is due to the fact that the discourse has been internalized. As Mukhimer puts it, "Hamas seems more willing to enforce civil and political rights to the degree it is perceived by the international community as 'a legitimate actor'" (Mukhimer 2013: 130). The same is also the case vis-à-vis the population of the Gaza Strip: As the idea of good governance is available to the population, due to Palestine's integration into world society, it serves as an important element of Hamas's legitimization towards the population. The importance of legitimization by adhering to good governance also impacts Hamas's Islamist agenda. According to Nathan J. Brown "Hamas (…) has still had to shelve or postpone any efforts at Islamizing the Palestinian legal order. Any step toward Islamization of law would bring international condemnation and, more importantly, domestic grumbling" (2012: 12).[82] It follows that the good governance discourse forms an essential feature of Hamas's political agenda and can primarily related to Hamas's desire to be considered a legitimate political actor in world society.

Rationalized Decoupling

As the above mentioned case of the MDGs shows, the translation of the global norm of good governance into the local context of Palestine can be accompanied by a considerable degree of decoupling. In the MDG monitoring reports there are frequent references to the 'localization of MDGs' (MDG Steering Committee 2005: 59–63; Palestinian National Authority 2012b). In other words, the MDGs need to be adapted to the local Palestinian context. In this sense, "[l]ocalization or adaptation of the MDGs and targets is a process of agreeing on national priorities, targets and indicators, and setting a baseline through a consensus drawing different stakeholders into the decision-making process" (MDG Steering Committee 2005: 59).

The deviation between global norm and local context is often rationalized by the responsible actors involved. In other words, decoupling is described as a

[82] It is important to note, however, that in the face of rising Salafism in Gaza, it is debatable whether Brown's statement can still fully be maintained.

rationalized process. In Palestine, three dimensions are particularly relevant in the context of rationalized decoupling. First, one strategy of rationalized decoupling refers to the obstacles posed by the Israeli occupation for Palestinian attempts to properly realize good governance. For instance, the PA presents the Israeli occupation as the main obstacle for achieving the MDGs (Palestinian National Authority 2012b: 12). The PA thus argues that

> "[o]ur progress towards achieving MDGs is remarkable in the context of the ongoing occupation and blockade; illegal colonization of our land and exploitation of our natural resources; periodic military assaults; and violent attacks on our land and our people by Israeli settlers" (Palestinian National Authority 2010a: 6).

UNDP adopts this rationalized decoupling as it relates Palestine's deterioration in the HDI ranking to the impact of the Israeli occupation (United Nations Development Programme 2005b: 102). This account, however, is criticized and questioned by the Palestinian Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ) which undertook an evaluation of the PA's MDG attainment. Accordingly, ARIJ concludes that while the PA often blames the occupation for shortcomings, the

> "lack of MDGs attainment is contributed largely to the misuse, mismanagement, and corruption of local authorities rather than lack of resources. (…) [I]nefficient authorities are more to blame than Israeli Occupation and unstable political reality. On the contrary, the Occupation is used as a cover-up for the deep-rooted corruption and dishonesty in Palestinian local authorities" (Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2010: 4).

As a result, ARIJ rejects an externalization of the responsibility for the failure to achieve the MDGs and locates the reason for it in the PA itself (Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) 2010: 7; Alyatim et al. 2010: 14). Regarding the reference to the Israeli occupation as a rationalized decoupling, the Israeli blockade of the Gaza-Strip is one of the main reasons for Hamas for not being able to properly adhere to good governance (Mukhimer 2013: 128).

In this context, it is also relevant that to a considerable degree agents of good governance themselves contribute to decoupling. This is the case in instances when they tend to give priority to security considerations over good governance in Palestine. For example, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, international donors expected from the PA to silence domestic opposition against the Oslo peace

process in order to ensure Israel's security and diplomatic progress (see Turner 2011).

Second, rationalized decouplings potentially relate to traditional Islamic values that are portrayed as being incompatible with values that are perceived as Western, such as the MDGs. In the case of Hamas, for instance, Islamic values tend to be seen as obstacles for the implementation of modern global norms. For example, in April 2013, Hamas introduced rules supporting gender segregation in schools on the basis of Islamic values (Reuters 2013).

A third rationalized decoupling can relate to the intra-Palestinian division between Fatah and Hamas that makes progress regarding good governance adherence difficult. Accordingly, both factions tend to justify the lack of progress in political and institutional reforms by stressing that national unity needs to be realized first. In particular, this is the case regarding the postponement of presidential and parliamentary elections which have been due since 2009 and 2010 respectively.

Conclusion

The preceding elaborations attempted to highlight the importance of good governance as a particular configuration of modern governmentality in world society. I argued that good governance represents a technology of power which represents an important mechanism for generating order in world society in general and in Palestine in particular. Agents of world-cultural principles are decisive for the global diffusion of good governance. They employ various mechanisms of surveillance on the basis of monitoring and evaluation in order to promote the global diffusion of good governance. It became evident that responsibilization and legitimization are of great significance for this purpose. By adhering to good governance, the PA is constructed as a responsible and legitimate actor in world society. Moreover, responsibilization and legitimization contribute to the adoption of good governance by the PA. Accordingly, good governance is not imposed on the PA but voluntarily adopted. I have pointed out that not only for the PA but also for Hamas good governance represents an essential feature of political ordering. The different socio-economic development plans clearly show that the PA has adopted the discourse of good

governance as a guiding principle of its policies. The established mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation can be considered as a means of self-surveillance of good governance. Both the PA and Hamas systematically utilize rationalized decoupling in order to justify shortcomings in translating the global norm of good governance into the local context of Palestine. In particular, references to the Israeli occupation on the one hand and to traditional values on the other are presented as obstacles for the proper realization of good governance. All in all, the present chapter emphasized that the seemingly a-political discourse of good governance carries highly political implications for the political ordering of world society.

6 The Order of the Subject: Technologies of the Self in Palestine

Introduction

After having turned to the importance of biopolitics in Chapter 4 and surveillance in Chapter 5, this chapter focuses on the importance of the freedom of the individual for modern governmentality. Accordingly, referring to sociological neo-institutionalism, the diffusion of the norm of individualization in world society plays an important role in this regard. In this context, this chapter will address the question of how individuals are involved in the constitution of world-societal order in Palestine. In many respects, analyses of power relations and societal order in political science and IR often fail to take into account the importance of individuals.[83] By contrast, this chapter highlights that focusing on the role of the individual is crucial in order to make sense of world-societal power dynamics. Accordingly, modern governmentality is related to a specific conception of subjectivity that is pervasive in world society and thus also in Palestine. I will therefore rely on the conceptualization of modern subjectivity that was presented in Chapter 3. While I have presented modern subjectivity as a central feature of modern governmentality in world society, in order to assess the individual's involvement in dynamics of world-societal order in Palestine it is necessary to further conceptually elaborate on the relationship between governmentality, subjectivity, and power.

In order to unfold this argument, I will first address the fact that there is a striking disregard of subjectivity in the discipline of International Relations. In the next step I will point to the relationship between subjectivity, power and governmentality. In this context, I will show that subjectivity is socially constructed in a simultaneous process of empowerment and subjection, a process that Foucault describes as subjectification. It will also become evident that subjectivity and governmentality are closely interrelated. I will argue that technologies of the self lead to the active and voluntary involvement of individuals into the dynamics of world-societal order. In other words, by taking care of oneself, the individual makes a fundamental contribution to the order of

[83] In the case of IR, the volume edited by Jacobi and Freyberg-Inan (2015) represents a notable exception.

world society because modern governmentality considerably relies on mechanisms of indirect rule, or the conduct of conduct. At the same time, technologies of the self help to make sense of the potential contradiction between the simultaneous empowerment and subjection to which the subject in/of modern world society is continuously exposed. To put it differently, the modern subject relies on technologies of the self in order perceive himself/herself as part of world society. The subsequent section will examine the centrality of subjectivity with a special focus on the relation between freedom and power. On this basis, I will relate modern subjectivity to the social production of space. I will argue that both in the study of IR and governmentality, space is a neglected phenomenon. Instead, by focusing on the nexus of subjectivity and space and by bringing together the work of Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre, I will highlight that space is not only socially produced through everyday practices of individuals but that this dimension matters for the question of how order comes into existence in world society. As a result, I will show that the everyday and the local – brought together in everyday spatial practices – represent important sites of modern subjectification that need not be relegated to a subordinate stage compared to seemingly superior patterns of global politics. In this context, it is important to note that space possesses both a material and a discursive dimension. Hence, when we focus on everyday spatial practices, these can relate to material everyday spaces and places but also to discursive spatial formations.

Based on these substantial theoretical and conceptual elaborations I will analyze everyday spatial practices as self-technological acts in Palestine and their contribution to world-societal order in Palestine. In this context, I will first turn to the urban development of Ramallah and related spatial practices through business entrepreneurship. In a second step, I will examine the city of Rawabi as an example of urban development from scratch. After these two cases of self-technological business entrepreneurship, the focus will shift towards the social production of space in Palestinian refugee camps. It will become evident that local camp committees are of central importance for the order of refugee camps. In this regard, this chapter will analyze UNRWA's camp improvement program and the related project 'Campus in Camps' as cases of self-technological everyday spatial practices. Subsequently, I will address rooftop gardening

projects as examples for how refugees develop the space of the camp as technologies of the self. The chapter concludes with a summary of the presented argument and a reflection on research that relates technologies of the self to resistance in Palestine.

The Centrality of Subjectivity

When it comes to taking into account subjectivity it is possible to identify two different directions in the literature. First, IR, area studies, comparative politics as well as conflict studies are mainly characterized by a disregard for subjectivity and the individual. Related approaches often are based on a macro-perspective and are characterized by an ontological preoccupation with the state as the main point of reference, or, in other words, with methodological nationalism. Individuals, in these cases, are often simply treated as the recipients of public services, international aid, collectively binding decisions, or as targets of development projects and thereby degraded to a passive status dispossessed of any sense of political agency. At best, therefore, individuals are taken into consideration as collectively organized 'civil society', concomitantly constructing an opposition between the state on the one hand and society on the other. Second, by contrast, especially ethnographic and anthropological studies often display an exclusive focus on subjectivity on a micro level. These studies clearly represent important contributions due to detailed assessments of individual living conditions and cultural particularities. It is important to note, however, that ethnographic studies often addressing the overarching political context within which the observed actions take place. Hence, as a result, if being utilized in an ideal-typical sense, both perspectives, focusing on a macro or micro dimension, eventually reify dichotomies such as inside/outside, global/local, international/domestic and thereby neglect the importance of the respective other side of the distinction and inherent interrelations.

This limitation has been partially ameliorated with the adoption by IR of sociologically inspired anthropological perspectives and methods, exemplified by the discipline's recent discovery of 'the local', 'the everyday' (see Guillaume 2011; Kessler/Guillaume 2012; Mac Ginty 2014), and, related, what is described as the 'practice turn' (for an overview see Adler/Pouliot 2011). It is in this context that I want to situate my own research on governmentality and

subjectivity since such a perspective transcends different levels of analysis and thereby avoids the exclusive focus on either a macro or a micro dimension of social reality. In this sense, the focus on power relations as opposed to institutional structures makes governmentality suitable for multiple contexts and thus also for an analysis of subjectivity and technologies of the self in Palestine. To put it differently, governmentality understood as the conduct of conducts which targets populations always also encompasses the individual conduct of the self. Subjectivity, therefore, represents a crucial dimension of modern governmentality.

The advantages of such a research perspective which puts subjectivity at the center are highlighted by Reckwitz and Schlichte (2013): First, as such a perspective does not rely on theoretical foundations which have been developed with reference to Western Europe, it possesses a sensibility to contexts outside of the OECD-world which can help to avoid the Eurocentrism inherent in many social science research perspectives. In this regard, focusing on the subject allows a stronger focus on empirical and historical contingencies. At the same time, taking the subject as the point of departure avoids the reification of dichotomies such as inside/outside or domestic/foreign. In this sense, such a perspective is capable of simultaneously taking into account different levels of analysis. Finally, a focus on subjectivity helps to overcome methodological nationalism by considering the state as a form of specific and historically contingent power relations (Reckwitz/Schlichte 2013: 121–122).

The above described limitations can best be overcome by conceiving subjectivity as an important element of modern governmentality which is embedded in world society as the overarching structural horizon. In this reading, as sociological neo-institutionalism stresses with reference to the norm of individualization, the very idea of modern subjectivity has globally diffused in world society and is thus also available in Palestine. Similarly, in an empirically rich study, Jung et al. (2014) analyze Muslim subjectivities in Egypt and Jordan by connecting theories of global modernity with poststructuralist elaborations on the constitution of the modern subject.

Governmentality, Power and Subjectivity

The subject and therefore also modern subjectivity cannot be considered as ontologically pre-existent, but it is itself a societal construction. In other words, the subject gets socially produced. Power relations are crucial in order to make sense of how the subject gets constituted. In this regard, Nikolas Rose points out that

> "[t]o analyze the relations between 'the self' and power, then, is not a matter of lamenting the ways in which our autonomy is suppressed by the state, but of investigating the ways in which subjectivity has become an essential object, target, and resource for certain strategies, tactics, and procedures of regulation" (Rose 1996: 152).

It follows that in the process of subjectification "the subject constitutes itself in different forms at different times through the use of varied practices, but always by distinguishing itself from the physical body that engages in those practices" (Kelly 2013: 513; see also Reckwitz 2007: 10). The underlying paradoxical character of the constitution of subjectivity is highlighted by Ulrich Bröckling as he argues that the subject results from the exercise of power but at the same time it presupposes the subject due to the fact that power can only be exercised towards subjects (Bröckling 2007b: 122). In other words, the subject is product of and precondition for the exercise of power. As a result, I argue that the constitution of the subject entails the simultaneous empowerment and subjection of the individual.

On the one hand, therefore, concerning the empowerment of the individual, the constitution of subjectivity creates 'autonomous and responsible individuals' (Miller/Rose 2008: 18) or an active subject potentially equipped with different forms of actorhood. In this sense, Foucault refers to subjectification as "the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity which is of course only one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness" (Foucault 1988a: 253). Power, thus, is not necessarily repressive but also productive as it produces the subject on the basis of the freedom of the individual. Accordingly, these 'powers of freedom' (Rose 1999b) do not primarily involve individuals by domination but by appealing to their individual freedom (see Burchell 1993). In Foucault's words: "Power is

exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (Foucault 1982: 790).

On the other hand, subjectivity is at the same time created in a process of subordination or subjection to power. This is the case because in order to be part of society the subject is required to internalize and adhere to specific predominant cultural rules (Reckwitz 2006: 9–10). In this sense, the modern subject is confronted with certain expectations regarding how one should behave. This is expressed, for example, in specific prescriptions regarding education and work and the individual life course in general (see Meyer 2004). Accordingly, the constitution of modern subjectivity is not merely a matter of individual choice, disconnected from (world) society but considerably socially institutionalized (Meyer 1987). It is noteworthy, in this regard, that, as Kelly points out, for Foucault the process of subjectification entails only the empowering dimension of the constitution of the subject (Kelly 2009: 88). In this, he differs from Butler who uses the term 'subjection' in order to encompass both the empowerment and the subjection of the individual (Butler 1997: 2). While it is therefore possible to make a distinction between subjectification and subjection it needs to be highlighted that the constitution of subjectivity requires both processes (see Andersen 2003: 24). As a result, thus, "[s]ubject-positions empower individuals, while subjecting them at the same time" (Bröckling et al. 2011: 14). On this basis, it can be argued that both empowerment and subjection are interlinked, because a subject can only become an active, autonomous, empowered and free self by subjecting itself to the existing societal order (Reckwitz 2007: 14). Accordingly, modern governmentality depends on the freedom of the individual in order to contribute to societal order. In this context, Nikolas Rose highlights that the

> "human beings who were to be governed (…) were now conceived as individuals who were *active* in making choices in order to further their own interests and those of their family: they were thus potentially active in their own government. The powers of the state thus had to be directed to empowering the entrepreneurial subjects of choice in their quest for self-realization" (1999b: 142, emphasis in the original).

Subjectivity in this regard is a crucial dimension of governmentality because "governing society has come to require governing subjectivity" (Rose 1999a: 217).

Governmentality relates to the complex interplay of the government of others and the government of the self, or in other words, the conduct of conducts. The crucial link between this simultaneous empowerment and subjection of the modern subject lies in what Foucault terms technologies of the self. In this sense, as Yüksel et al. (2014: 25) put it, technologies of the self are "key mechanisms of how to address the contradictions between fictional autonomy of the subject and its factual embeddedness in society."

According to Foucault, therefore, it is necessary to address the productive side of power: "This contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality" (Foucault 1988c: 19). For Foucault, the interrelation between subjectivity and technologies of the self is clearly evident. He even states that an analysis of subjectivity presupposes taking into account not only technologies of domination but also technologies of the self:

> "I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, he has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the self. Let's say: he has to take into account the interaction between those two types of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques of the self" (Foucault 1993: 203).

Technologies of the self denote mechanisms by which single individuals or individuals as collectives relate to themselves. Technologies of the self enable them to get actively and voluntarily involved in the establishment of societal and political order. According to Foucault, therefore, technologies of the self

> "permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state-of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality" (Foucault 1988c: 18).

As modern governmentality in world society essentially relies on the freedom of the individual, technologies of the self are indispensable for its exercise. An important aspect of technologies of the self is the internalization of problems that were previously related to instances external to the individual subject. Governmentality, as the conduct of conduct, therefore, is directed towards the relationship individuals develop towards themselves in their exercise of freedom. It follows that governmentality

> "increasingly impinges upon individuals in their very individuality, in their practical relationships to themselves in the conduct of their lives; it *concerns them at the very heart of themselves by making its rationality the condition of their active freedom*" (Burchell 1993: 276, italics in the original).

As a result, in order to properly make sense of political order in world society, it is necessary to direct attention towards the interplay of power and subjectivity that takes shape in the reliance of modern governmentality on technologies of the self. In this regard, it is important to note that a research perspective that focuses on how the individual relates to himself/herself necessarily overcomes the distinction between public and private and instead highlights the importance of the individual in the constitution of world societal order.

As was explained in detail in Chapter 3, autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization are crucial features of modern subjectivity. The modern subject contributes to world-societal order by means of technologies of the self that are based upon these three dimensions. That the constitution of modern subjectivity needs to be contextualized with the role of social spatiality will be the subject of the subsequent section.

Social Production of Space, Spatial Representations of Power

The contribution of the modern subject to political order often occurs in a spatial context that tends to be neglected. Space matters however, as the modern subject's social environment is always complemented by particular spatial settings that are made and remade by the subject. As a starting point I therefore argue that subjectivity and space exist in a reflexive relationship. In this sense, space plays an important role in the constitution of subjectivity while subjectivity impacts how space is socially produced. One way of connecting the different realms of subjectivity and space is through a focus on everyday spatial practices. Hence, I follow Michel de Certeau's insight that everyday practices should "no longer appear as merely the obscure background of social activity" (Certeau 1984: xi). In this way, the local becomes a genuine site of politics that is not relegated to a subordinated level compared to the global. In this sense, the everyday is the site where subjectivity and spatiality interact and thereby contribute to world societal order.

While power relations have the potential to transcend boundaries – be they geographic or infrastructural – it is important to note that power dynamics need to be understood in their relation to the space in which they occur. It is striking that both IR in general and (international) governmentality studies in particular give so little attention to space. Even though John Agnew (1994) pointed to the 'territorial trap' in IR and the concomitant disregard of space/territory already in 1994, this problem is still rarely addressed (Helmig/Kessler 2007: 241). Exceptions primarily originate in the field of 'Critical Geopolitics' which explicitly draws on the work of Foucault and which can be located at the intersection of IR and political geography (see Allen 2003; Gregory 1996; Murdoch 2006; Ó Tuathail 1996; Soja 1989).[84] Research based on this strand of literature makes the important argument that space and territory are socially constructed. As a result, instead of considering space as ontologically given and borders as fixed and ontologically pre-determined demarcations, they shift the focus of attention to the production of space and boundary-drawing as social practices (Paasi 2005), and to related processes of bordering, re-bordering and de-bordering (Albert et al. 2001; Stetter 2008a).[85] It is therefore, for instance, quite surprising that, even though a recent symposium on 'Theories of Territory beyond Westphalia' in the journal *International Theory* stresses that "[t]erritory is one of the most under-theorized concepts that we rely on both in political theory and international relations" (Banai et al. 2014: 99), the authors completely disregard contributions from the field of Critical Geopolitics and fail to address the idea that space can be socially produced.

Moreover, while governmentality has come to figure prominently in IR, Foucault's thoughts on geography have received considerably less attention. The reason being perhaps that, on the one hand, when power is conceptualized as being relational as in the case of governmentality one could infer that space is irrelevant for analyzing power. On the other hand, governmentality primarily targets the population and thus deviates from pre-modern forms of power which focused on territoriality. Evidently, the population has to be in the center of attention. This, however, should not lead us to completely ignore the importance

[84] Brenner and Elden (2009) present an account of Henri Lefebvre's work on space and contextualize it within the study of IR.

[85] On the social production of territory/space in Israel/Palestine see Newman (2013) and Gregory (2005).

of space for the exercise of power. At the same time, we should also acknowledge that even though Foucault dealt with geography and space to a certain extent, his engagements were rather cursory and unsystematic. Therefore, as Nigel Thrift (2007: 55) observes, "it has been left largely to other authors to construct a Foucauldian spatiality." By no means it is my intention to provide such a Foucauldian spatiality (for this see Crampton/Elden 2007; Philo 1992). Rather, I perceive that in order to properly address how power is exercised we need to take into account the relationship of power and space. Foucault clearly acknowledges the importance of space in relation to power: "[s]pace is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power" (Foucault 2000b: 361, see also 1980b: 70–71). Therefore, as Foucault argues, for an analysis of power relations "we must (…) try to localize them in their historical and geographical specificity" (Foucault 2007b: 156). Accordingly, governmentality possesses a spatial dimension. As Huxley puts it: "Governmentality is (…) indelibly spatial, both in terms of the spaces it seeks to create and in the causal logics that imbue such attempts with their rationality" (2007: 199).

Foucault's conception of space resembles that of Henri Lefebvre in the sense that both consider space as being constructed through social practices (see Soja 1989: 17–18). Foucault captures this insight in response to the question of whether architectural projects can be sites of liberation or resistance:

> "There are a certain number of things that one can say with some certainty about a concentration camp, to the effect that it is not an instrument of liberation, but one should still take into account - and this is not generally acknowledged - that, aside from torture and execution which preclude any resistance, no matter how terrifying a given system may be, there always remain the possibilities of resistance, disobedience, and oppositional groupings" (Foucault 2000b: 354).

Accordingly, spaces are produced as sites of liberation or oppression through social practices. Foucault, in this regard, describes heterotopias as sites which can simultaneously possess different contradictory, incompatible representations (Foucault 2000a). While this does not necessarily make heterotopias sites of resistance (Johnson 2006), they at least provide the potential for it, depending on the respective social practices.

Concerning the social production of space, it is worth turning to Henri Lefebvre who proposes a three-dimensional conceptualization, which distinguishes and interrelates *spatial practices, representations of space,* and *representational space.*[86] Accordingly, first, spatial practice refers to *perceived space* as a material dimension of space so that the "spatial practice of a society secretes that society's space; it propounds and presupposes it in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it" (Lefebvre 1991: 38). These spatial practices encompass, for instance, urban infrastructure which determines how daily routines, such as commuting, can be exercised (Schmid 2008: 36). Second, representations of space denote *conceived space* in the sense of maps or plans based on the knowledge of experts, such as urban planners or statisticians. Finally, representational space, or *lived space,* addresses the symbolic dimension of space. In this sense, space can be considered as "directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols (…)" (Lefebvre 1991: 39, emphasis in the original). Therefore, representational space is the space of everyday experience. It is evident that the way in which space is lived in everyday life can substantially deviate from the way it was conceived by its original architects.

On this basis, by conceiving space and power as being interdependent it is possible to relate Lefebvre's three-dimensional conception of space to Foucault's understanding of power. In this sense, the fact that power tends to materialize spatially does not result in a static constellation of neither power nor space. Rather, power relations are dynamic and subject to change as spaces are *lived* differently than originally *conceived.* By referring to different cases of self-technological space appropriation in Palestine, the following section will illustrate how infrastructures and relations of power get constantly re-interpreted and altered through everyday practices and how these contribute to the political ordering of Palestine.

Everyday Spatial Practices as Technologies of the Self in Palestine

In the context of technologies of the self, many Palestinians opt for leaving Palestine in order to improve their individual situation. Hence, according to

[86] Omar Yousef (2009) offers a very insightful utilization of Lefebvre's conception of space in the context of Jerusalem.

sociological neo-institutionalism, Palestinians who opt for exiting the country do so as entrepreneurs of their individual life course.

In this sense, Palestinians choose to emigrate temporarily or permanently in order to improve their individual situation elsewhere. Related to the phenomenon of a brain drain, this can have deteriorating effects for the societal order of Palestine. For example, according to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in June 2015, about 50 percent of the population of the Gaza Strip intends to emigrate abroad (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 2015). At the same time, however, exit can mean to pursue university studies abroad and return to Palestine with improved education and thereby contribute to the societal order in Palestine. Therefore, leaving the country is often related to education as a second technology of the self.

Palestinians have become a global people ever since the expulsion and flight of roughly 700,000 people in the context the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 (see Masalha 2003, 2012; Morris 2004; Pappe 2006; Sa'di/Abu-Lughod 2007). These events that have become known in the Palestinian national narrative as the catastrophe – *nakba* – have not only contributed to a population of about 5.5 million refugees in the year 2014 registered by UNRWA (2014), but they have also led to the global dispersal of Palestinians so that there is a considerable diaspora community also beyond the Arab world (Lindholm Schulz 2003). As pointed out in chapter four, this globally dispersed nature of the Palestinian population is also mirrored in the mandate of the PCBS that collects data about Palestinians all over the world. The PCBS estimates that at the end of 2014 there were about 12.1 million Palestinians, half of whom were living outside of Israel and Palestine, made up of 5.34 million living in Arab countries and around 675,000 residing in foreign countries outside of the Arab world (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2014: 1). As a consequence of the *nakba,* and in the face of difficult living conditions in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, Palestinians adopted emigration as a 'household strategy,' as Jamil Hilal puts it, in order to improve their 'life chances' (Hilal 2006: 190–197). Therefore, he suggests framing Palestinian emigration patterns as 'enterprise creation', "through which individuals and families seek to change their circumstances by

opting out of risk situations created by wars, occupation, repression, economic stagnation, or discrimination" (Hilal 2006: 195). In this context, the *nakba* also yielded what Pamela Ann Smith termed the 'exile bourgeoisie of Palestine' (Smith 1986a, see also 1986b). Smith, in this context, highlights that this Palestinian bourgeoisie had been exposed to the global diffusion of modern business techniques already under the British rule of mandate Palestine. In turn, this Palestinian diaspora business elite contributed to the diffusion of these techniques to other parts of the Arab world:

> "Trained in modern business methods under the British, they found a ready welcome in the British protectorates of the Gulf as well as in Saudi Arabia, where their knowledge of English and of international trading made them especially useful" (Smith 1986a: 26).

Looking at this trend of emigration, the first half of the 1990s marked a turning point. The Oslo Peace processes not only allowed the resettlement of tens of thousands of Palestinians,[87] many of whom started working for the newly established PA administration. But also besides these public sector employees, numerous diaspora Palestinians – many from the US and Canada – were optimistic regarding the potentials of Palestinian independence and returned in order to contribute to the business development of their homeland (Hilal 2007: 1; Lindholm Schulz 2003: 212). At the same time, in response to Yassir Arafat's support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, around 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf countries. About 300,000 of whom, possessing a Jordanian passport, resettled in Jordan, but about 30,000 to 40,000 also returned to the West Bank. (Haddad 2010: 41; van Hear 1995: 354–357; Lesch 2005: 171–173; Le Troquer/al-Oudat 1999: 37; Lindholm Schulz 2003: 65–67). To a certain extent, these Palestinians returning from the United States and Gulf countries contributed to "a reversal of the 'brain drain,' and an influx of much needed capital" (Sayre/Olmsted 1999: 8; see Hammer 2005: 93–98).

Modern Urbanism and the Business Development of Ramallah

In this section, I will analyze how self-technological everyday spatial practices related to business entrepreneurship have affected the urban morphology of

[87] Lindholm Schulz (2003: 211) clarifies that the actual number of returnees between 1994 and 1999 considerably varies between 40,000 and 100,000 depending on the respective source.

Ramallah.[88] It will become clear that even though this section only implicitly deals with subjectivity, it is still relevant in the context of technologies of the self. This is the case because the development of Ramallah is to a great extent driven by private-sector entrepreneurship that is based on the concept of modern subjectivity as being constituted by the autonomous, responsible and enterprising self. Accordingly, the self-technological business development of Ramallah is an important aspect of the constitution of political order in Palestine.

Before analyzing the business development of Ramallah and its everyday spatial practices as contributing to Palestinian societal order, a note of caution is required. It is important to highlight that the Israeli occupation is the major impediment for sustainable economic development in Palestine, a constellation that Sara Roy has termed 'the political economy of de-development' (Roy 1995, 1999). In this sense, the occupation fundamentally obstructs the creation of any meaningful economy in Palestine that goes beyond small 'islands of prosperity' into which both donors and business people invest money with the endorsement of the PA (see in particular the contributions in Turner/Shweiki 2014). In many cases, therefore, Palestinian political activists and critical observers reject approaches that promote economic development without changing the overarching political setting. Such steps are regarded as counter-productive because they obscure the actual misery of the Palestinian population under occupation and thereby rather normalize the state of being occupied. (Dana 2014). At the same time, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund point to the problem that economic growth in Palestine is primarily driven by public sector investment and donor aid so that the insecure economic environment of the occupation prevents meaningful private sector investments (see e.g. International Monetary Fund 2011; World Bank 2011).

When examining the impact of business entrepreneurship on the urban morphology of Ramallah, it is useful to first look at its historic development of urbanization. As Lisa Taraki and Rita Giacaman show (2006: 20–28), unlike Palestinian cities with a cosmopolitan flair, such as Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa,

[88] It is important to note that in many cases when using the term Ramallah this refers to the space that also encompasses the administratively separate twin town of al-Bireh as well as adjacent Beituniya. Accordingly, in this book, Ramallah denotes the urban space of Ramallah, al-Bireh and Beituniya (see Harker 2014b: 318; Taraki 2008a: fn 2, p. 19).

Ramallah had not been exposed to Ottoman modernization. At the same time, in contrast to Nablus and Hebron,[89] Ramallah was not a regional urban center in the Palestinian hinterland. Rather, it is important to note that business entrepreneurship as an everyday spatial practice was instrumental in the gradual transformation of Ramallah from a village to a town of regional importance to the most important political, cultural and economic hub of the West Bank. According to Taraki and Giacaman,

> "[t]he first expansion of Ramallah into a town occurred in the early part of the twentieth century, with the dramatic increase in emigration to the Americas. Gradually, remittances from abroad began to change the face of the town, as émigrés began to invest in building residences and establishing community institutions, businesses, and services. Ramallah became a service and commercial center for the region" (2006: 21).

Furthermore, the *nakba* of 1948 significantly catalyzed Ramallah's urban transformation as many middle-class Christian refugees with a background in trade and commerce settled in Ramallah and, as opposed to peasant refugees who were primarily located in camps, became integrated into the local society. In addition, after 1967 the Israeli occupation and the concomitant annexation of Jerusalem contributed to Ramallah's status as an urban center (Taraki/Giacaman 2006: 22–25). As a result, "the town had accumulated enough cultural capital as a site of modernity and diversity to later become the seat of Palestinian politics and an important node in the national economy" (Taraki/Giacaman 2006: 26). Hence, the historical evolution of Ramallah's urban morphology clearly shows that Ramallah had acquired the features of a modern and cosmopolitan urban center already before the establishment of the PA in 1994 (see Taraki 2008a). At the same time, however, the Oslo accords also had a considerable impact on the urban space of Ramallah leading to a substantial increase in construction that changed the outlook of the city as a whole (Taraki 2008a). Accordingly, "[t]he optimistic political atmosphere surrounding the Oslo agreements and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) encouraged local and

[89] There is some disagreement about the historic and contemporary differences of urbanization patterns between Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron. While Taraki and Giacaman (2006) argue that the three cities differ fundamentally, Ramallah being the most open and modernized one, Hebron the most conservative and Nablus in between, Maya Rosenfeld (2008) as well as Thomas Malsch and Hilke Rebenstorf (2014) disagree and reject such a dichotomous distinction between the three cities. Rather, they point to a much more ambiguous and heterogeneous relationship of urbanization patterns.

expatriate entrepreneurs to invest in construction and to launch businesses" (Taraki/Giacaman 2006: 26).

The influx of returnees was particularly beneficial to Ramallah which became the seat of PA government institutions and attracted many of the Palestinian returnees, a considerable number of them having lived in the US. In this sense, "[c]hain migration and 'oscillating migration' between different countries and Palestine has provided Ramallah with various influences from outside as well as with money from migrants in many countries" (Hammer 2005: 141–142). As a result, the Oslo process set free an entrepreneurial spirit to which particularly Ramallah has become exposed. While returnees, from Arab countries on the one hand and from North America and Europe on the other can be regarded as a driving force for this economic development, it needs to be seen in the overarching context of the Oslo process. Accordingly, while being constrained by the Israeli occupation on the one hand and corruption and nepotism in Palestinian institutions on the other, both the PA as well as the donor community had an interest in promoting an environment that is beneficial for business development (Khalidi/Samour 2011; Lagerquist 2003).

At the same time, especially during the second intifada but also subsequently, closures have been a common tactic employed by the Israeli military to inhibit the freedom of movement of the Palestinian population in the West Bank. Therefore, as Taraki argues, the Israeli closure regime has contributed to a situation where Ramallah has become partially disconnected from its surrounding rural areas – as well as from Jerusalem – not only spatially but also regarding the differing life styles, leading to a 'metropolitan localism' (Taraki 2008a: 6) in Ramallah. Even though this 'enclavization' (ibid.) of Ramallah clearly has an impact on the social production of space, it is important not to ignore persisting patterns of exchange between Ramallah and the rest of the West Bank. In this context, it is useful to account for what Christopher Harker terms 'ordinary topologies' (Harker 2014b) in order to make sense of everyday spatial practices and their impact on the urban morphology of Ramallah. As an example, Harker refers to the neighborhood of Umm al-Shara'et in Ramallah to which many people moved from other parts of the West Bank in order to work in Ramallah. A characteristic feature of this neighborhood are its high residential

apartment buildings into which many of these people moved. Despite having moved to Ramallah for job-related reasons, however, these residents are not as disconnected from the rest of the West Bank as comparisons of Ramallah with a bubble, or enclave might suggest. As Harker shows, many residents of Umm al-Shara'et regularly return to their home towns in the West Bank to visit their families over the weekends by shared taxis (Harker 2014b: 328–330; see also Harker et al. 2014). As a result, the everyday practice of family visits clearly works against trends of disconnection between Ramallah and the rest of the West Bank.

In spite of the urban development of Ramallah, however, it is a city of contradictions and ambiguity. As Nasser Abourahme notes:

> "Tethered between indirect colonial occupation and the restless mobilization of local urbanity, between encampment and the haphazard expansion of its urban fabric, it uneasily nestles in a distinctly liminal space - neither directly occupied nor free, besieged but somehow vibrant, neither the capital city of an emergent state nor just another squeezed and battered Palestinian town, rife with new social contradictions but still tentatively held together by a kind of residual 'national' solidarity, not really 'inside' but definitely not 'outside'" (2009: 501).

These insights are a reminder of the fact that the urban development of Ramallah and the related economic growth lack a sustainable basis. For example, as a downside of the construction boom, many apartment blocks remain unfinished or empty as the increase in construction does not necessarily correspond to consumer demands, thereby resulting in 'ghost neighborhoods' (Abourahme 2009: 503–504). This can lead to the impression that "[t]he dream of the nation was 'realized' through investment, mostly in real estate" (Bulle 2009: 26). In this context, the Palestinian-American business consultant Sam Bahour warns about 'Palestine's economic hallucination' (Bahour 2012: 8) and therefore is among the advocates for a Palestinian development agenda that is less dependent on external donor aid (Tartir et al. 2012). As a result, on the one hand, it is crucial not to ignore the wider context of the occupation into which the punctual development of areas such as Ramallah is embedded. On the other hand, it needs to be taken into account that the economic boom of Ramallah is also accompanied by problems, such as PA household deficits and debt driven by private consumption, making many observers associating these developments with a bubble (Harker 2014a; Hass 2012; Rabie 2013), referring to a general 'Ramallah Bubble' (Rubin 2013), a 'real estate bubble' (Hattem 2014), a 'financial

bubble' (Naylor 2012a) or an 'economic-peace bubble' (Khalidi/Samour 2011: 8).

As opposed to cities in which public authorities devise top-down master plans, the urban development of Ramallah is a project of private business entrepreneurship and in this, clearly an expression of a "new globalized and modernist urban middle-class ethos" (Taraki 2008b: 62). In this sense, in the case of Palestine, "public space is not the result of the actions of the state, but is a product of a cultural and economic sphere, largely independent of the (non-existent) state" (Bulle 2009: 27). It follows that the urban development of Ramallah resulted from self-technological spatial practices of Palestinian business entrepreneurs. This entrepreneurial spirit needs to be seen in the context of inaction of the PA regarding the provision of public services. The change of the urban outlook originating from business entrepreneurship becomes clearly visible in Ramallah. Therefore,

> "[a]s residents of the town reclaimed public space, new spaces (mostly commercialized) were created to accommodate the new thirst for urban pleasures. Internet cafés sprang up, new hotels and restaurants were established, several swimming pools were opened, a number of upscale and more modest fitness centers were set up, and even a disco was allowed to operate" (Taraki 2008b: 71).

That the role of Palestinian entrepreneurship is not limited to the spatial development of Ramallah is also evident in a statement of a former PA official. Hence, as former Minister of Planning (2007-2009), Samir Abdullah Ali clarifies, the PA was well aware of the importance of private sector development for the overall economy.[90]

As a result, the entrepreneurial spirit has fundamentally changed Ramallah's urban and socio-economic fabric. Business entrepreneurship represents a self-technological practice of everyday life that plays an important role for the establishment of societal order in Palestine.

[90] Author interview with Samir Abdullah Ali, Ramallah, 1 November 2011.

Urban Development from Scratch: Business Entrepreneurship in Rawabi

Located about nine kilometers north of Ramallah, Rawabi is advertised as the first ever systematically planned Palestinian city[91] and, according to its developers, with a total investment of 1 billion US-Dollars "the largest private sector undertaking in Palestinian history."[92] As such, and especially due to the lack of involvement of the PA, Rawabi therefore represents a particular example of business entrepreneurship in relation to everyday spatial practices in Palestine. Primarily directed at the Palestinian middle class, with over 600 apartments already sold in mid of 2015, Rawabi is supposed to be the home for up to 40,000 residents and should include shopping malls, an amphitheater, schools, cafés, cinemas as well as a church and a mosque. Apartments are advertised for 60,000 to 200,000 US-Dollars, thus being out of reach for large parts of the Palestinian population and only attracting middle-class customers. At the same time, however, these prices lie below those of booming Ramallah (Kershner 2014; Lowe 2014; Schienberg 2014; Sherwood 2013). After years of delay, primarily due to a refusal of Israeli authorities to provide Rawabi with water supply, in early September 2015, the first 640 families moved into their new apartments (Shuttleworth 2015).

There is a fundamental difference between urbanization patterns of Rawabi and other Palestinian cities. Whereas other cities are characterized by a centuries-old history of growth, change and development, Rawabi is a city by design. Ramallah is often associated with a lack of space, with crowdedness and congestion. (For a problematization of the lack of an outline plan see Abu Helu 2012; Khamaisi 2006; Khatib 2014). By contrast, the developers of Rawabi portray the city as an explicit alternative equipped with open spaces, order and calmness (Sherwood 2013). This is also evident in the fact that the planners stress that, in contrast to most Palestinian housing units, and as an attempt to present Rawabi as a 'modern city', buildings in Rawabi will not have any of the black rooftop water tanks which are associated with traditionalism and backwardness (Rawabi 2013b).[93] In

[91] There are some interesting parallels between the development of Rawabi and the creation of Tel Aviv as a distinctively modern project. For the latter see LeVine (2005).

[92] Official Rawabi website, http://www.rawabi.ps/about.php.

[93] Note that the black rooftop water tanks originally were a typical identification feature of Palestinian houses. This, however, is not any more the case because Palestinians have also started using white water tanks that had been associated with Israeli houses.

addition, the prospect of living without being reminded of the occupation might appeal to some potential buyers.

Built on a hilltop in a fortress-like structure, Rawabi bears striking resemblance to Israeli settlements and thereby can be seen as an attempt to inverse the hierarchical spatial relationship in which the occupier is located on the hills and the occupied in the valleys. In this sense, the construction of Rawabi can be seen as a contestation of what Eyal Weizman describes as the 'politics of verticality' (2007: 12–16). The project is confronted with accusations of normalization and depoliticization since on the one hand the planners of Rawabi try to make the occupation invisible (Melhem 2014), yet on the other hand, the whole project is dependent on the consent of the Israeli occupation authorities (see e.g. Yehya 2012). In particular, besides ongoing problems with the approval of access roads, it was a 'political battle' (Peri 2015) until Israel gave permission for water supply in Rawabi in March 2015 (Doucet/McMullen 2015).

The main driving force behind Rawabi is the Palestinian business entrepreneur and multi-millionaire Bashar Masri who returned to Palestine in the early 1990s attracted by the post-Oslo euphoria (Schienberg 2014). Jointly with Qatari investors he initiated Rawabi in 2008 and runs the project as founder and director of Bayti Real Estate Investment Company that is in charge of the realization of the project. While the profit orientation of the project is evident, Rawabi is also marketed as being part of the Palestinian nation-building project. In this regard, Masri rejects the accusation of normalization and instead highlights that:

> "Statehood is at the heart of the issue. (…) It is my duty to build my nation. The creation of a new way of living for the Palestinian people won't make them forget the occupation – but at least they can live a better life in their own homes, in their own community" (quoted in Holmes 2011).

The notion of state-building is also expressed by Amir Dajani who is Deputy Managing Director at Bayti Real Estate Investment Company. According to him, Rawabi will not only create 3,000 to 5,000 permanent jobs but also 8,000 to 10,000 construction jobs. Rawabi also represents a new housing destination in Palestine and thereby responds to the need for affordable housing. All this,

Dajani states, "contributes to the vision of state-building."[94] Furthermore, Masri displays an internalization of the responsibilized self when he states that "[i]t's our responsibility as citizens to help build a model state from scratch" (quoted in Schienberg 2014). Accordingly, instead of referring to the PA he makes clear that Palestinians need to become active themselves in order to change their situation. Therefore, Masri goes on, "Palestinians need to push ahead despite the occupation and help develop our society, economy, and democracy" (quoted in Schienberg 2014). The connection between state-building and business entrepreneurship is not only established by Masri but by politicians themselves. For instance, according to Mustafa Barghouti, member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and head of the political party Palestinian National Initiative, "Rawabi is a testament to steadfastness and determination of Palestinians. (…) It is truly a modern city we have created ourselves, and it speaks to our readiness as a nation for statehood" (Rawabi 2013a: 9).

In any event, Rawabi is an example of self-technological everyday spatial practices related to Palestinian business entrepreneurship. Given that Rawabi allows Palestinians to maintain a presence in the occupied territories, it contributes to the societal and political order of Palestine. The cases of Ramallah and Rawabi show that urban development is based on modern subjectivity which relies on the autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization of the self. After the focus on business entrepreneurship the following section will address patterns of everyday spatial practices in the context of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank.

The Social Production of Space in Palestinian Refugee Camps

While Palestinian business entrepreneurship in the context of Ramallah and Rawabi has only implicitly addressed the contribution of the modern individual to the social production of Palestinian space, the case of refugee camps explicitly shows how refugees contribute to the social order of the camps. This topic was chosen because the social order of the camps can only be explained in relation to the role of everyday spatial practices of refugee camp residents. As the refugee community represents a substantial part of the Palestinian population, the camps

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[94] Personal Correspondence with Amir Dajani, Deputy Managing Director at Bayti Real Estate Investment Company. 27/06/2015.

represent an important instance in which the social order of Palestine is generated.

Following Lefebvre, it will become evident that there is an important difference between how the camp space was originally conceived and how it becomes 'lived space' through the refugees' self-technological everyday practices. With regard to the constitution of the conceived camp space, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) plays a central role. Accordingly, there is good reason to consider UNRWA as the supreme governance authority of Palestinian refugee camps. For example, UNRWA provides health care for the refugee population, runs schools and is an important employer for Palestinian refugees. According to Robert Bowker, UNRWA therefore can be equated with "a quasi-state institution whose responsibilities extended to areas of education, health, and social services that would otherwise be handled by national governments" (Bowker 2003: 130). As a result, UNRWA is equipped with the capacity "to act virtually as a state within a state" (Bowker 2003: 147). For Sari Hanafi, therefore, UNRWA is more than an agency that provides services to the refugees because it qualifies as a 'phantom sovereign' (2014). While the importance of UNRWA cannot be denied, it is by no means the exclusive force that is involved in the establishment of social order in refugee camps. Rather, depending on the respective host country and the respective camp, a variety of actors is involved in governing the camps. While in Syria before the civil war that broke out in 2011 and in Jordan state authorities exercise close control over the camps, refugees in Lebanon and the occupied territories possess greater possibilities for self-governance (Hanafi 2010). The focus of this chapter is on these possibilities for refugee self-governance. To be more precise, I am interested in the ways in which Palestinian refugees contribute to the social order of the camps by means of technologies of the self related to everyday spatial practices.

The issue of Palestinian refugees, and thereby also refugee subjectivity, has primarily been addressed in three ways in academic literature and political practice: First, refugees are treated and perceived as passive recipients of humanitarian aid distributed through UNRWA. Second, the question of the right of return of Palestinian refugees is a recurrent point of contention in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Third, Palestinian refugee camps are considered

as centers of both armed and popular resistance against the Israeli occupation. Accordingly, the first two cases reduce refugee subjectivity to passive objects while the third one only portrays a very narrow understanding of active refugee subjectivity. In any event, these representations of refugee subjectivity fail in addressing the importance of refugee subjectivity beyond a passive object of aid reception or diplomatic negotiation on the one hand and active resistance on the other. In this sense, I will show that in order to comprehend the power dynamics of refugee camps it is necessary to go beyond these established perceptions. I will highlight potentials for refugee agency in the context of self-technological everyday spatial practices in refugee camps. These spatial practices, I argue, fundamentally impact the lived camp space and thereby are constitutive for social order of the camps.

While refugee camps in general are regarded as sites of humanitarianism and temporariness, this is less the case in the context of Palestine. This can be seen with regard to UNRWA, whose role has shifted from short-term relief works to long-term human development objectives (see e.g. Hanafi et al. 2014; Rosenfeld 2009). Even though this change has been met with some opposition from the refugee community due to fears of losing their entitlement to the right of return, clearly the camps no longer serve as temporary shelters but rather as preliminary permanent neighborhoods with related infrastructures.

The emergence of tangible bottom-up agency emanating from the camps can be related to the experience of the first intifada on the one hand, and to the conclusion of the Oslo Accords on the other. The first intifada provided the Palestinian population in the occupied territories within and beyond the camps with a sense of social solidarity and cohesion from below (see e.g. Hiltermann 1993; King 2007) that has endured after the uprising itself. At the same time, the Oslo Accords and the subsequent establishment of the PA had three major implications for the refugees. First, on a diplomatic level, the Oslo Accords signaled to the refugees that the PLO is willing to postpone negotiating the right of return as long as Israel allows for partial self-administration. From the perspective of the refugees, this perception resulted in a contestation of the PA's authority and legitimacy over the camps. This can be witnessed, for instance, in the refugees' refusal to participate in municipal elections (see e.g. Bowker 2003:

41). Second, with the Oslo Accords the PA took over responsibilities from the Israeli army regarding the day-to-day management of the Palestinian population. As a consequence, at least potentially, this allowed for fewer direct confrontation between occupation forces and camp residents. Third, and related to the questioning of the PA's legitimacy, in contrast to the non-refugee population, the PA displayed a policy of neglect towards the refugees.

Taken together therefore, the experience of the first intifada and the consequences of the Oslo Accords created a political opportunity for the refugee population in which they could take over responsibilities for the social order of the camps (see Sayigh 2006: 136–137). In other words, the refugees had the chance to utilize technologies of the self, related to modern subjectivities based on responsibilization, autonomization and entrepreneurialization in order to affect the social order of the camp. In this sense, I argue that technologies of the self are crucial to understand how the social order of refugee camps as an instance of social order in Palestine is generated. In many respects, these technologies of the self are crucially interlinked with the space of the camp. Accordingly, I will examine the impact of refugees' everyday spatial practices on the camp and its social order.

The Importance of Camp Committees for Refugee Self-Governance

In this context, it is important to take into consideration local (or popular) committees as one of the clearest examples of refugee agency and self-governance. While the formal international legal responsibility for the refugee camps lies in the hands of UNRWA, the camp residents manage their daily lives to a considerable degree on their own, in coordination with UNRWA (see Bowker 2003). In the refugee camps of the West Bank, local camp committees play a key role. Originating from the popular committees of the first intifada, these committees were established in the 1990s by the initiative of camp residents and are composed of approximately 10 to 15 members who are anchored firmly in the camp community.[95] Before and during the first intifada, youth centers played an important role in the context of refugee self-governance and agency. These youth centers were originally established already in the early

[95] Author interview with UNRWA staff, Jerusalem, 5 September 2012.

1950s by UNRWA. When it turned out, however, that they became a hub for political mobilization against the Israeli occupation in the context of the first intifada, in 1988 UNRWA cut its ties from the youth centers (Misselwitz 2009: 251–253, 255). While most youth centers have been replaced by more comprehensive local committees after the first intifada, the youth center of Amari camp in Ramallah remains very active and is engaged in many activities that in other camps would be managed by the camp committee. As a consequence, the local committee in Amari remains comparatively weak. In general, the influence of local committees on camp affairs varies from camp to camp (Misselwitz 2009: 254–263).

Basically, camp committees are charged with three major tasks. First, they represent the camp population and their right of return externally and deal with UNRWA and the PLO. There are different modes of representation according to which the camp committees are composed in the West Bank. In few cases are the committee members elected, rather most often they are respected representatives of the predominant political factions of the camps who have earned their credentials in the Palestinian national struggle (Hanafi 2010: 11). Due to the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) wanted to exert some leverage over the camp committees, in 1996 the PLO established the Department of Refugee Affairs (DORA), thereby coopting the local committees to a certain extent. DORA is responsible for dealing with refugee affairs and, at the same time, plays a certain role in the coordination between camp committees and UNRWA (Hanafi 2010: 9–10). For instance, DORA asks the local committees in the camps for their priority of projects, tries to raise funding and supports the realization of the projects.[96]

The committees' relationship with UNRWA is a mixed one. On the one hand, UNRWA is accepted as a provider of services. UNRWA also sees the committees as an important partner: "We believe that the local committees are the best partners to implement projects in the camps. We want to create a sense of ownership."[97] On the other hand, tensions often arise, for instance, when UNRWA is being perceived as reducing services for refugees. According to one

[96] Author interview with staff of the PLO Department of Refugee Affairs, Ramallah, 10 September 2012.
[97] Author interview with Sandi Hilal, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.

interviewed UNRWA official, "the camp committees are strong enough to close down our offices in the camps if there is disagreement."[98] Also in this context, it is evident that "the popular committees in the camps remain (…) major sources of popular mobilization" (Hammami et al. 2001: 33).

Second, camp committees are involved in providing public services to the camp community and thereby affect how the conceived space of the camp transforms into lived space. In this regard, it is also worth mentioning that members of local committees often head NGOs that are active in the camps. As one member of the Am'ari refugee camp local committee puts it, "the local committee is like a municipality for a city."[99] The local committees are involved in infrastructure improvement projects, youth activities, or they support the poorest members of the camp community.[100] For example, "the local committee sees how to fix a broken road or a damaged house."[101] In this regard, Sandi Hilal, UNRWA head of Camp Improvement Program in the West Bank 2008 – 2012, points out that "the local committees realized that they will only gain legitimacy by providing services to the community."[102] At the same time, members of the local committees, who are often but not necessarily affiliated to political factions, express a sense of responsibility for the local community and the awareness that they need to take their fate into their own hands. One member of the local committee of Jalazone camp north of Ramallah expresses this position in a personal interview: "We thought that if we don't help our people, who will help them? We love to help our people. We are happy when children smile. We feel that it is our duty to do so."[103] This perspective is also shared by a member of the local committee of Qalandiya refugee camp: "I love to volunteer to help the population. It is in my blood."[104]

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[98] Author interview with UNRWA staff, Jerusalem, 05 September 2012.
[99] Author interview with members of Am'ari Local Committee, Am'ari Refugee Camp, West Bank, 20 September 2012.
[100] Author interview with members of Jalazone Local Committee, Jalazone Refugee Camp, West Bank, 27 September 2012.
[101] Author interview with members of Am'ari Local Committee, Am'ari Refugee Camp, West Bank, 20 September 2012.
[102] Author interview with Sandi Hilal, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.
[103] Author interview with members of Jalazone Local Committee, Jalazone Refugee Camp, West Bank, 27 September 2012.
[104] Author interview with member of Qalandiya Local Committee, Qalandiya Refugee Camp, West Bank, 27 September 2012.

Third, the local committees serve as a mediator in the case of disputes and also provide for security (see Misselwitz 2009: 256). As a member of the local committee of Jalazone refugee camp clarifies:

> "The camp is very crowded. Such a situation can create problems between people. We are not exactly playing the role of the police, but we have a special committee to solve problems in the community. Most probably, they are solved in [the building of the local committee]. In cases of violent crime or theft we coordinate with the [PA] police. When we identify a thief, we bring him to the PA police. In legal problems, we deal with the police directly. But if you have problems between neighbors, we solve it here."[105]

The PA security forces rarely interfere into the internal affairs of the camps. As many camps of the West Bank are located in Area C, the PA does not possess any formal authority over them. The Shuafat refugee camp, in this regard, is a particular case. As the only refugee camp that is located within the Israeli municipal boundaries of Jerusalem the PA has neither de jure nor de facto jurisdiction over the camp. At the same time, Israeli authorities do not feel responsible for what is going on in Shuafat and thus have erected a concrete barrier around the camp and the surrounding neighborhood, thereby sealing it off it from the rest of Jerusalem. The access to and from Shuafat is controlled through a border-like terminal (B'Tselem 2006: 20; Bulle 2009; Friedman 2006; Thiry/Schlotterbeck 2012). This situation not only negatively impacts the camp infrastructure, but it also challenges the social order of the camp in terms of public security. In this context, according to an UNRWA official, cooperation with the camp committee can be crucial: "The PA is unable and Israel is unwilling to deal with security issues. In this regard we try to involve the local community. The committee is approached when there are internal conflicts."[106]

As a result, the camp committee's mandate is a mixture of representing the camp community, in coordination with UNRWA, providing services for it, and settling disputes: "They are the equivalent of municipal administrations and are, among other things, responsible for the water and electricity supply, garbage collection, for the settling of conflicts between camp residents, and for dealing with external authorities" (Hanafi 2010: 10). According to Misselwitz and Hanafi, therefore, "[t]he popular committees (…) stand out as the most important local governing

[105] Author interview with members of Jalazone Local Committee, Jalazone Refugee Camp, West Bank, 27 September 2012.

[106] Author interview with UNRWA staff, Shuafat Refugee Camp, 05 September 2012.

body in Lebanon and the OPT" (Misselwitz/Hanafi 2009: 376). Accordingly, I argue that camp committees are an important mechanism through which Palestinian refugees organize their daily lives. Even more so, the camp committees are a vital element of the exercise of technologies of the self of Palestinian refugees thereby contributing to the social order of the camp.

The Everyday Production of Space in Refugee Camps

The social order of Palestinian refugee camps is determined by multiple dimensions of spatiality and temporality as well as the way in which conceived spaces are interpreted and lived through everyday practices. For example, in many cases, camp quarters are named after the original home villages of the refugees.[107] Thereby, "[t]he space of the camps reterritorialized Palestinian villages" (Peteet 2005a: 111).[108] Due to considerable changes of social life, however, for instance regarding the relationship between public and private spaces, this was only a "fragmented geosocial reconstitution" (Peteet 2005a: 111). At the same time, on a temporal dimension, this was also an attempt to transform the history of Palestinian home villages into the present of camp life and keep the memory alive. In addition, UNRWA's infrastructure and the influence of political factions have an impact on the social space of refugee camps (see Peteet 2005a: 136).

When it comes to an analysis of Palestinian refugee camps, studies with an exclusive focus on service provision often tend to address mechanisms of disciplinary power and control of refugees by UNRWA in the tradition of Giorgo Agamben. For instance, Sari Hanafi and Taylor Long focus on the impact on the state of exception on refugees' everyday lives (Hanafi/Long 2010), and Hanafi describes refugee camps as 'disciplinary spaces' (Hanafi 2008). Similarly, while being aware of the ambiguous nature of refugee subjectivity and the importance of camp space, Peteet stresses that UNRWA's operations have penetrated the refugee body in a way that has yielded "docile recipients of food aid" (Peteet 2005a: 76). Clearly, analyses with such a focus are important in

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[107] Note, however, that the identification with these camp quarters seems to have decreased – something which can be related to the increasing urbanization of the camps (Misselwitz 2009: 278–283).

[108] For a detailed analysis of the importance of naming in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see Peteet (2005b).

elucidating disciplinary elements of refugee camp governance. In particular, it is reasonable to argue that the United Nations has contributed to the emergence of a specific kind of globally pervasive refugee subjectivity. According to Liisa Malkki, therefore, the result of the modern refugee regime that has emerged since the second half of the 20th century, "was to depoliticize the refugee category and to construct in that depoliticized space an ahistorical, universal humanitarian subject" (Malkki 1996, quoted in Peteet 2005a). At the same time, however, even though it is evident that refugees are subject to various technologies of control, such a perspective tends to privilege repressive elements of power over its productive side. In this sense, refugee subjectivity is portrayed as being produced by space. The fact that refugees themselves are involved in the production of space through their everyday practices is rather ignored. As a result, such contributions risk neglecting the potential of refugee agency and thus reduce their role to that of passive aid recipients. In contrast to this, in accordance with Foucault's conception of power, it can be argued that "[n]o monopoly of control exists, local and negotiated formations of power interact with the various suzerains to regulate and administer the space. This creates agentic possibility" (Abourahme/Hilal 2009: 10–11; see Sanyal 2014).

What distinguishes the everyday spatial practices in refugee camps from many other contexts is that these forms of self-technological space appropriation function from below, without a master plan. Hence, following the Palestinian architect and anthropologist Khaldun Bshara, these acts of transforming conceived space into lived space can be termed as

> "*micro-sophisticated-spatial processes* because they are locally and historically contextualized, technically complicated, socially invested with meanings and symbols, and lengthily negotiated within, and take into consideration, a broad web of relations" (Bshara 2012: 27, emphasis in the original).

In this sense, self-technological everyday spatial practices that refugees exercise have an important impact on the camp space. Nasser Abourahme and Sandi Hilal in this context refer to 'self-urbanization', denoting changes of the camp's space emanating from the refugee community. For instance, refugees often extend their houses by adding another floor on top or are involved in infrastructure related projects: "[R]efugees have had to construct many of their own houses, pave their own roads, organize and deliver most of their basic

services, upgrade and maintain their own infrastructure, and build and run their own institutions and recreational venues" (Abourahme/Hilal 2009: 13). In this regard, Abourahme and Hilal observe a rethinking of refugees' entitlements and their everyday lives. According to them, refugees manage to separate their political and legal claims of refugeehood from their socio-economic situation by "explicitly linking urban improvement to the creation of new political space for agency" (Abourahme/Hilal 2009: 16). Similarly, Sylvaine Bulle stresses that

> "[e]nclosed Palestinians, especially in the case of refugees, seem to distinguish between the order of representation, where collective duties and norms such as resistance, nationalism, and the right of return are placed, and the order of affect which includes privacy, individual choice and self realization" (Bulle 2009: 27).

In addition, in Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem it is possible to witness a particular case of self-technological space appropriation exercised by the refugee community. Beginning in the 1980s, the refugees expanded the formally fixed boundaries of the camp to the north into the directly adjacent area – now known as Doha. Since then Doha has grown to approximately 20,000 inhabitants of which about 70 percent are refugees, which earned Doha the title 'refugee city' (Abourahme/Hilal 2009: 23). Originally that area belonged the municipality of Beit Jala. In order not to lose the Christian character of Beit Jala, however, its municipality decided to redraw the municipal boundaries to exclude the newly established neighborhood. At the same time, UNRWA rejected any responsibility for Doha. As a result, in order to ensure the provision of public services, residents of Doha decided to create their own municipality instead of being incorporated into the municipality of Bethlehem (see Misselwitz 2009: 240). Therefore, instead of abstaining from municipal politics as is regularly the case in refugee camps in the occupied territories, Doha represents a special case in which refugees decided to actively engage in their own affairs without the patronage of UNRWA or another political body. Abourahme therefore correctly states that "[t]he camp had literally spilled over into municipal politics. It also spilled past the inside/outside demarcation between camp and city" (Abourahme 2014: 12). This example of a self-technological space appropriation bears striking resemblance with what Asef Bayat has termed the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' referring "to noncollective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of

their lives (...) in a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion" (Bayat 2010: 45). Accordingly, the refugee-driven camp expansion over its official boundaries serves as an example for active refugee agency through everyday spatial practices that result in the appropriation of new social and infrastructural spaces.

UNRWA's Camp Improvement Program

In 2006 UNRWA's newly established 'Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department' initiated a pilot project for the development and improvement of Palestinian refugee camps that was conducted in cooperation with the Department of Urban Design of the University of Stuttgart. This pilot project, conducted in the West Bank camp Fawwar near Hebron, resulted in the institutionalization of a Camp Improvement Program which aims at involving the camp community into the process of redesigning their space of living on a participatory basis (Misselwitz 2010).[109] This approach was novel due to several reasons. First: "Strategic planning had remained untested in the context of refugee camps worldwide and therefore included many legal, administrative, political and practical uncertainties" (Misselwitz 2010: 84). Second, the program is characterized by strong bottom-up elements. Thus, by emphasizing refugee ownership and participatory planning, the program intends to generate acceptance of the refugee community on the one hand and contribute to the camp residents' empowerment and responsibilization on the other.

The Camp Improvement Program needs to be understood in the context of a paradigm shift regarding UNRWA's approach away from basic humanitarian relief works towards a more development-focused perspective. The main reason for this paradigm shift lies in the need to respond to the dire living conditions in Palestinian refugee camps that are characterized by extreme density, small housing units, narrow roads, lack of public and green spaces and an underdeveloped infrastructure (see Rueff/Viaro 2009). A member of the Qalandiya refugee camp local committee compared the situation in the camp with an 'animal farm,' pointing out that "we cannot see the sun because the houses are so close to one another."[110] This insight is mirrored in the report of

[109] For a detailed account of the initial set up of the camp improvement program see Misselwitz (2009: 329–400).
[110] Author interview with member of Qalandiya Local Committee, Qalandiya Refugee Camp, West Bank, 27 September 2012.

the UNRWA Geneva Conference of 2004 which distinguishes between the (political) right of return and the (social) right to improved living conditions. In this sense, UNRWA stressed that the development of the refugee camps does not contradict the refugees' right of return and therefore does not lead to a normalization of the refugee issue (UNRWA 2004).[111]

In addition, according to Sandi Hilal as a result of the first intifada, "UNRWA has faced a very empowered refugee community."[112] In this sense, the Camp Improvement Program can also be seen as an attempt to deal with this powerful refugee community that expresses demands that go beyond mere relief work. Underlying this is therefore a transformation of refugee subjectivity. As Sandi Hilal puts it, from the perspective of UNRWA therefore, "[W]e cannot any more deal with refugees as subjects of relief."[113]

The fear of normalization also relates to the naming of the Camp Improvement Program which originally was supposed to bear the title 'Camp Development Program'. Refugees, however, rejected the term 'development' because they perceive it as potentially leading to normalization and thereby endangering their refugee status.[114] Closely related, from the outset, the Camp Improvement Program was confronted with a particular challenge, embodied in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust: "In its top-down approach to delivering services, UNRWA had developed an *institutional arrogance* not recognizing the local community as partners in developing solutions, but instead, keeping locals at arm's length (…)" (Misselwitz/Hanafi 2009: 380). As a result, the camp improvement program allows for a redefinition of the relationship between UNRWA and the refugee community and thereby contributes to the empowerment of the latter. According to Muna Budeiri, who serves as deputy director of UNRWA's Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department, "the engagement of the community is important for the sustainability of the project."[115] UNRWA has become aware of this need to develop the camp space from below. As Budeiri puts it: "The only hope lies in an approach that locates the refugees at the heart

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[111] This paradigm shift is further spelled out in UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy 2010-2015, see UNRWA (2009).
[112] Author interview with Sandi Hilal, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Author interview with Gudrun Kramer, Ramallah, 6 September 2012.
[115] Author interview with Muna Budeiri, 17 June 2015.

of decision-making" (Budeiri 2014: 193). To sum it up, according to her (Budeiri 2014: 197–198), the Camp Improvement Program is based on the following conceptual principles: the awareness that there is an interdependent relationship between quality of life and the built environment in which this life takes place; the insight that strategic urban planning is an essential tool for ameliorating the situation of the camps; utilizing both a flexible and integrated approach in recognition of the complex network of multiple relations that the camp represents; stressing community participation so that "the local community becomes the key agent of change" (Budeiri 2014: 198); a change from emergency relief to human development; and the need to take into account the socio-economic context of the refugee community. As a result, for the first time, the camp as a whole is envisioned as an integrated, multi-faceted social space. In order to realize the Camp Improvement Program, UNRWA has developed a comprehensive 'Camp Improvement Manual' with detailed instructions for how to successfully improve refugee camps. Hence, based on the experiences gained from the pilot project, the manual presents a seven-step-methodology. In a first step, it is recommended to make initial contacts and form a working group that will be involved in the subsequent steps. The second step revolves around an integrated assessment with the help of the refugees' participation. As a third step, the outcomes of the integrated needs assessment will be synthesized into an integrated diagnosis. On this basis, the fourth step deals with comprehensive planning in order to develop a camp improvement plan which results in, fifth, a detailed action plan. Subsequently, the sixth step addresses the implementation of the projects while the final and seventh step aims at ensuring the sustainability of the camp improvement (UNRWA 2012).

Furthermore, the Camp Improvement Program clearly shows that the refugee community cannot be regarded as a homogeneous group vis-à-vis UNRWA. Rather, in the context of community empowerment, it became evident that conflicts of interest and power struggles exist within the refugee population. In this regard, in an ethnographic study of the contestations around an urban space in Talbieh camp in Jordan south of Amman, Fatima Al-Nammari has shown that "[w]ithin the overcrowded camp environment, open space has immense value and thus has become a significant symbol of power" (2014: 217).

A similar situation was observable in Jenin refugee camp whose reconstruction between 2002 and 2005 can be regarded as a precursor to the Camp Improvement Program. In the course of the so-called military operation 'Defensive Shield' the Israeli army reoccupied large parts of the West Bank and destroyed large parts of the Jenin refugee camp (Weizman 2007: 201–203). When UNRWA planned the reconstruction of the camp in a community-based approach, the intention was to widen its originally narrow roads in order to counter the camp's congestion. While, from a technical perspective, widening the roads appears as an improvement of the camp's infrastructure and as contributing to the refugees' quality of life, the camp committee initially opposed this plan because it would provide the Israeli army, tanks in particular, with much better access to the camp (Weizman 2007: 204–205; Levy 2004). Eventually, however, the camp committee conceded to the plan, primarily because a stalemate in reconstruction meant that those refugees who lost their homes due to destruction would have continued to remain homeless. The reconstruction of Jenin refugee camp illustrates that UNRWA and the refugee community approach the issue of camp spatiality from different, potentially contradictory, angles. From a depoliticized technical perspective, UNRWA is eager to emphasize the advantages of widening the roads for the benefits of the refugees. By contrast, the refugee community stresses the implications of this endeavor in the context of resisting the Israeli occupation (Tabar 2012). At the same time, the case of Jenin refugee camp shows that including the camp community into the planning process does not necessarily result in the acceptance of the resulting plans.

In this context, it is important to note that the participatory, empowering approach of the Camp Improvement Program can challenge existing power structures in the camps. Hence, this potential source of conflict needs to be taken into account when realizing the program.[116] In this context, Muna Budeiri points out that the camp committees tended to reject the project's participatory approach as presented by UNRWA. The reason being was that the committees perceived themselves as appropriately representing the refugee camp community, originally rejecting the need for other forms of representation. UNRWA, however, stressed that important parts of the community are not

[116] Author interview with Gudrun Kramer, Ramallah, 6 September 2012.

represented by the camp committees, such as children or women. Therefore, UNRWA "had to struggle with the community to insist on a participatory platform that is more inclusive and representative than the engagement of a few members of the local committee."[117] Furthermore, Budeiri clarifies that the Camp Improvement Program does not intend to challenge the power structures of the camps. Rather, the attempt to change them needs to come from within the camp community. Hence, the Camp Improvement Program only provides the tools for discussing and developing new forms of representation.[118]

Campus in Camps

An illustrative example for technologies of the self that refugees exercise in a spatial context is the project Campus in Camps. The project is realized in cooperation with Al Quds University, and it allows young residents of Dheisheh camp near Bethlehem to explore new forms of representation by encouraging participants to develop their own understanding of refugees' needs and assets. In other words: "Campus in Camps explores and produces new forms of representation of camps and refugees beyond the static and traditional symbols of victimization, passivity and poverty" (Petti 2013c: 20). The architect and co-founder of the project Alessando Petti emphasizes that Campus in Camps "could not have existed without the support of the Popular Committees of Southern West Bank refugee camps" (Petti 2013a).

On the one hand, as a university within a refugee camp, Campus in Camps relates to education as a fundamental self-technological mechanism. On the other hand, the project also possesses an entrepreneurial dimension because it is directed at developing the enterprising capabilities of the self. Campus in Camps is supported by UNRWA's camp improvement program and has been set up in Dheisheh refugee camp. Participants are refugees who will eventually get a certificate from Al-Quds University which is a cooperation partner of the project.[119] According to Petti, Campus in Camps is

> "a space for communal learning and production of knowledge grounded in lived experience and connected to communities. It brings people together in a pluralistic environment where they can learn freely, honestly and enthusiastically. It reasserts

[117] Author interview with Muna Budeiri, 17 June 2015.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Author interview with Jonas Geith, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.

> what is fundamental and profound in the lives of the participants, forming an active group that chooses words, constructs meanings, and creates useful knowledge through actions within their communities" (Petti 2013a).

The project thereby was designed to create a 'protected space' within the refugee camp in which refugees can develop "new spaces of representation."[120] Hence, the project clearly has important spatial implications. Locating the campus inside of the camp is an act of space appropriation that enables the refugees to pursue their education within the space of the camp. This is also important due to the separation barrier and other obstacles, preventing residents from Bethlehem and therefore also refugees from directly accessing al Quds University's campus in the Abu Dis neighborhood of Jerusalem.

At the same time, Campus in Camps contributes to the empowerment of the refugee population in different respects. During the project's first year the participants engaged in developing a commonly shared understanding and language of the social space of the camp and the context of refugeehood. In this way, as an act of self-empowerment, refugees exercised the 'practice of naming' (Peteet 2005b) their own social and spatial environment and thereby re-acquired ownership of the camp space. A crucial element of this part of the project was the process of 'un-learning' in which the participants questioned existing terms and contested established knowledge and instead replace it with their own understanding of their social experiences and reflections.[121] Accordingly, "[p]articipants are co-authors of meanings, giving names to the reality that surrounds them in order to provide a deeper sense to what they see and experience" (Petti 2013a). For instance, Kusai, one of the participants, critically reflects on 'sustainability' which is a common term in international development cooperation: "Sustainability often ends when the related project ends. But that is not the idea of sustainability."[122] The process of un-learning resulted in the creation of a 'Collective Dictionary' that serves as a foundation for all other projects of Campus in Camps and provides contextualized bottom-up knowledge of the camp. In the 'Collective Dictionary' participants present their

[120] Author interview with Sandi Hilal, UNRWA Head of Camp Improvement Program in the West Bank, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.
[121] Author interview with Jonas Geith, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.
[122] Author interview with Kusai, Dheisheh refugee camp, Bethlehem, 4 October 2012.

own experiences and understandings of terms such as participation, responsibility, or ownership.

While the first year was dedicated to the development of self-derived as opposed to externally imposed knowledge, the second year of Campus in Camps focused on relating this knowledge to action through different initiatives and active interaction with the camp space. In particular, refugees participated in projects in which they explicitly addressed the social and infrastructural space of the camp, such a public square, the municipality of neighboring Doha or a garden. As a result: "The very existence of these common places within refugee camps suggests new spatial and social formations beyond the idea of the camp as a site of marginalization, poverty and political subjugation" (Petti 2013c: 27).

Furthermore, in a personal interview the participant Kusai reflects on the transformation of refugee subjectivity from passive recipients of public services from UNRWA to active agents of change who are capable of shaping their social environment without giving up their right of return. In this context, Kusai points out that a project on recycling and reusing "is not an aim but a tool to empower the population where waste is considered a problem." In this sense, "the core question is how to change the attitude" of the refugee community related to waste in the public spaces of the camp. "Why don't we collect waste as a community on the day when the employees of the garbage collection have their day off? (…) We need to create the awareness that each person has a value. How can we use that value for a collective concern of the community?"[123] Referring to the responsibilizing and the enterprising self, Kusai thereby makes clear that the everyday practice of reducing waste does not only have an impact on the camp space as such. In addition, this self-technological act contributes to refugee agency because the refugee community displays a sense of responsibility for the camp, independent from UNRWA or the PA. Kusai therefore highlights: "It is upon the refugees to act on their own. What are we waiting for? Who is claiming the refugees' rights? No one is doing it. Refugees should act towards these rights. We need to ask ourselves what our concerns are. It comes from within the community. How can you contribute your value?"[124]

[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.

In a similar manner, the importance of the responsibilization and entrepreneurialization of the self is also expressed by Hamza, a young refugee from Qalandiya camp who volunteers in a program called 'Youth for Change' that addresses problems related to the space of the camp such as waste pollution. One of its volunteers described the underlying rationale:

> "Very often, when there are problems in the camps, people blame the occupation. With this program, we want to address problems like the garbage in the camp. We will start volunteering with the children to clean the camp. We see the problems and try to work on it. The kids are very motivated about it. We want to make the camp beautiful."[125]

Collecting garbage thereby represents a self-technological everyday practice that is based on the responsibilized and enterprising self and that has a considerable effect on the space of the camp.

Furthermore, when reflecting on his involvement as a participant in Campus in Camps, Murad Odeh is well aware of the transformative capacities of the project and its empowering effects:

> "I feel the power of our ideas that we built through one year when we meet people and discuss with them about our work or even about the situation in general. I feel that much of responsibility that others gave us after we discuss with them, and I feel proud to help in opening a new way of representation and in creating our own Palestinian meanings and definitions" (quoted in Petti 2013b: 142).

His statement also gives evidence for the internalization of responsibilization, when he states that he "feel[s] (…) responsibility", and of entrepreneurialization in the sense that he is involved in "creating our own Palestinian meanings and definitions".

Rooftop Gardening as Refugee Self-Governance

Rooftop gardening represents a recent innovative phenomenon by which refugees contribute to the everyday spatial development of several refugee camps in the West Bank and Lebanon. Due to the lack of space for gardening and farming in densely populated and built up refugee camps, rooftop gardening allows refugees to grow their own fruits and vegetables. In terms of subjectivity, they transform from passive subjects of aid reception to active subjects who actively shape and develop their everyday life and environment. In other words,

[125] Author interview with Hamza, Qalandiya Refugee Camp, West Bank, 27 September 2012.

the everyday spatial practice of rooftop gardening equips Palestinian refugees, particularly women who primarily take care of the gardens, with active agency, and at the same time, change the space of the camp. For instance, Asmahan Ramadan, a resident of Dheisheh refugee camp in Bethlehem who grows vegetables on her rooftop, makes this clear: "I feel more empowered. (…) I grow something and I eat from my work. I'm contributing to my family and that's a good feeling."[126] A project coordinator of the local Palestinian refugee NGO Karama, which initiated the rooftop gardening project in Dheisheh camp, thereby enabling 15 families to grow vegetables, reveals the importance of empowerment in a personal correspondence with the author:

> "The idea of empowerment has a huge importance for us. We see both at the personal level, participants, mostly women, experience a great feeling of empowerment by learning skills, using their own thoughts and creativity and seeing the results from her work. The women report to be more involved in decision-making in their household, and they feel better to contribute more productively to their family's overall wellbeing. Secondly, we are working at the level of community empowerment by stressing that we as Palestinian refugees are capable of improving our condition, to be healthy and to be producers. By stressing these capabilities we can stay strong and connected as a community to work and fight together for a just solution for our future."[127]

In close relation to empowerment, it is evident that in this project, the enterprising self as a core feature of modern subjectivity clearly plays a role. Hajar Hamdan, a 60 year old Palestinian woman who grows vegetables in her rooftop garden, states:

> "We send a message with this and I hope it will spread further. We can benefit from these simple things, since we are economically damaged as Palestinians. Now at least we can produce our own vegetables. Even when a woman stays at her home, she will become a producer. And she can even develop it into something bigger. Because we dream very big."[128]

Not only is the enterprising self important in this context but also the responsibilization and the autonomization of the self. Hence, on the one hand, according to Karama, Palestinian refugees have to be masters of their own destiny and reduce dependence from donor aid: "Many of our problems come from all the conditions of this aid money, and so we teach farming to help people

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[126] Quoted in Kestler-D'Amours (2012).

[127] Author email correspondence with Karama Rooftop Gardens Project Manager, 30 April 2015.

[128] Quoted in Al Jazeera (2014).

to learn to depend on themselves."[129] In this sense, Karama stresses "the capabilities of participants and work from the beginning towards their self-reliance"[130] One of Karama's aims is therefore to contribute to the self-responsibilization and autonomization of the participating refugees: "After the micro farms are installed on the roofs, the participants are stimulated to take responsibility for the continuation of the project."[131]

On the other hand, the importance of vegetables for a healthy diet also plays a role in rooftop garden projects. For instance, the Palestinian NGO Lajee Center that realizes rooftop gardens in Aida refugee camp in Bethlehem regards the improvement of community health as one of the main goals of the project.[132] This approach is also shared by the participants themselves. In the words of Hajar Hamdan: "I do not own land. But I do want to have healthy vegetables without chemicals."[133] In other words, Hajar Hamdan refers to the fact that the modern self is responsible for its own health. This observation also shows that, following sociological neo-institutionalism, there is a globally pervasive understanding of the importance of a healthy, self-caring individual.

In addition, rooftop gardening helps preserving the Palestinian narrative of a special connectedness with the homeland that is particularly important for refugees' collective memory due to the flight or expulsion from their former homeland in the context of the *nakba* (Bowker 2003: 87–121). Since many refugees are descendants of farmers, rooftop gardening literally means going back to the roots of their ancestors and their connection to the homeland (see Rubin 2013). In this context, Abdelnour et al. therefore stress that while it has been neglected by the donor community and the PA alike, "[f]or Palestinians, agriculture is more than a source of income or an economic category in budgets and plans. It is tied to the people's history, identity, and self-expression (…)" (2012: 1). In the words of Asmahan Ramadan from Dheisheh camp: "[Rooftop gardening] gives me a connection to the land. My family was farmers and I've

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[129] Quoted in Naylor (2012b).
[130] Author email correspondence with Karama Rooftop Gardens Project Manager, 30 April 2015.
[131] Karama Rooftop Gardens Website, http://www.karama.org/eng/rooftop_farms.html.
[132] Lajee Center website: http://www.lajee.org/content/lajee%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98rooftop-gardens%E2%80%99-bloom-aida-camp, see also Karama website, http://www.karama.org/eng/rooftop_farms.html
[133] Quoted in Al Jazeera 2014.

come back to my roots. It gives me the feeling like I'm sitting in a big field. This is my big field."[134] It should also be noted that, in a similar manner, agriculture possessed a special importance for the Zionist movement that intended to 'make the desert bloom' (see George 1979). Therefore, agriculture is another case in which the mutual imitation of the Jewish Zionist and Palestinian nationalist narratives becomes evident.

The special relationship with the Palestinian homeland is therefore also mirrored in rooftop gardening as an everyday practice that impacts the lived space of the refugee camp. According to the interviewed Karama project coordinator, therefore,

> "Green spaces do greatly increase the well-being of the people living there, many participants report that they like to sit in their gardens for relaxing as well; they put chairs and spend the afternoon there chatting and sitting with their children. It makes participants, especially some of the older people reported this, feel like they are closer to the village of their families – that were left around 1948. Some even said working in the garden made them feel they had a big field, like their parents used to have. We are soon starting to build some gardens with young people, and we are curious if they are seeing the same linkages."[135]

In this context, the Karama project coordinator states that the project can "contribute to the process of *self-government*. If seen as a way of taking (more) charge of their own nutrition, their own production, their income and their own well-being then this project definitely contributes to this."[136] As a result, the rooftop gardening projects relate to the key dimensions of modern subjectivity, namely the entrepreneurialization, responsibilization and autonomization of the self. In this sense, the everyday practice of rooftop gardening represents a spatial self-technological everyday practice by which Palestinian refugees contribute to the order of the camp.

Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the importance of subjectivity for the constitution of societal order through modern governmentality. In this sense, I consider technologies of the self, together with biopolitics and surveillance, as constitutive

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[134] Quoted in Kestler-D'Amours (2012).
[135] Author email correspondence with Karama Rooftop Gardens Project Manager, 30 April 2015.
[136] Ibid, emphasis added.

dimensions of modern governmentality. While this chapter has focused on power dynamics in Palestine, as with biopolitics and surveillance, the observed technologies of the self are also of relevance for political order in other contexts of world society. Even more so, given that the self-technological everyday spatial practices that I described are embedded into an overarching world-societal horizon. As I have highlighted, there is good reason for the discipline of IR to shift the attention towards the importance of subjectivity for power dynamics in world society. In this sense, there is a need to overcome methodological nationalism not only towards the global but also the local level. As I have argued, the framework of world society encompasses both these dimensions without reifying a dichotomy between them. At the same time, there is a need to take spatiality seriously in IR. By utilizing in particular the work of Henri Lefebvre, this chapter has shown that space is socially produced and closely linked to subjectivity. The context of Palestine, in this regard, clearly shows that one can only properly make sense of the dynamics of world-societal order if modern subjectivity is taken into account. Therefore, beyond the empirical cases that have been presented, it has become evident that modern subjectivity relies on autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization as core dimensions.

Apart from the presented perspective, in the context of future research it is possible to identify self-technological everyday spatial practices that relate to resistance against the Israeli occupation. For example, the act of building without a permit – a practice which is pervasive especially in Palestinian East Jerusalem and in Area C of the West Bank – can be framed as a spatial practice that confronts the occupation. Moreover, it is also possible to frame graffiti on the separation barrier as acts of space appropriation that contest the social order of the occupation. In these contexts, it would make sense to elaborate on the conceptual relationship between power and resistance that figures prominently in the work of Foucault. On this basis, one could also explore the implications of these spatial contestations of the occupation for the concept of *sumud* which resonates both with regard to everyday life and spatiality. The linkage between *sumud,* the Arabic term for steadfastness, and subjectivity lies in the fact that *sumud* as a form of resistance against the Israeli occupation directly addresses the attitude of the individual person exercising it. For example, and here the spatial

dimension matters, a Palestinian resident of East Jerusalem who has built a house without the permission of the Israeli authorities does so in order to maintain a presence in the city. But at the same time, this individual everyday act of building can be regarded, and is often described by affected persons themselves, as *sumud*. As already stated, these fields represent avenues for future research.

7 Conclusion

This book has offered insights concerning the question how order comes into existence in Palestine and how this relates to world society as the overarching context in which power dynamics are embedded. It is one of the book's major observations that modern governmentality represents a globally diffused norm that determines how power is exercised in world society and thus also how order is generated in Palestine. Modern governmentality, in this sense, represents a constitutive pattern of political ordering in world society that is directed at governing populations based on economic rationalizations with the help of specific institutional arrangements that monitor the state of the population.

This means that in order to make sense of power dynamics in Palestine it is necessary to overcome methodological nationalism and a concomitant analytic *othering* that leads to the separation and distinction of Palestine from the rest of the world. In other words, as has been shown in Chapter 2, it is crucial to take into account that power dynamics in Palestine, as well as in other political contexts, occur in the overarching horizon of world society. Both existing Palestine studies and governmentality research often fail in taking into account this embeddedness of Palestine into world society even though – as this book has shown – there are many empirically observable examples for it. In order to theoretically make sense of this global integration of Palestine, I have suggested a synthesis of governmentality theory with the Stanford School's sociological neo-institutionalism, the compatibility of which has been clarified due to similar epistemological foundations. Accordingly, the world can be regarded as a single polity that represents the context for the power relations that occur within it. Hence, the power dynamics that are observable in Palestine need to be seen in a world societal context. In other words, the power dynamics in Palestine cannot be analyzed in isolation from the rest of the world. In other words, the world observes Palestine and Palestine observes the world. At the same time, the Stanford School's world society theory has provided governmentality with an overarching structural framework that existing approaches are lacking. This move has appeared necessary because governmentality does not exist in a structural vacuum. Moreover, Foucault himself makes use of the term society but does not provide a definition of it. It was shown that conceptually

embedding governmentality in world society also has the advantage of being able to overcome the Eurocentrism that is often concomitant with governmentality studies. In this sense, the book has highlighted the deep rootedness of governmentality as a constitutive norm of governing in world society that has globally diffused since the 19th century. Furthermore, it was clarified that relating governmentality to a world-societal context helps overcoming dichotomous analytical perspectives that often lead to simplistic inferences about global power dynamics. As a result, power dynamics are not regarded as being inside or outside a political configuration, but they are treated as being internal to world society.

In order to make sense of world-societal power dynamics in Palestine, Chapter 3 presented a genuine conceptualization of governmentality. For that purpose, I have critically discussed liberal-institutionalist governance theory and its limitations in particular given that this research perspective is not only pervasive in IR but also in Palestine studies. It was shown that governance theory suffers especially from an indifference towards power that is grounded in its technocratic, instrumental understanding of governance. In addition, the chapter has demonstrated that even though power is a central category in the discipline of IR, it largely lacks coherent conceptualizations of it. By contrast, I have introduced Foucault's specific understanding of power – as being, among other things, relational, polycentric, and productive – in order to point out that governmentality is a theory of power. On this basis, the book has presented Foucault's original understanding of governmentality before critically evaluating existing studies of governmentality. In this context, it has been made clear that IR encountered governmentality after a delay of a decade if compared to political science where it emerged already in the early 1990s. On the one hand, I have offered an 'immanent critique' of governmentality studies that focus on power relations beyond the state but remain within the framework of national societies, from which important conceptual innovations have been adopted. On the other hand, I have addressed the contributions of international/global studies of governmentality. In this regard, Chapter 3 has pointed to the limitations of a repressive reading of governmentality that neglects the importance of freedom but is instead preoccupied with repressive disciplinary forces in the international sphere. I has also been shown that this specific take on governmentality is also

predominant if applied to Palestine/Israel. Besides this repressive interpretation of governmentality, I have examined in detail the contribution of international governmentality studies that instead refer to the role of (neo-) liberalism. In this regard, I have demonstrated that these approaches differ concerning their conceptualization of the international, their assessment of liberalism, and their conceptualization of political agency. Based on this critical appraisal, I have introduced modern governmentality as a constitutive pattern of political order(ing) in world society. This conceptualization differs from existing approaches in three main aspects. First, as opposed to approaches that exclusively focus an international sphere of governmentality, my understanding of governmentality relates to potentially any power relations within world society. As a result, my conceptualization refrains from reifying dichotomies such as global/local but rather conceives of power dynamics as internal developments within world society. Second, I have rejected a preoccupation with liberalism and instead suggested using the term *modern* governmentality in order to highlight that governmentality also exist in global contexts that do not qualify as liberal. In this way, it is also possible to overcome the Eurocentric perspective of many governmentality studies. Third, with reference to political agency, contrary to governmentality studies that stress an inescapable predominance of global liberalism that makes active political agency impossible, I have argued that governmentality is unthinkable without the freedom of the individual. Accordingly, I have pointed out that governmentality relies on a specific configuration of modern subjectivity that is based on autonomization, responsibilization, and entrepreneurialization.

This conceptualization of modern governmentality has served as the foundation for the analysis of the dynamics of world-societal order in Palestine. I have suggested that biopolitics represents a core dimension of modern governmentality, and Chapter 4 has analyzed social statistics as biopolitical technologies of power. For that purpose, it has been argued that the discovery of the population and the related increase of statistical data was essential for the emergence of modern governmentality. Concerning Palestine, I have argued that the birth of Palestinian statistics can be regarded as a global phenomenon, in particular because Palestinians made use of existing knowledge about modern statistics in order to establish the PCBS. The chapter has also highlighted that

the Palestinian authorities considerably rely on statistics in order to govern the Palestinian population based on rationalized calculations with the help of apparatuses of security. As became evident, this is not only the case with the PA, but also Hamas is aware of the importance of statistical data and makes use of it. I have pointed out that the census represents the most important instrument to acquire knowledge of the population in order to govern it. In addition, the census has crucial inclusionary and exclusionary effects. With regard to inclusion, the first Palestinian census of 1997 clearly contributed to Palestinian national identity formation because it gave Palestinians the first ever opportunity to count themselves as Palestinians. At the same time, I have shown that there is a mutual contestation of demographic data in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the PCBS is confronted with attempts to politicize their data. Ultimately, on this basis I have argued that that modern statistics as biopolitical technologies of governmentality fundamentally contribute to world-societal order in Palestine.

Surveillance has been presented as a second core dimension of governmentality and focused on the surveillance of the global good governance discourse in Palestine in Chapter 5. I have argued that good governance can be considered as a technology of power that is based on benchmarking and evaluation as central mechanisms for its diffusion. I have made clear that these mechanisms are especially utilized in the context of responsibilization and legitimization so that the PA is made responsible for its progress in adhering to principles of good governance, which makes it a legitimate actor in world society. It became evident that especially the United Nations, IMF and World Bank serve as agents of good governance and contribute to its diffusion to Palestine. I have also highlighted that the diffusion of good governance does not primarily rely on coercion but that the PA voluntarily adopts its principles into its policies. As I have shown, the adherence to good governance is not limited to the PA, but also Hamas constantly refers to principles of good governance. As such, the chapter has argued that the surveillance of good governance represents an important element of modern governmentality contributing to world-societal order in Palestine.

Technologies of the self have been introduced as a third core dimension of modern governmentality in Chapter 6, and I have focused on the role of everyday spatial practices and their contribution to world-societal order in Palestine. For that purpose, I have highlighted the interdependent relationship of governmentality, power and subjectivity and referred to the importance of modern subjectivity in world society as relying on the autonomization, responsibilization and entrepreneurialization of the self. On this basis, I have pointed out that space and its social construction represent neglected aspects in governmentality research. By relying on the work of Henri Lefebvre, the chapter stressed the social production of space and, in particular, the difference between conceived and lived space. With regard to Palestine, I have examined the role of everyday spatial practices driven by business entrepreneurship in the urban development of the cities of Ramallah and Rawabi. Subsequently, it has been argued that Palestinian refugees play an important role in the social production of space in refugee camps and thus also in the constitution of world-social order in the camps.

As such, this analysis makes a contribution to Middle East/Palestine Studies on the one hand and the discipline of IR on the other. The contribution to Middle East/Palestine Studies mainly lies in making sense of the intricate power dynamics that contribute to political order in Palestine by observing them through the perspective of governmentality. At the same time, as I have pointed out, the chosen research perspective helps in overcoming the artificial Orientalist distinction between a separate Palestinian dimension and a universal global dimension of power dynamics. In this sense, order that comes into existence in Palestine needs to be considered as world-societal order. Regarding IR, the book has offered a theoretical perspective that overcomes the methodological nationalism and related dichotomous thinking that are predominant in the discipline by embedding power relations into a world-societal framework. At the same time, the suggested conceptualization of governmentality allows for a procedural understanding of power relations that goes beyond a debate about the role of structure and agency and thereby is capable of simultaneously addressing different levels of analysis. On this basis, the suggested research perspective has the potential to offer new insights into power dynamics of other world-societal contexts beyond Palestine.

Given the fact that this is a book about power and world-societal order in Palestine it makes sense to also briefly reflect on the underlying understanding of power and its relationship towards common conceptions of power in world politics. At a first glance, these two seem disparate, parallel universes. From such a perspective, one might assume that the suggested understanding of power only encompasses micro-phenomena of power that primarily materialize in everyday practices. As a result, it would seem unrelated to the common usage of power in IR, namely in the context of power politics exercised by states on world order. Instead of this, however, I would suggest that neither are micro-phenomena of power and its 'big' questions in international politics unrelated, nor is this book's research perspective incapable of making sense of them. In this regard it is noteworthy that to a certain extent, Foucauldian research and related perspectives in IR have been accused of being lofty and preoccupied with discourses and thereby inadequate to substantially examine phenomena of international politics. Fred Halliday, for example, made clear his objections towards what he describes as the "distortions of post-modernism" in IR (Halliday 1996: 323). By contrast, this book attempted to show that, as William Walters (2012: 88) has correctly pointed out, its empiricist nature is one particular strength of Foucauldian governmentality research.

Accordingly, the book's chosen perspective on power starts with micro-phenomena, but it does not end there. Rather, this perspective provides the tools for analyzing contingent configurations of power relations that can lead to institutionalized stabilizations, such as, for instance, the state. In other words, I would argue what are perceived as the 'big' questions of power rest upon a multiplicity of micro-phenomena of power relations that can be deconstructed with the help of the suggested take on power. Thereby, it is, for example, possible to identify the political technologies and rationalities upon which these big issues of power rest.

At the same time, this book tried to clarify with reference to Palestine that the chosen perspective on power as governmentality possesses great relevance regarding the constitution of political order in world society. This is of particular importance given the fact that the examined micro-phenomena of power are no less important in the political order of Palestine than seemingly more relevant

issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli occupation or the intra-Palestinian division between Fatah and Hamas. In this regard, there is an interesting parallel with the prevalent distinction in IR and political science between so-called 'high politics', such as international security, and 'low politics', such as trade or environmental protection. Since the end of the Cold War this dichotomy has become obsolete, given the fact that issues that would have been framed as low politics, such as climate change, financial crises or migration have increasingly become securitized and thereby promoted to a greater relevance, both from an analytical and a policy-making point of view.

Power in the Foucauldian sense is not limited to the sphere of formal politics. Accordingly, international politics is not limited to the state. In this sense, the book presented a more comprehensive view on power that rests upon the insight that political power can be located in various instances beyond the state and that these contribute to political order in world society.

As has been highlighted, the suggested research perspective considers certain analytical dichotomies as not particularly helpful. The distinction between international and domestic politics neglects the interconnectedness between both spheres because all power dynamics occur within world society. In this regard, I suggest that the relevance of micro-phenomena of power beyond the state and the underlying comprehensive understanding of power justifies the use of the term *world-societal order* instead simply of *world order*. As a result, one can infer from the example of Palestine that power relations, in the sense of this book, while often neglected, are of central importance to political order in world society as a whole.

In the context of the conclusion it is also appropriate to reflect on the limitations of the presented research. In this regard, one could stress that focusing on micro-phenomena could lead to a stronger emphasis of the re-iterative impact of the empirical findings on the theoretical framework. While the present study has been developed in a theory-guided manner, it is conceivable to ask what implications power dynamics in Palestine have for governmentality theory. In this sense, Palestine could be considered as a space of encounter with governmentality that leads to new implications regarding the theoretical perspective, for example in general regarding the specific interplay of

governmental, sovereign and disciplinary power. In addition, the encounter of governmentality and Palestine can help to reflect on the role of the state, because governmental power relations are pervasive in a setting in which certain features of statehood are evidently lacking. Furthermore, the study's field work was confronted with some practical limitations. A stronger focus on the Gaza Strip, including field work, would have been desirable in order to complement the insights generated in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and thereby develop a more comprehensive picture. In particular, as has been highlighted with regard to good governance and statistics, field work in the Gaza Strip would have enabled me to further examine the actual exercise of modern governmentality by Hamas. This, however, was not possible due to the tense political and security situation and difficulties of access to the Gaza Strip. In addition, as governmentality is primarily directed at the population as opposed to territoriality, a stronger focus on the Palestinian population beyond the occupied territories and how it is governed would have been interesting. This would encompass taking into account also Palestinians in Israel as well as both the refugee communities in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria and the global Palestinian diaspora.

Avenues for future research can be identified in four respects. First, a closer look at the historical foundations of modern governmentality appears promising. In this context, research could address the historical mechanisms of diffusion of modern governmentality and its resulting deep rootedness in Palestine. In the case of the Middle East in general this could mean examining in particular the impact of both Western colonialism and Ottoman modernization during the 19th century. In order to highlight the impact of the historical arrival of modern governmentality in the Middle East it would make sense to analyze the region under the label of a post-Ottoman space. Second, while the present research project has deliberately focused on the importance of modern governmentality in Palestine, it is reasonable to examine the interplay of governmentality with disciplinary and sovereign power. Such an examination would need to take into account both a theoretical and an empirical dimension. Third, it makes sense to pay even greater attention to the importance of modern subjectivity in world society. While especially Chapters 3 and 6 have dealt with the role of modern subjectivity, it seems to possess a significance that suggests doing further

conceptual and empirical research of its own into this direction, in a way that puts modern subjectivity into the center of attention. Finally, since I consider the suggested theoretical framework as being globally pervasive, it would make sense to relate modern governmentality to other political configurations or issue areas in world society.

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Appendix: List of Interviewees Including Professional Positions

Abdullah Ali, Samir: Director General of the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), PA Minister of Planning 2007-2009, Ramallah.

Abu-Libdeh, Hasan: Founding President of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1993-2005), Ramallah.

Abu-Zahra, Bader: Head of Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Palestinian Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, Ramallah.

Al Madi, Yousef: Director of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Natural Resources, Damascus.

Awad, Ola: President of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (since 2009), Ramallah.

Budeiri, Muna: UNRWA Deputy Director of Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Department, Amman.

Burchard, Matthias: UNRWA Representative to the EU, Brussels.

Geith, Jonas: Project Advisor, Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population, German Development Cooperation – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Ramallah.

Hilal, Sandi: UNRWA Head of Camp Improvement Program in the West Bank, Bethlehem.

Jarbawi, Ali: PA Minister of Planning and Administrative Development (2009-2012), Ramallah.

Khatib, Ghassan: Director of the PA Government Media Center 2009-2012, Minister of Planning 2005-2006, Ramallah.

Kock, Udo: Resident Representative of the International Monetary Fund for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (2010-2014), Jerusalem.

Kramer, Gudrun: Program Manager, Regional Social and Cultural Fund for Palestinian Refugees and Gaza Population, German Development Cooperation – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Ramallah.

Nakhleh, Khalil: Palestinian anthropologist and researcher, Ramallah.

Nasir, John: Lead Economist for the World Bank in Palestine, Jerusalem.

Pulfer, Gerhard: United Nations Development Programme, Governance Strategy Group Coordinator for the Palestinian Authority, Jerusalem and Ramallah.

Sabella, Steve: internationally renowned Palestinian artist, Berlin.

Suleiman, Munjid F.: Head of Division of Statistics, Studies and Information, PA Ministry of Education, Ramallah.

Tiltnes, Åge A.: Research Director for Middle East Studies, FAFO Research Foundation, Oslo.

Anonymous interviewees:

Am'ari Local Committee members.

Hamza, volunteer in Youth for Change Project, Qalandia refugee camp.

Jalazone Local Committee members.

Karama Rooftop Gardens Project Manager, Dheisheh refugee camp.

Kusai, particpant in the Campus in Camps Project, Dheisheh refugee camp.

PLO Department of Refugee Affairs staff, Ramallah.

Qalandiya Local Committee members.

UNRWA staff in Shuafat Refugee Camp.

UNRWA staff in Jerusalem.